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NOTES
The Operation of the Entity Concept of Partnership in
Federal Income Taxation
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade the partnership form of business has become increasingly popular due to the heavier tax burdens imposed on corporations, 1 and tax considerations 2 have, in many instances, induced a preference for the partnership, especially as against the close corporation form
of business.3 Consequently greater attention and interest has been focused
on the problems attendant upon the taxation of partnerships. 4
The partnership is not taxable as an entity, but is treated as a
computing unit, the profits and losses being allocated to the various
partners who are taxed on their distributive shares.5 This method would
seem to be consistent with the common law theory that a partnership is
a combination of co-owners operating jointly for profit. However, for
some purposes partnerships have been treated by decision or legislation
as though they were legal entities. 6
It is the object of this note to ascertain when the partnership is treated
as an entity separate from its members and when it is regarded as a
group of co-owners; to determine or suggest the reasons for the aberration from the traditional concept; and to note the income tax consequences resilting therefrom. Since it appears that the answers are not
discoverable from any general dogmas, emphasis will be placed on the
specific facts involved. Judicially undecided questions are beyond the
scope of this note, 7 and discussion will be restricted to fairly recent cases
which will be classified and treated according to the typical business transactions which they represent. The problems peculiar to the family partnership and to8 the incorporation of partnerships will not be specifically discussed herein.
1. See Klein, Selected Features of the Revenue Act of 1938, 16 TAx MAGAZINE
507, 546 (1938) ; Note, 23 MINN. L. REv. 506, 520 (1939). During the war years, the
heavy corporate taxes induced a flight to the partnership form; after the war when
rates were reduced and the excess profits taxes repealed, the shift was toward the corporate form, but with the recent reductions in individual rates it is still wise tax policy
for many enterprises to operate in the partnership form.
2. The decision to form a partnership or corporation depends upon the particular
business involved. For an anlysis of the various factors to be considered, see 3 CCH
1948 FED. TAx REp. 1 1169,016-1169,018.
3. See, e. g., Rabkin and Johnson, The PartnershipUnder the Federal Tax Laws,
55 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1942). Although the close corporation may be essentially different from large public corporations, it is subjected to the same relatively heavy tax
burdens. See Janis, The Special Taxation of Corporate Business, 16 TAx MAGAZINE
511, 561 (1938) ; Klein, supra note 1, at 507.
4. See, e. g., Fuller, Partnership Agreenents for Continuation of an Enterprise
After the Death of a Partner,50 YALE L. J. 202 (1940) ; Rabkin and Johnson, supra
note 3.
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.181-1, 187-1 (1943). References to treasury regulations will hereinafter be designated, Reg.'111, etc.
6. Note, 41 COL. L. REv. 699 (1941); CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS § 3 (1938).
7. Some of the problems raised by this note have been raised and discussed in
prior articles (see notes 3 and 4 supra), but without the benefit of enlightening case
material that has since appeared.
8. The problems raised by the family partnership 'have already received much attention. See Paul, Family Partnershipsin Tax Avoidance, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
121 (1945) ; Note, 47 COL. L. Rev. 289 (1947). The incorporation of partnerships is
a subjectfor separate treatment. An example of the type of problem arising upon incorporation is found in Comm'r v. Whitney, 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAx REp. 119354.
(52)
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I. PARTNERSHIP OR CORPORATION?
Before entering into the discussion of judicial treatment of groups
known as partnerships, mention of the controversies involving the very
issue of classification of business groups for federal taxation purposes
should be made to illustrate the tendency to view "partnerships" as legal
entities.9 Under the Code definitions, "corporation" includes "an association," 10 and "partnership"

includes "syndicate . . . joint venture." "I

The regulations are not very enlightening in stating that "partnership"
commonly includes groups not called partnerships, and that "corporation" is not limited to an artificial entity but also includes certain partnerships. 12 It is therefore understandable that the courts have classified
enterprises mainly by the broad criteria of the salient features of a corporation set forth in Morrissey v. Commissioner.'3

These are: title held

by a continuing body, centralized management, 14 continuity of the organization uninterrupted by the death of an associate or by the transfer of his
interest, and limited personal liability.15 Courts comprehend that there is
"an endless variety of organizations" shading from those having all the
typical characteristics of a corporation to those having all the features of
a partnership, and have resolved the issue on the basis of greater resemblance of the particular organization to a corporation or partnership
"rather than by identity therewith." 16 It is well recognized that the importance of the above mentioned characteristics will vary with the facts
of each case. Statutory associations, such as limited partnerships, which
have incidents of both forms of business, generally receive much the same
treatment in taxation, as do other groups.' 7 The decisions seem to be
bottomed on the policy of taxing as "corporations" those associations
which seek the business advantages of being treated as juristic entities for
other purposes, and also to avoid tax burdens attached to corporations.' 8
This apparently supports legislative intent to so tax such business
groups. 19
While the courts may have successfully effectuated this intent, it has
been suggested that an enduring solution can only be reached by a law
which distinguishes the size of the enterprise as well as its legally molded
9. For a history and thorough discussion of such disputes, see Vernon, Whet Are
PartnershipsLikely to Be Taxed as Associations?, N. Y. U. FOURTH ANN. INSTITUTE
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 489 (1946).
10. INT. REV. CODE §3797(a) (3).
11. Id. at (2).
12. Reg. 111, § 29.3797-1.

13. 296 U. S. 344 (1935). Comm'r v. Rector, 111 F. 2d 332 (C. C. A. 5th 1940);
Riggs Tractor Co., 6 T. C. 889 (1946).
14. The fact that a partner has a controlling vote is not enough ipso facto to
change a partnership into an "association." Riggs Tractor Co., supra note 13.
15. Courts have taxed groups as associations although provision for limited lia-

bility had not been made. Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Comm'r, 149 F. 2d 1016 (C.
C. A. 8th 1945); Syndicate Under Agreement, P-H 1945 TC MEImo. DEC. SERV.

1 45,249. All the elements need not be present in any one case. Penna. Co. for Insurances v. U. S., 138 F. 2d 869 (C. C. A. 3d 1943).
16. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S.344, 357 (1935) ; Comm'r v. U. S.
and Foreign Securities Corp., 148 F. 2d 743, 744 (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
17. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B. T. A. 176 (1942). In this respect, local law is
not controlling. Reg. 111, §§ 29.3797-1, 3797-5, 3797-6. See Heiner v. Mellon, 304
U. S.271, 279 (1938). It is fairly clear, however, that a state statute may have a
material effect in the determination of the question as to when a partnership is dissolved or terminated. See notes 30, 56 infra.
18. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Magruder, 37 F. Supp. 711, 714 (D. Md. 1941);

Penna. Co. for Insurances v. U. S., 138 F. 2d 869, 873 (C. C. A. 3d 1943) ; Rubin,
Associations, 8 LA. L. REv. 313, 322 (1948).
19. Ibid.
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forms, for, as regards the legal bases for variant taxation methods, there
is, in many instances, little substantial difference between the operation
of a close corporation and a partnership other than the consequences
wrought by a legal distinction which oftentimes has no economic basis.20
Where the group to be taxed is admittedly a "partnership," the courts,
faced with numerous confusing problems, have seldom been able to devise
any uniform solutions. The significant issues, hereinafter treated separately for convenience of discussion, cannot be regarded as isolated problems, for the determination of one question often produces a material effect
on other determinative elements of the tax picture.

II.

PROBLEMS ARISING ON THE DEATH OF A PARTNER

Taxable Year: Since partnership profits, whether distributed or not
are taxed to the partners,2 1 the tax year is based, not upon the partnership
accounting period but upon the tax year of the individual partner. No
difficulty exists where the partner and partnership operate on the same
tax year, but where the partnership fiscal year differs from the partner's
tax year, the net income of the partner will include his distributive share
for that partnership year which ends within his taxable year. 22 Hence, by
terminating the partnership fiscal year long before end of the base year, it is
possible to postpone taxation on partnership distributions until the ensuing
taxable year of the partner. This commonly employed arrangement saves
taxes if there is a judicious selection of the partnership year in accordance
with expected trends in the tax rates.23 However, should the partnership
unexpectedly "terminate" before the opening of the partner's ensuing tax
year, the earned partnership income that otherwise would have been deferred, is precipitated into the current year thus resulting in increased
taxable income to the partner and a heavier tax rate by reason of elevation to a higher tax bracket.2 4 It is important then to ascertain when and
why a partnership is "terminated."
Ofie of the common events giving rise to this question is the death
of a partner. There once was authority to the effect that the decedent's
accounting period was not terminated by his death but continued to the
end of the partnership fiscal periodY5 This rule was subsequently re20. See Janis, supra, note 3 at 561; Alexandre, The Corporate Counterpart of the
Family Partnership,2 TAX L. Rxv. 493, 494, 506 (1947). The suggestion of Mr. Randolph Paul that small businesses be taxed in the same manner whether they be partnerships or not is noted in Block, Tax Problems of Smll Business, 25 TAX MAG. 142
(1947).

21. INT. REv. CODE, § 182.
22. INT. REv. CODE, § 188---"If the taxable year of a partner is different from that
of the partnership, the inclusions with respect to the net income of the partnership, in
computing the net income of the partner for his taxable year, shall be based upon the
net income of the partnership for any taxable year of the partnership . . . ending
within or with the taxable year of the partner."
23. The selection of fiscal periods is affected by the trend of the tax rates. The
illustration of postponement is chosen since the current practice is to push the partnership tax year forward, the expectation being that tax rates will decline. See Ahern,
Getting the Best Effective Use Out of Accounting Methods and Accounting Periods,
N. Y. U. SIXTH ANN. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 479, 481, 487 (1948).
24. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U. S. 493 (1938). To illustrate:
X partner operates on the calendar year and the partnership fiscal year ends Jan. 31
so that partnership income earned from Jan. 31, 1948 to Jan. 31, 1949 is taxable as of
Jan. 31, 1949. But if the partnership terminates Nov. 1948, the income share of X
is taxed as of 1948 under the current rule and this may double X's income for the year
1948 which will include his share of partnership income which was earned in the fiscal
year from Jan. 31, 1947 to Jan. 31, 1948.
25. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Bowers, 295 Fed. 89 (1923).
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versed by the leading case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner2 6
wherein the court declared that the main object was to tax income as of
the year of distribution nothwithstanding that the tax year might be determined by fortuitous circumstances, producing an additional tax burden."i
Even a partnership agreement not to compute or distribute decedent's
share until the end of the business period originally failed to preclude the
cutting short of the taxable year.28 Inasmuch as the courts abandoned
the implicit entity hypothesis, where a partner died,29 one could infer that
the use of a separate partnership accounting period is based primarily
on accounting convenience rather than on the recognition of a partnership entity, and that the administrative difficulties occasioned by adjustments on a partner's death are insufficient to induce an aberration from
the common law rule requiring dissolution. Criticism of this "precipitation" of income 30 and statements that such a result should not follow under
a specific partnership agreement 31 received a favorable response in the
Reyenue Act of 1942 32 which provided that income which accrued solely
by reason of the partner's death should be taxed, not to him, but to his
estate as of the time of receipt and in the same manner as it would be,
had he lived. 33 Thus Congress accomplished what the courts felt incapable
of doing, i. e., the insulation of the partner from the partnership. 34 The
change has been justified where there was a partnership agreement to continue on the ground that posthumous distributions were but the closing
of a contract 35 and not really income to the decedent. 36 The desirability
of the statutory change is manifest in those situations where, by the agreement, distributive shares are not to be computed until the end of the
fiscal period notwithstanding the death of a partner, for there may be
intervening post-death losses which would diminish the amount of taxable
income.
While the above enactment resolves the issue in most cases, the taxability of income precipitated by death remains an open question in the
less usual cases where no partnership agreement to continue has been
26. 303 U. S. 493 (1938).

27. Id. at 497, 498. The same reasoning has been applied to income accruable but
not collectible at the death of the decedent. Helvering v. Enright, 312 U. S. 636
(1941). For changes in the law regarding accruals see Guterman, Income of Decedents, N. Y. U. FoURTH ANN. INsTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, 24, 26 (1946).
28. Darcy v. Comm'r, 66 F. 2d 581 (C. C. A. 2d 1933). But cf. Estate of Hunt
Henderson, 155 F. 2d 310 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
29. Were the entity theory to be applied, the accounting period of the partnership
would remain unaffected by death of a partner, just as the accounting of a corporate
entity is not affected by the death of a shareholder.
30. See Rabkin and Johnson, supra note 3 at 933 et seq.
31. MoNTO ERY'S FEDERAL TAXES, CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS, V-2, 767
(1948). Under § 42 Uniform Partnership Act, the estate of a decedent partner is entitled to share in the profits earned while the estate's capital investment continued.
Moffet v. Peirce, 344 Pa. 16, 24 A. 2d 448 (1942). It would seem consistent with such
a rule to tax the income to the estate as of the end of the fiscal period. For a general
criticism of taxation of accrued income under prior law see Parlin, Accruals to Date
of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 295 (1939).
32. 56 STAT. 831 (1942), 26 U. S. C. § 126 (1946).
33. Reg. 111, § 29.126. See note 27 stpra.
34. It is often said that a partnership is not terminated by death where there is an
agreement to the contrary. See Henderson v. Comm'r, 155 F. 2d 310, 313 (C. C. A.
5th 1946); John G. Madden, P-H 1946 TC MEmO. DEC. SERv. 46,158.
35. See Rabkin and Johnson, supra note 3, at 948; Guterman, supra note 27, at 36.
36. If the estate has no power to collect within the current year, then the income

really hasn't flowed to decedent's estate and should not be taxed. However, the contrary view is well based on the theory of taxing income as it is earned.
TAXABLE INcOmE 186 (1945).

MAGILL,
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made. In such cases, the above discussed justifications for the statutory
rule would be absent. Hence the courts may properly tax the decedent's
distributive share as of the year of death in such situations. The argument that an unfair burden is added, loses force here because the decedent
probably effected a tax saving by his choice of a tax year in the first
instance, and the final accounting tends to cancel the self-created advantage.
Furthermore, the risk of an unfavorable choice of the partnership year
should rest upon the partners as the persons who made the choice.
As to surviving partners, the rule of termination by death has not
been so rigid. In Walsh v. Commissioner3 7 the tax court held that the
death of a partner did not cut short the taxable year of the survivors
because, under the applicable state law, the partnership was "dissolved but
not terminated." 38 Aside from this technical ground, the justification
for the decision lies in the recognition that the income of the surviving
partners is oftentimes not computed or distributed any differently from
the way in which it was before the technical dissolution. The decision is
desirable since the expedient of a separate partnership year should not
be abandoned absent material business changes as regards the surviving
partners. 39 However, where no business inconvenience is effected by
the premature closing of the partnership fiscal
period, as where the interest
41
0
in question was terminated by withdrawal 4 or by complete liquidation,
the partnership taxable year has been cut short at the event of termination. It is evident from the decisions that disputes as to when the partnership taxable year ends are decided on the policy of business convenience.
The ability of the judge to implement this policy by the choice of one
or the other of the concepts of partnership, determines the ultimate
importance of each concept.
Impact of Tax Liability: A concurrent problem arising on the death
of a partner is whether distributions to the estate pursuant to an agreement
to continue the enterprise 42 constitute income, taxable to the estate, or an
expenditure by the surviving partners to purchase decedent's capital interest; in which case the surviving partners would have to pay the income tax thereon. Naturally the estate will claim that the transaction
is a sale in order to shift the tax burden to surviving partners 4 3 who
44
normally reciprocate by contending that the distribution is of income.
37. 7 T. C. 205 (1946) ; acq. 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
38. Such a rule would be found in all states which adopt § 30 of the Uniform
Partnership Act. 7 U. L. A. 43 (1922).
39. "Because of the necessities of the situation, there are special rules for determining the income in respect of decedents that do not apply to living taxpayers." Mary
D. Walsh, 7 T. C. 205, 208 (1946). This practical appproach had been earlier taken
in cases involving incorporation of partnerships having the same fiscal period. C. A.
Tooke, 17 B. T. A. 690 (1929), acq. IX-1 Cum. BULL. 54 (1930). J. E. Reynolds, 17
B. T. A. 693 (1929).
40. Louis Karsch, 8 T. C. 1327 (1947). The problem of pyramiding income also
appears where there is termination by withdrawal.
41. Anne Jacobs, 7 T. C. 1481 (1946). The only point of distinction between this
case and the Walsh case, supra note 37, is that the liquidation was not complete in the
latter case.
42. The agreement may be to continue as if decedent had not died and to distribute
earnings to the estate, i. e., treat the estate as a partner (Bull v. United States, infra
note 47) or to make a specified payment to the estate and continue without decedent's
estate (Raymond S. Wilkins, infra note 43). Obviously the type of agreement involved is of some importance.
43. Raymond S. Wilkins, 7 T. C. 519 (1946). Edmund B. Bellinger, P-H 1946
TC MEMo. DEc. SERV. 146,040 (1946).
44. Charles F. Coates, 7 T. C. 125 (1946); John G. Madden, P-H 1946 TC
MEmo. DEC. SERv. 46,158.
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Where a mercantile or industrial partnership is involved, it is relatively
easy to show that payments are for assets, but in the case of personal
service partnerships 45 which require a relatively small amount of physical
capital, controversies often arise. The cases hereinafter discussed involve
personal service partnerships and relate to payments made pursuant to
specific partnership agreements to continue the business after the death
of a partner.
In earlier decisions, posthumous distributions to the estate from earnings were regarded as purchase payments for decedent's capital, hence
taxable to surviving partners.40 A
_ less doctrinaire view was taken on
this point in Bull v. United States,47 wherein it was recognized that
neither the "Income Rule" nor the "Purchase Rule" were of exclusive
application in all such transactions. The court set forth two broad tests
in determining which rule was applicable, namely, whether the decedent
made a substantial capital investment,48 and whether he had an ownership interest in any substantial tangible partnership property. 49 The court
minimized the value of goodwill and of the right to profits aside from the
profits themselves.
Whether or not goodwill is to be considered a capital asset is an
unsettled issue,50 and to declare that it should depend on the particular
business is to point up the specific problem facing the courts. Atlany rate,
goodwill cannot be discounted, and may be the deciding factor as to
whether the distribution is a capital expenditure or a distribution of an income share. 5 ' The courts have preferred to skirt the misty field of goodwill and to decide on the basis of the53 wording of thie partnership agreement5' 2 and the intent of the parties.
It may be said in justification that the contracting partners, realizing
that a decedent's interest is adverse taxwise to a survivor's, probably
agreed that payments should be of a nature potentially to the favor of one
45. E. g. Law firms, accounting firms, insurance agencies, brokerage firms, etc.
In such organizations, the chief productive asset is the ability of the members. The
value of office equipment, books, etc., is normally negligible as contrasted with the
volume of business represented by firm accounts.
46. Hill v. Comm'r, 38 F. 2d 165 (C. C. A. 1st 1930) ; United States v. Carter,
19 F. 2d 121 (C. C. A. 5th 1927); City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 29 B. T. A. 190
(1933).
47. 295 U. S. 247 (1935).
48. See note 45 .stpra. The fact that a small original contribution was made for
law books, would not justify a claim of capital interest in a law firm, for the value
of the physical assets are negligible. Compare the cases cited note 50 infra.
49. John G. Madden, P-H 1946 TC MEMo. DEC. SEav. 1 46,158; Gussie K. Barth,
35 B. T. A. 546 (1937).
50. See Helvering v. Smith, 90 F. 2d 590 (C. C. A. 2d 1937). But see cases cited
note 46 supra. "Although respondent feels that the deceased partners had a valuable
interest in the goodwill and partnership name, it is apparent from the entire record
that the parties to the argument placed no value upon these items. Ordinarily no
value, or nominal value, will be given to goodwill attaching to a personal service partnership . . . Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 331." Charles F. Coates,

7 T. C. 125, 133, 134 (1946). But cf. Charles R. Nutter, 46 B. T. A. 35 (1942) ; City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 29 B. T. A. 190 (1933).
51. H. Lewis Brown, 1 T. C. 760 (1943) ; Charles R. Nutter, supra note 50; City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., supra note 50.

52. Charles F. Coates, supra note 50; Frederic C. Bellinger, P-H 1946 TC MEMo.
Dzc. SEav. 1146,040. See Charles R. Nutter, supra note 51 at 39; Gussie K. Barth,
35 B. T. A. 546, 548 (1937).
53. Richard F. Hallowell, 39 B. T. A. 50 (1939). See Meyer, Operating a Partnership, N. Y. U. SIXTH ANN. INSTITUTE N FDEP-L TAXATION, 998, 1011, 1012
(1948).
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or the other under the stress of the actual facts. 54 Hence the court is
fairly safe in giving weight to the statements found in the agreement,
absent more reliable evidence. However, where the agreement provides
for specified, unconditional payments to the estate in lieu of earned but
uncollected fees, this approach is undependable. Despite the argument that
the partners intended a premature distribution on a liquidated basis of
decedent's accruable income, such a transaction was held to be a purchase of "receivables," a capital asset, and the surviving partners were
taxed on the income so distributed. 55 In unique jurisdictions where the
partnership is, in contemplation of law, a legal entity distinct from the individual partners, it is unaffected by the death of a member, and the impact of taxation on distributed income falls automatically on the recipient
estate.5 6
As seen from the above analysis, the decisions do not support any
general conclusions as to the operation of the common law and entity
concepts of partnerships in adjudications involving the impact of tax liability. The courts do not appear to be materially influenced by the concepts. Goodwill could be considered a capital asset under either theory
of the nature of a partnership. The courts base their decisions on contractual intent for want of a better standard of judgment, 57 and since this
rationale is also consistent with either of the concepts, it seems safe to
conclude that they are of little or no importance and that the factual considerations mentioned are determinative of the outcome.
III. PROBLEMS ARISING UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF A LIVING PARTNER
The nature of the distributions to a retiring partner is significant
also where the dissolution arises from his withdrawal. 8 The same general
tests as to the Income and Purchase rules above discussed, are equally
operative in dissolutions by inter vivos transactions. Thus a distribution
in lieu of earnings is taxable to the recipient as income. 59 However, taxation on payments received by him from a sale of capital may be lighter 60
than taxation of income received. Distributions of amounts representing
the capital interest of recipient partners have tax significance only to the
extent that there is a gain or loss measured by their individual investments. By special tax provisions 61 lighter tax rates are imposed on
"long term" capital gains under the broad policy of encouraging investment capital.62 It is not surprising therefore to find numerous disputes
where a withdrawing partner poses as a seller of a captial asset rather than
as a recipient of income.
54. It is not likely that an elderly tax-wise lawyer or accountant would make an
agreement under which his estate will absorb the impact of tax liability unless the distributions arranged really were income in their nature.
55. Raymond S. Wilkins, 7 T. C. 519 (1946). But cf. John G. Madden, P-H 1946
TC MEMo. DEC. SERV. 1146,158. For a criticism of the Wilkins case, see Friedman,
Estate Income Planning,N. Y. U. SIXTH ANN. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, 63,
67 (1948).
56. Henderson's Estate v. Comm'r, 155 F. 2d 310 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
57. See, e. g., cases cited note 50 supra.
58. Whereas a decedent's estate would pay an estate tax on a capital distribution,
the retired partner would be subject to tax under the capital sale or exchange provisions of the Code.
59. James W. McAfee, 9 T. C. 720 (1947).
Cf. Helvering v. Smith, 90 F. 2d
590 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) (taxing decedent partner's estate on distributions, as income).
But cf. William T. Jones, P-H 1944 TC MEMO. DEC. SEav. 1 44,028.
60. For some of the factors involved, see Reg. 111, §§29.113 (basis), 29.117-4
(holding period).
61. IxT. REv. CODE § 117(b).
62. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 116 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1945).
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Starting with the observation that a partnership interest is not a
bare co-ownership of assets, insofar as the partner's rights are limited by
those of creditors and other partners, 63 the courts have constructed the
theory that a partnership interest, as a right to share in partnership income, is an asset separate and distinct from the co-ownership of physical
capital. 64 The artificial reification of the "interest" into an existence apart
from the assets permits the same tax consequences on an exchange of a
partner's interest as would follow the sale of corporate stock. The rationale
supports the finding that a sale of his interest by a withdrawing member
of a personal service partnership is a sale of a capital asset although the
physical capital employed is negligible.0 5 The strength of this view
is uncertain. The Second Circuit purported to adopt one taxpayer's contention that the interest sold was a capital asset, 66 but in Williams v.
McGowan67 the court indirectly shifted' its position. There a sole
proprietor sold his hardware business in toto and the court decided that
the sale was not of a capital asset. Consequently the sale had to be
"comminuted" into its elements, i. e., each item sold had to be matched
against the Code definition of a capital asset 68 to determine whether the
sale of a particular item was a sale of capital. The accounting difficulties
and prohibitive costs which may be involved in such a procedure seem
to be ample justification for applying the entity theory especially in the
case of a sale of a partnership interest. 69 To effectuate Congressional
intent and to escape the onus of evaluating and deducting the value of each
non-capital asset from capital, such fundamentalism has been eschewed. 70
The task bf sorting out "capital" from "non-capital" has been sidestepped
by holding that the excess of the price over the value of the physical
capital assets is the price paid for such intangibles as the right-to-profits
and goodwill. 71
Another phase of the general difficulty of distinguishing between
income and capital distributions is well illustrated by Hirsh v. Commissioner.72 There the sale of partnership interests by original partners, who
had never made an out-of-pocket capital contfibution other than undistributed income, was held to be a capital sale. Just when the undistributed income 73 became capital was not evident. The court, in deciding
63. See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 10 (1928).
64. Comm'r v. Shapiro, 125 F. 2d 532 (C. C. A. 6th 1942) ; Joseph L. Merrill, 9
T. C. 291 (1947). See Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A. 280, 283, 284 (1935) ; Comment, 59 HARV. L. REv. 464, 465 (1946).
65. William T. Jones, P-H 1944 TC MEmo. DEC. SERV. 44,028; Dudley T. Humphrey, supra. But a sale of a partnership interest does not change taxable income to
affect taxable capital gain. Louis Karsch, 8 T. C. 1327 (1947).
66. McClelland v. Comm'r, 117 F. 2d 988 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
67. 152 F. 2d 570 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
68. INT. REv. CODE § 117(a) : ". . . The term 'capital assets' means property
held by the taxpayer . . . but does not include stock in trade . . . or other property . . . which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer . . .
or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade ..

69. See, e. g., Joseph L. Merrill, supra note 64. While large businesses with complete cost accounting systems may find the described task possible it would not seem
to be feasible for the numerous smaller enterprises to make such a breakdown computation without undue expense and loss of time.
70. L. F. Long, CCH MEMO. DEC. SEav. 15,840 (1947) ; Comm'r v. Shapiro, 125
F. 2d 532 (C. C. A. 6th 1942). The court in the Shapiro case noted that the resolution of the question whether a partnership is an entity or co-ownership woula not
throw any light on the subject.
71. Ibid.
72. P-H 1942 TC MEMo. DEC. 42,073. Accord: Joseph L. Merrill, supra note 64.
73. Partnership income is taxable whether distributed or not. Reg. 111, § 29.182-1.

60

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

that the capital interest existed from the very beginning of the enterprise
implicitly relied on the entity fiction to arrive at a simple but questionable solution. Another inducement to the adoption of the entity hypothesis
of a partnership interest is the fact that a going business has value aside
from its tangible assets,'74 and that the retiring partners probably receive
some compensation therefor. This is the old question of goodwill and its
value,7 5 the determination of which the courts achieve by combining goodwill with the equally intangible capital asset, a "partnership interest."
Thus on the issue of gain or income, one sees a judicial struggle with
problems raised by a troublesome definition of capital assets; by the imperceptible conversion of income to capital, and by evaluation of intangibles. The entity theory achieves importance by affording a useful
basis whereby the partnership interest is easier to handle judicially than it
would be under the co-ownership theory. Where either concept was applied on 6its own merits as a rule of law, the courts have arrived at ridiculous
7
results.

IV. PROBLEmS

ARISING AFTER THE ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL
OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

Insofar as a partnership interest is considered a capital asset, and
subject to special tax provisions, 77 it becomes necessary to determine the
proper method of computation of capital gain or loss. Here again, the
partnership is not taxed thereon, but is merely employed as the unit for
ascertaining the distributive shares of capital gain or loss allocable to the
individual partners. 78 The two main elements of computation are "basis"
and "holding period." The basis, or base figure, is the tax cost which
must be recovered out of the price before there is a gain. 79 The tax rate
on such amounts will depend upon the length of time the capital asset
was "held." 80 Consequently, the application of the entity or co-ownership
principle will be significant insofar as they affect these two elements.
Basis: Solution of the basis problem requires the figuring of (a)
the partnership basis, and (b) the partners' allocable shares. In order to
avoid confusion one must clearly distinguish the allocation and adjustments of the partners' basis from a taxable "realization" of capital gain or
loss, as the former changes often occur without the latter.81
74. See Comm'r v. Shapiro, supra note 70, at 535.
75. See note 51 supra.
76. See discussion of Williams v. McGowan, p. 59 supra; Gustav Hirsch, P-H
1942 TC MEMO. DEC. SEav. 42,073 (rigid application of the entity theory).
77. See note 80 infra.
78. Reg. 111, §29.113(a)(13)-l-2.
79. Basis is also used as the basic figure in computing depreciation. Reg. 111,
§29.113(a) (13)-1.
80. INT. REv. CODE § 117(b) Percentages Taken Into Account--"...
Only the
following percentages of the gain or loss recognized upon the sale or exchange of a
capital asset shall be taken into account in computing net capital gain, net capital loss,
and net income:
100 per centum if the capital asset has been held for not more than 6 months,
50 per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 6 months." Thus
long-term gains result in lighter taxes. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 117 (Rev. ed.
1945).
81. E. g., X partner may buy out Y partner's interest thereby requiring re-allocation of the partnership basis, although X realized no gain or loss. See, e. g., Robert
E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946) ; Helvering v. Archbald, 70 F. 2d 720 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
Broadly speaking the partner's basis is that percentage of the partnership basis which
represents his partnership interest. Reg. 111, § 29.113 (a) (13) -2.
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When is the value of a physical capital asset to be taken as its base
figure? As values shift daily, this problem is fundamental. The broad
answer would seem to be, when the partnership received it, and this answer
suffices where the property is received from a third party or from a partner
at the same valuation as his original basis. Difficulties arose, however,
where the partner contributed property at a different valuation than his
individual basis by reason of appreciation or depreciation.8 2 The courts
originally applied the rule that the basis was the fair market value at the
time of contribution.8 3 Thus a new basis was assigned to the property,
but the contributing partner escaped tax on any intermediate appreciation on the ground that he did not "realize" any gain inasmuch as the
"partnership interest" received by him as an exchange did not have any
market value.8 4 Nor was there a taxable gain to each partner when the
partnership sold the particular asset because "the proceeds take the place
of the assets sold and abide the fortunes of the partnership until its dissolution and liquidation." 85
Apparently the court was inclined to apply the entity concept of
partnership in allowing the partnership as a distinct unit to compute its
basis as of the time of contribution, the implicit conclusion being that the
contributor had exchanged a physical asset for an intangible asset, namely,
the right to share in partnership profits. Had the court been willing to
find a "realization" 80 of gain or loss to the contributor by putting a valuation on his partnership interest, the problem of his old basis would have
been done away with, and the partnership basis, uniformly allocable to
all the partners. Instead, the court preferred to place the onus of special
accounting adjustments on the partnership.8 7 The question of which
alternative is the greater evil is open to dispute.
Furthermore, by permitting the stepping-up of basis without a concurrent tax on the increased value to the contributing partner, manifest
tax delay and escape possibilities were created and duly exploited,88 thus
82. Compare Sehtam Corp. v. Comm'r, 125 F. 2d 655 (C. C. A. 2d 1942) with
Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F. 2d 683 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
83. Helvering v. Walbridge, sipra.
84. Helvering v. Walbridge, supra; Crawford v. United States, 39-1 U. S. T. C.
19232 (1939); Flannery v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 677 (D. Md. 1938); Spaid
v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1938), aff'd 106 F. 2d 315 (C. C. A. 4th
1939). In the Walbridge case the court required a "more palpable measure" of value
than the judgment of the partners. The court may have feared the possibility of collusion between partners to reduce taxes by false valuation of capital assets, but avoiding the question of valuation actually fostered tax avoidance. See cases cited note 89
infra.
85. See Flannery v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 677, 683 (D. Md. 1938).
86. While it is prudent "to proceed cautiously in computing and taxing a profit
which is still wrapped up in . . . property of . . . uncertain value" and therefore advisable to leave the question to administrative judgment, there was no -need for
a rigid rule in such cases, and the court might well have recognized a realized gain
in the Walbridge case, sipra. See H. 0. Wood, 33 B. T. A. 806 (1935), non-acq.
XV-1 Cum. BULL. 48 (1936). For a clear exposition of the conflicting economic, legal,
and administrative considerations on realization of gain here involved, see MAGILL,
TAXABLE INCOME, 121-138 (Rev. ed. 1945).
87. The net result of judicial refusal to tackle problems of computation is a complex method of basis allocation. See, e. g., Meyer, Operating a Partnership,N. Y. U.
SIXTH ANN. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATiON 988, 1002 et seq. (1948).

The con-

tributing partner must be made by accounting adjustments to compensate the others
who are in effect taxed on his original lower basis although they credited him with a
higher value in computing his interest.
88. Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F. 2d 14 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
641 (1935). The court upheld use of the partnership form, knowing that it was employed to avoid taxation. The futility of putting off the computation of gain on exchange was thus illustrated. See also Isaac W. Frank Trust, 44 B. T. A. 934, 940
(1941).
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requiring an avoidance-plugging statutory rule 89 that the partnership basis
on contributed property is the cost or other basis to the contributing
partner. 90 Having developed from the above matrix, this rule, still in
force, could not be said to be rooted in either the co-ownership or the
entity concept of partnership.
As "realization" is the event whereby the determined value of a particular asset is to be contrasted with the basis to ascertain the existence
of capital gain or loss, the judicial notion of what constituted "realization"
is material to the computation of such gains or losses.
Under the entity rationale, we have seen that the partner's capital
asset is an intangible interest apart from the physical assets. Obviously
the value of the interest will depend to some extent on the physical capital,
but the fictional theory permits them to be treated on separate planes.
As a consequence, changes in physical assets will not necessarily give rise
to a taxable event, for "realization" can only arise on the disposal of the
"interest" itself as a capital asset. 91
The employment of the fictional reasoning has not been unrestricted.
Where partnership property has been distributed in kind, the courts have
refused to carry the theory to the extreme of holding that the tangible
property was an exchange for the "interest" as to give rise to a taxable
exchange. 92 The claim of a realization of loss was rejected even where a
retiring partner received in lieu of his "interest" physical assets of an
agreed market value which was below his basis. 93 The court declared that
the partner merely received his share of the property owned as co-owner
and that the distribution left him "no richer or poorer than he
was. .

.

."

94 The questionable conclusion may be employed to avert the

necessity for impracticable calculations of reduction in the real value of
capital assets that results from withdrawing them from a going business.
The courts willingly find a realization in the event of distributions of
cash 95 or on final disposition of distributed assets.98 The distinguishing
feature of these latter cases, that the partner completely surrendered his
89. See The Sehtam Corp., 44 B. T. A. 258, 262 (1941) ; Isaac W. Frank Trust,

supra at 944.

90. The Sehtam Corp., mpra note 89, aff'd, 125 F. 2d 655 (C. C. A. 2d 1942);

Reg. 111, §29.113(a) (13)-1 (1943) ; G. C. M. 10092, XI-1 Cum. BuLL. 114 (1932).
91. Helvering v. Archbald, 70 F. 2d 720 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). Accord: H. 0.
Wood, Jr., 33 B. T.-A. 806 (1935). Although a partner adds to his interest, there is
no gain or loss. Robert E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946). But cf. Nathan Blum, 5 T. C.
702 (1945), where the sale of a partner's interest changed the business from a partnership to a sole proprietorship. The gain or loss to the sole owner wasn't based on the
"interest" bought. The cost was allocated to the several units and gain or loss computed on the disposition of each unit rather than the totality. The shift from the sale
of an "interest" to a sale of partnership assets probably occurs only in the situation
where a sole owner remains. Cf. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. 2d 570 (C. C. A. 2d
1945). See Marks, Tax Problems in Buying and Selling a Business, N. Y. U. FoURTH

ANN.

INSTITUTE

ON

FEDERAL TAXATION,

671, 677 (1946).

92. But see Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A. 280, 283, 284 (1935) for a different
view in a different fact situation.
93. Long v. Comm'r, TC M~mo. Op. DxT. 3677 (1947); Annie Laurie Crawford, 39 B. T. A. 521 (1939), acq. 1939-1 Cum. BuLL. 8 (loss on dissolution) ; Reg.
111, §29.113 (a) (13)-2. But cf. Annie Stevens Woodruff, 38 B. T. A. 739 (1938),
non-acq. 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 9 (loss recognized to recipient of distribution in kind
before final disposition thereof).
94. See Annie Laurie Crawford, supra note 94 at 525.
95. Long v. Comm'r, supra note 93; George R. McClellan, 42 B. T. A. 124 (1940),
aff'd, 117 F. 2d 988 (C. C. A. 2d 1941) ; Stilgenbaur v. United States, 115 F. 2d 283
(C. C. A. 9th 1940).
96. Reg. 111, § 29.113(a) (13)-2.
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proprietary interest for a definite money value, suggests itself as the nub
of "realization." 07
One may readily conclude from the above (1) that the co-ownership
principle was applied to distributions in kind because it results in the
highest degree of certainty as the actual value realized, and consequently
as to the computation of gain or loss, and (2) that the entity theory, as
applied to the former cases also furthers the basic policy of certainty of
evaluation 98 in that it postponed "realization" until the ultimate termination of the "partnership interest." Moreover, if such ultimate disposition
should result in an exchange for distributions in kind, the entity postulate
is abandoned for the co-ownership theory, thus further postponing "realization" until final disposition of the distributed assets. This switching
from one rationale to the other can only be explained on the basis of the
desire for practical and certain valuation of the particular asset involved.
Holding Period: Having determined the amount of capital gain or
loss, the rate of taxation or deductibility thereof depends on the length
of time the capital asset was held by tfie individual partner.9 9 Under
the common law rule the partner's capital interest inheres in the co-ownership of the specific physical assets so that there will be a holding period
for each specific asset depending on the time of the partnership's acquisition and disposition of each item. Under the entity reasoning the holding period will coincide with the period of tenure of the "partnership interest." Since the "partnership interest" will normally equal or outlast
the use and turnover of specific physical capital items, taxpayers prefer to
compute their h6lding periods under the entity theory thus tending to
lengthen the holding periods and consequently to lighten capital gain
taxes, 100 at which point the tax collector manifests great respect for common law principles regarding co-ownership. Neither party has been completely victorious, for a conflict of authority has developed on this point.
As to physical property contributed by a partner, the settled rule is
that the holding period includes the time for which the partner had individually held it. 1° 1 This is a corollary to the statutory rule as to the
basis of such property. 10 2 Conversely, where the property in question was
held after distribution from the partnership, their individual holding periods
include as well the partnership holding period.10 3 The controversies arise
where certain changes are made in the partnership interest. 1° 4 When a
"partnership interest" is surrendered on a capital sale or exchange, the
majority of courts base the holding period on the tenure of the interest
in the going business rather than in the physical assets. Thus in Kessler v.
United States'0 5 a member of a'ormer partnership which had been incorporated was permitted to tack on to the holding period of the stock re97. Comm'r v. U. S. and Foreign Securities Corp., 148 F. 2d 743 (C. C. A. 3d
1945); Robert W. Wilmot, 44 B. T. A. 1155 (1941); Annie Laurie Crawford, 39
B. T. A. 521 (1939). Receipt of notes or securities of ascertainable value given is
equivalent to receipt of cash. Perry v. Comm'r, 152 F. 2d 183 (C. C. A. 8th 1945).
98. "This problem of realization could be considered as being one exclusively of
the time at which it is convenient or desirable to compute a tax on a particular item."
MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 22 (1945).
99. See note 80 supra.
100. See Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A. 280, 283, 284 (1935). See note 62
.supra.
101. INT. REV. CoDE 117(h) (2) ; 1933-1 Cum. BuL. 128.
102. Reg. 111, § 29.113(a) (13)-1.
103. G. C. M. 20251, 1938-2 Cum. BuL. 169.
104. Robert E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946).
105. 124 F. 2d 152 (C. C. A. 3d 1941). Accord: Thornley v. Comm'r, 147 F. 2d
416 (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
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ceived in exchange for his interest, the duration of his interest in the
partnership. The Tax Court relied on this reasoning in declaring that a
partner's holding period was not cut short by several changes in his
percentage of the partnership interest due to death and withdrawals of other
partners. 10 6 The conflicting common law view was adopted by the Court
of Claims which limits each holding period to the 0time
during which each
7
specific physical asset was held by the partnership.
Given certain sets of facts, both views are well taken. It is fair to
tax gains from the date of acquisition of specific physical assets if the gains
are mainly attributable to the appreciation of the value of those assets.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the parties involved in the
sale of a partnership interest are oftentimes more concerned with the
general condition and earning power of the business than with the incidental ownership of physical assets, 08 and this would seem to justify adoption of the entity rule. As neither factor is entirely absent in most cases,
an intelligent choice between the above rules would depend on the predominance of one or the other in a given situation.
Judicial aberration from the common law theory has been defended
also where the death of a partner might work a technical dissolution of all
partnership interests. It is not felt that drastic tax consequences should
befall the survivors by an automatic change in the holding period 109
where the business fact is that partnership affairs continue without substantial change, for it is a well recognized policy not to discourage such
investment capital by taxing gains thereon as income and at a higher rate
due to a resulting elevation of the income level. 10
Intelligent application of the holding period provisions requires due
attention to the policies involved. Since the policy to tax short term
gains more heavily than long term gains is based on the distinction drawn
between investment and speculative capital,"' how can one say that the
holding period should be terminated or extended under either of the available rationales without a good look at the facts and into the nature of the
gain?
Administrative considerations might also influence the selection of the
rule. Where there is a fairly rapid turnover of capital assets, the entity
analysis is useful in that it permits the holding period of the partners to
be computed on the basis of one asset, the "partnership interest," whereas
the co-ownership rule would require numerous successive computations of
different periods for the different physical assets. It is conceivable that,
in many instances, the accounting difficulties thus occasioned would 112
be
more undesirable, as a matter of policy, than the reduction of a tax.
Contrariwise, in those small enterprise partnerships which infrequently
effect a change of capital there would seem to be little basis for such divergence from the common law rule as to allow tax avoidance.
106. Allan S. Lehman, 7 T. C. 1088 (1946). Accord: Ransohoffs, Inc., CCH TC
16,017 (1947). The court rejected the argument that a technical dissolution occurred by death of parties because the applicable law permitted continuation of
the partnership. For an explanation of the conflicting policies involved in this type
case, see Comment, 95 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 682 (1947).
107. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. U. S., 47 F. Supp. 98 (Ct. Cl. 1942).
108. See Comment, 41 MicHE. L. REv. 739, 742 (1943).
109. Even the difference of a day may work substantial tax changes. See Diamond, Relationship of Basis to Holding Period, N. Y. U. FIFr ANN. INSTITUTE ON
FEDERAL TAXATION, 477, 478 (1947) ; cases cited note 51 supra.
110. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 106 (1932); 1939-1(2) Cums. BULL.
728, 732.
111. Ibid.
112. See, e. g., Comment, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 682, 683 (1947).
REG. DEC.
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In the light of the above considerations, it would be inane to claim
that either rule is inherently superior to the other. Proper enforcement
of tax policies requires due regard for the facts before the court rather
than slavish adherence to a particular dogma which may violate the very
purpose of the law in a given case. The cases reveal that the relative
importance of tangible and intangible capital assets, of technical dissolutions, of accounting facility and of the speculative nature of capital more
largely depend upon the financial size and type of business than upon its
legal form. The confusion does not arise fundamentally from apparently
conflicting authorities which may be well applied if intelligently restricted, 1 3 but from an inherent defect in the Code which embraces in one
classification enterprises which have little in common as regards their
economic operations.
V. SALARIES

While the partner must pay taxes whether the income is received as
partnership profits or as wages for services to the partnership entity, some4
differences may result from the choice of one theory as against the other."
The current view is that the so-called salaries paid to partners are part
of their distributive share of partnership profits 115 even though the salaries
are not based on the relative capital investments of the partners." 6
Where the partnership fiscal period extends over two tax years, the
salaries are taxable as of the ensuing tax period inasmuch as they constitute distributions of anticipated distributable profits." 7 Thus, if tax rates
drop from one period to the next, the partner pays less taxes on the earlier
salary distributions than he would if taxed as of the earlier year of receipt. The reverse would follow under the entity rationale. If the tax
rates rose, the entity principle would be preferable from the standpoint
of tax savings, but the movements of tax rates have not induced any
divergence from the co-ownership rule which operated on the reasoning
that a partner is a co-owner, therefore an employer, and therefore could
not be an employee at the same time.""
VI. EVALUATION
While the above analyses of the cases may afford some basis for an
appraisal of tax law as regards partnerships, it is only tentative, for the
cases are not sufficiently numerous to reveal many definitely crystallized
patterns in judicial thought. The initial difficulty encountered in the very
task of classifying business groups under the indefinite "definitions" of the
Code is itself considerable, and alleviation of that trouble does not seem
plausible under the present statutory scheme. The truism that tax law is
eminently practical cannot readily be appropriated to describe the statutory
113. Cases applying different rationale may be reconcilable on their facts in the
light of policy considerations. Compare Allan S. Lehman, 7 T. C. 1088 (1946) (holding period in partnership interest) with Nathan Blum, 5 T. C. 702 (1945) (holding
period in individual assets).
114. E. g., Gottleib Bros., 1 B. T. A. 684 (1925), acq. X-2 Cum. BULL. 27 (1931)
(Reasonable allowance for salaries of partners allowed as deduction in computing net
income of partnership for purposes of excess profits tax) ; 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 249
(denying salary deductions in computing unjust enrichment taxes).
115. Reg. 111, § 29.183-1.
116. G. C. M. 13771, XIII-2 Cum. BULL 229 (1934). Hence any salary distributions in excess of a partner's share of profits would be a return of his capital and not
taxable. Augustine M. Lloyd, 15 B. T. A. 82 (1929).
117. S. U. Tilton, 8 B. T. A. 914 (1927).
118. Id. at 917. The rule checks any attempt to avoid taxation by so timing salary
distributions as to render them taxable in years of lower tax rates.
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plan which fails to anticipate administative difficulties of maintaining a
suitable, harmonious accounting connection between partner and partnership as regards capital valuation and taxation. The Code's broad definitions of capital assets exemplifies the typical inadequacy of being incapable
of practicable administration. 119 The courts have characteristically sacrificed literal adherence, not only to this provision, but also to the very
philosophy of the nature of a partnership, for the achievement of desired
methods and consequences in tax adjudication. 20 They have disregarded
any notion of the "known certainty of the law" as such, for the best knowable certainty of the desirability of their conclusions in considering typical
tax-significant transactions.12 ' Thus they have given the above truism a
new twist generally to mean that tax law administration is eminently
practical.
The role of state law regarding the incidents of membership in a
partnership has been indecisive, the courts invoking state law where it
served their purpose and rejecting it as irrelevant where it conflicted with
the policies involved.122 Notwithstanding the general desirability of uniform treatment of partnerships under the Uniform Partnership Act the
courts are justified in thus subordinating state statutes which were not
drafted to comport with federal tax policies. For instance, the "partnership" under state law may have some special incidents typically accorded
to corporations 123 because of which
special incidents Congress originally
24
levied heavier corporate taxes.'
Some analysts have complained that the source of confusion lies in
the judicial refusal to follow the statutory scheme and philosophy of partnership taxation. 25 The contention is that if one exclusive theory of the
nature of partnership is devised, the ultimate tax pattern will be clarified
and improved. In some situations this conclusion may prove to be a
reductio ad absurdum as regards tax policies. 12 6 The defects in the present
system should not be attributed to judicial administration which, on the
whole, has produced defensible results. Nor is the cure for the legal
headache to be found in either of the discussed concepts of the "essential
nature of the partnership." 127 Some of the basic problems are common
to the entire field of income taxation, and it is enlightening to find in the
introductory chapter of a volume on taxable income, statements of troublesome aspects of taxation that seem particularly applicable to the problems raised hereinbefore. 12 The defect seems to be in the scheme of tax119. See discussion of gain or income section III ante.
120. See, in general, George Whitney, 48-5 CCH FED. TAx REP. 1 9354. Although
the court refused to apply the entity theory to the facts before it, it mentioned with
approval the Lehman case, supra note 106, which did apply the entity theory, thus
stressing the fact that the particular tax policy involved and not the theory is the
paramount consideration.
121. Ibid. See, e. g., cases cited note 72 supra.
122. See note 70 supra.
123. We have seen that a partnership may continue existence unaffected by death
in some states, in the same way a corporation continues in existence. Allan S. Lehman,
7 T. C. 1088 (1946).
124. See cases and regulation cited note 18 upra.
125. See Rabkin and Johnson, Th.e Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws, 55
H v. L. REv. 909, 949 (1942).
126. See discussion of Williams v. McGowan, p. 59 supra.
127. See Rabkin and Johnson, supra note 125,
128. In brief, it is stated that accounting practice serves to condition and modify
the concept of income; that administrative limitations are a fundamental conditioning
factor; that courts tend to limit recognition of income to receipts of money; that
realization problems exclusively depend on the time at which it is convenient to compute a tax on a particular item. MAGILL, TAXABLE INcomE 19-22 (1945).

19481

NOTES

ing different business associations, and though a complete solution is not
available, there must be devised a better code by which the courts are to
decide, if they are to strip their decisions of unstable terms and dogmas.
Mention has been already made of the essential nature of the partnership. Obviously it is essentially a business association. This naive
statement may provide the key for successful taxation of income earned
by such groups. Although it is difficult to provide for a tax that will be
equitably applicable to all businesses, it may be possible to simplify taxation methods by a revision of the Code whereby all capital gains taxes are
to be taxed to the business association making them. Thus the partners
would not be taxed on later distributions of such proceeds: Problems arising on dissolution should be specifically covered by provisions dedicated
to such an eventuality. 129 Taxation of income from normal operations
need not be any different than it is at present, and specific provisions might
be made for different types of businesses. 130 Thus no new tax avoidance
issues need be created 131 nor will there be any, as to capital gains since
the partnership will be taxable thereon as of the event of realization. Such
a law would dispel3 2present difficulties in keeping the partners' accounts
specially adjusted.1

This method of taxing capital gains would be economically sound since
the benefit or burden of losses or gains would arise on the event of disposition of each specific capital asset, and this would accord with the basic
policy of the gains provisions to discriminate between speculative and
investment gains.13 3 The current majority rule would permit a long term
deduction where a physical asset was actually held less than six months. 34
One seemingly serious objection to the above suggestion would arise
where the distributive shares of the partnership income were not proportionately aligned to the capital investment of each partner, 13 for a partner
whose capital investment interest was smaller than his interest in income
would object to the use of partnership income to pay the taxes since a
disproportionate part of his share thereof would be employed to pay a tax
to the benefit of those partners who have a greater capital interest and who
reap a greater portion of the capital gain. 13 6 The difficulty does not involve a legal problem but one of partnership administration which can be
129. E. g., the abolition of the rule of technical dissolution would give the parties
complete relief against difficulties discussed in section II ante (see Hunt Henderson,
stpra note 56) ; in section III (see Raymond S. Willdns, mtpra note 55) ; in section
IV (see Lehman v. Comm'r, mtpra note 106). The disposition of profits or losses for
dissolution by incorporation would also be a problem.
130. E. g., capital assets of an investment firm are sufficiently distinct from those
of a retail hardware partnership business to warrant different treatment as regards
capital gains taxes.
131. Each partner must pay tax on his distributable share whether distributed or
not. Reg. 111, § 29.182-1(3).
132. One of the chief difficulties arising in partnership administration is the computation and constant adjustments necessitated by changes in the partnership assets.
See Meyer, supra note 53.
133. 1939-1(2) Cum. BULL. 728, 732, 733.
134. Under the entity rationale currently applied, a partnership may make successive speculative, short-term gains and still the partner may be taxed at the longterm rate because his "interest" lasted more than six months. See Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A. 280, 283, 284 (1935).
135. It is not uncommon for one partner to draw more of the income than his percentage of the capital he invested. See, e. g., Gustav Hirsch, P-H 1942 TC MEmo.
DEC. SERv. 1 42,073. This problem is absent in corporate taxation as the income distribution is theoretically based on the investment ratio.
136. E. g. If A had contributed 20% capital and B contributed 80% and each
drew 50% of the income, A would object to the use of more than 20% of his income
share to pay taxes on any capital gain to which B would have an 80% claim.
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overcome by adequate partnership agreements which anticipate such an
eventuality. One simple solution would be to have an adjustment immediately upon payment of the tax whereby the holder of the smaller
capital interest would receive, for the amount of his income share that
was used to pay the tax on the other partners' pro-rata share of the tax,
a credit against such other partners. Similarly, in cases of deductions
for capital loss, a reverse type credit might be formulated to properly allocate pro-rata deductions for capital losses. This method may seem as
complicated as the one currently employed, but it has the advantages of
divorcing the subsequent accounting problem from the simplified tax
computation and of levying the tax as of the time the gain on a specific
asset is actually realized.
The fact that a change in computation of capital gain or loss might
affect the surtax burdens of the individual partner is not a good reason
for avoiding realistic imposition of capital gains taxes. Even taking the
position that such an effect is undesirable, the surtax problem seems to
be so much the lesser evil as to warrant the proposed tax reform. Furthermore, where a change of the surtax bracket resulting from a capital gain
may be poswould be considered undesirable as a matter of tax policy, it
37
sible to avoid it by granting special adjustment privileges.1
The suggestions advanced are admittedly general and also require a
considerable number of changes in the present tax provisions. Any alternative remedy preserving the present philosophy of the partnership in
taxation will be limited to patchwork by diverse doctrines, changing with
different situations, and this is no better than what the courts have been
doing. No one can found a solid basis for an essentially economic institution on a legal concept of partnership that was evolved in early times
and which is ill-suited to all the aspects of modern business and tax administration.
W.D. V.

Discretionary Powers of Zoning Boards of Adjustment
in Pennsylvania
I.

INTRODUCTORY

One of the most active yet unsettled fields of administrative and
municipal law is that of zoning. Ever since 1916 when the City of New
York passed the first comprehensive zoning ordinance ' in the United
States the idea of zoning has held the attention of community planners
year after year. Following the impetus given to zoning by the United
States Department of Commerce in 1923 when a model zoning enabling
act was published and endorsed by that department 2 every state has
adopted an enabling act of some sort.3
Not the least confusing area of administrative zoning is the discretionary granting of variances by an administrative body called the zoning
137. The Internal Revenue Code contains many special adjustment provisions,
e. g., the Special Relief Provision of the Excess Profits Law.
1. THE PREPARATION OF ZONING ORIDINANCES 1 (Dep't Commerce 1931).

2. Ibid.
3. A comprehensive list of those state statutes based on the standard act is found,
id. at 27.
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board of adjustment. 4 It will be the aim of this note to present a sampling
of statutory and case law dealing with such discretionary powers; to indicate
some factors which determine whether a variance or an exception should
be granted or not; to explain the position of the courts in review of decisions of the boards; to point up some of the chief failings of the administrative machinery; and to suggest a few remedies.
Rather than take a cross-section of the law of zoning variances
throughout the United States, the discussion herein will be confined almost entirely to the law as it exists in Pennsylvania. The confusion
there may be said to be fairly representative of that which exists in other
states, since most states, like Pennsylvania, have followed the model zoning enabling act. 5 Furthermore, Pennsylvania being one of the most
litigious states, has had a sufficient number of zoning suits decided by its
courts to suggest at least that their decisions might be well-considered.
Basic Policies: The law of zoning variances embodies, in one sense, a
conflict of two contravening policies. On the one hand is the ever present
right of the individual property owner to use his own land as he pleases.
Opposing this right is the effort of the community, under its exercise of
police powers, to regulate the dimensions and uses of lots and buildings
with a view to "promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare
of" the community. 6 The variance and the special exception are the legislature's attempt to resolve this conflict in a way that affords a necessary
flexibility. 7 Some analysts suggest that the variance is a safety device
employed to impart to the zoning acts a constitutional validity which would
not otherwise be present because of the confiscatory cases which might
come up under the ordinance.8 While this suggestion is undoubtedly accurate from a legislative standpoint, the prime importance of the variance
is functional, one of giving the individual relief in proper cases from the
strictness of the ordinance.9
Enabling Act Provisions: In 1923, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed the Zoning Enabling Act for boroughs,' 0 devoting one section to a description of the function and powers of a zoning board of adjustment." This section has been adopted, with one exception, in all
subsequent enabling acts passed in Pennsylvania.' 2 It provides for the
appointment of board members, for meetings open to the public, and for
appeals to the board by "aggrieved" persons from any decision by the
4. In Pennsylvania the administrative body is called the zoning board of adjustment, see note 12 infra, except in the case of third class cities where it is called a
board of appeals (PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 12198-4113 (Purdon 1940)). Comparable
bodies in other states have one or the other of these titles.
5. See Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P. 2d 534 (1934);
Nicolai v. Board of Adjustment, 55 Ariz. 283, 101 P. 2d 199 (1940).
6. See White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 263-264, 134 AtI. 409 (1926).
7. WILLIAMS, LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 282 (1922).

8. THE PENNSYLVANIA ZONING PRIMER 13 (Pa. Dep't Commerce publication

1940).

9. BASSETT, ZONING 120-121 (1936).
10. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, §§ 15211.1-15211.10 (Purdon Supp. 1947).

11. Id. § 15211.7.

12. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 3829 (Purdon 1940) (for cities of the first class);
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 9189 (Purdon 1940) (for cities of the second class) ; PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 12198-4113 (Purdon 1940) (for cities of the third class) ; PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 19092-3107 (Purdon 1940) (for townships of the first class);
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 19093-2007 (Purdon Supp. 1947). Since these statutory
provisions are so much alike, reference hereafter will be made only to sections of the
borough zoning enabling act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 15211.7 (Purdon Supp. 1947).
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zoning officer. 13 Then the statute sets out the three powers of the zoning
board of adjustment: to hear appeals from the decisions of the zoning
officer; to decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance as provided for in such ordinance; and "to authorize . . . in specific cases
such variance from the terms of the ordinance . . . where owing to
special conditions a literal enforcement will result in unnecessary hardship." 14 Of these enumerated powers, it is the last mentioned which prefaces a sizable number of reported zoning decisions, and on the construction of this clause rests the decision of a majority of the cases hereinafter discussed.
The Act further provides for the taking of appeals from boards
of adjustment to the court of common pleas 15 which is empowered to hold
a hearing of its own and take such evidence as it deems necessary for a
proper disposition of the appeal. 16 As to appeals from the decisions of
the lower court the enabling statutes are silent. 17 Suffice it to say that
since the statute is silent as to the right of the board itself to appeal a
decision rendered against it in the trial court, the upper courts will not
permit such an appeal.1 8 On the other hand, the community, through
its borough or city council, has by decision been permitted to take an
appeal. 19 Generally, however, it is an intervening property owner who
prosecutes the appeal from a reversal o the board's decree.
Preliminary Distinction: It is surprising that lay members of boards
of adjustment, lawyers, and even judges have so often been confused as
to what a zoning variance is and what a special exception is. Each has
a technical meaning all its own. Yet, time and again boards will purport
to grant "exceptions" when in fact they ar6 granting "variances," and the
attorneys in their briefs and judges on review will continue to use these
words interchangeably. The difference is simply that a special exception
is provided for in the ordinance itself wherein the existence of certain
enumerated circumstances entitles the board in its discretion to grant the
exception provided for; whereas a variance can be granted only in cases
of unnecessary hardship. 20 In other words, in the former case the legislature in its ordinance has set up conditions under which a certain type
of use or building variation may be granted. An exception is relief
specifically provided for. In the case of the variance, however, any type
of variation, even of the most extreme sort, might be granted, so long as
the mandatory strict requirement of unnecessary hardship is present.
Logically, the granting of a special exception should arouse little
opposition and result in few zoning lawsuits. By the ordinance, the
legislature has given the board the "go ahead" in cases where the conditions have been met, and, more important, the draftsmen of the ordinance
presumably have included as special exceptions only uses of a lesser degree
of objectionability. Reported Pennsylvania decisions bear out this theory,
13. § 15211.7.
14. Ibid.
15. The acts for third class cities and for first class townships provide for appeals
to the court of common pleas. The other acts permit appeals to "a court of record."
See note 12, supra.
16. § 15211.7.
17. Ibid.
18. Lansdowne Borough Board of Adjustment's Appeal, 313 Pa. 523, 170 Atl.
867 (1934).
19. Perelman v. Board of Adjustment of Yeadon, 144 Pa. Super. 5, 18 A. 2d 438
(1941).
20. For a good definitive opinion see In re Devereux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 41
A. 2d 744 (1945).
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for few indeed are the cases in this area of zoning which involve special
exceptions. Grist for our mill is provided by the granting or refusal of
variances.
II. EXERCISING DIsCRETION
What Are Grounds for Granting Variances? The zoning enabling
acts have set the initial word standards as to what a property owner must
show and what a board of adjustment must find in order that the requirements for granting a variance may be met. 21 The petitioner 22 has to
show that 1) a literal enforcement will result in unnecessary hardship
to himself; and 2) the granting of the variance will not be contrary to the
public interest. 2
It is in meeting the first requirement that variance
seekers have the most difficulty 2 4 The courts have never given a satisfactory enunciation of what constitutes "unnecessary hardship" within
the meaning of the acts, undoubtedly because of the newness of zoning
and the peculiar nature of zoning cases which can be decided only as
narrow holdings limited to given fact situations. Until many more cases
have been passed on by our upper courts, "sufficient hardship" cannot be defined with certainty. However, from an inspection of the few
upper court decisions and from the many more common pleas decisions,
one may perhaps make an accurate guess as to what the law is.
The only tests (if they can be dignified by the term) thus far enunciated by the courts are for the most part negative. For example, ". . the
fact that the change might improve the selling or rental value of the property is not sufficient" grounds for granting a variance. 25 Indeed, it is
said that the variance seeker's difficulties must be "substantial, serious and
of compelling force." 28 Obviously, a use variance would tend to increase
the value of a particular property to its owner. However, in certain
situations granting a variance will mean "granting" a geographic business
monopoly. 27 If, for example, P, in a residential area is permitted to convert his private garage into a grocery store, he will have a neighborhood
advantage over other entrepreneurs who are unable to operate grocery
stores in the area. A reluctance, then, to sustain variances on the sole
ground that the property owner stands to make a financial gain is desirable.
A different problem presents itself, however, where the property
now is useless as it is and virtually unsalable under the existing ordinance. 28 If, for example, a lot in a residential district is situated between
21. § 15211.7 of the enabling act gives the board of adjustment power "to authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the ordinance as
will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a literal
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship,
and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done."
Many of the local ordinances also incorporate these requirements in variance provisions.
22. That the burden is on the petitioner, see Appeal of Murphy, 62 Montg. Co.
310 (Pa. 1946). "The zoning ordinance . . . fixes the use to which land may be
put in the various zones, and the burden is upon him who asserts that he is not bound
by its provisions or is entitled to a variance or special exception to make out his
case."

23. See note 21 supra. See also §§ 15211.1 and 15211.3.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Junge's Appeal (No. 1), 89 Pa. Super. 543, 547 (1926).
26. Id. at 547.
27. Thus, in some jurisdictions, ordinances have been passed so as to give the
owner of a non-conforming use a limited number of years to conform. See Note,
Amortizatio of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 U. oF CaI.
L. REv. 477-496 (1942).
28. BASSETr, ZONING 124 (1936).
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two non-conforming commercial buildings, P, normally unable to sell his
lot for residential purposes, should be allowed a variance entitling him to
erect a commercial building. Even in such a case, relief in the form of a
variance would be denied if further facts reveal that the proper remedy is
a legislative reclassification of the zoning map, e. g., where a "residential"
district has become "freckled" with commercial non-conforming uses it
should be reclassified as "commercial." 29
There is ample authority to the effect that just because a non-conforming use variance or set-back variance has been granted to other property owners in tlhe district, evidence thereof provides no basis per se for
granting a variance to the petitioner at hand.30 A clear illustration of this
is where a variance to establish a nursing home was denied even though
the same zoning board had granted such a variance to another property
owner in the same neighborhood. 31 Where, however, other considerations are present the courts will admit evidence of the nature of the surrounding area as a factor to be considered. In the recent case of Triolo v.
Exley,3 2 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained a variance to an
abbatoir 3 3 because the immediate neighborhood was predominantly devoted to least-retricted and industrial uses, and because the premises in
question were already equipped as a slaughter-house, having been so used
for many years prior to the zoning ordinance.3 4 That it is the latter
element, however, which supplies "hardship" is aptly illustrated by a
decision reversing the, grant of a variance because, as one member testified,
the board considered that, since other buildings in the district covered
the entire lots upon which they were erected, to deny P a variance enabling him to build a warehouse over 100% of his lot would be a hardship."
Frequently, the availability of alternate relief in law or in fact to the
petitioning property owner will preclude the petitioner from obtaining a
variance. If for example the Board of Health deliberately delays issuing
a necessary health certificate to P so as to prevent him from building a
slaughter-house until a zoning ordinance is passed which expressly excludes slaughter-houses, P's proper remedy is not a variance from the
terms of the new ordinance but a writ of mandamus of retroactive effect
issued to the Board of Health.3 6 Contrast a situation, however, where
the board correctly has recommended a reclassification 37 in a proper case
to the city council, and after no action by the council for twelve months,
P in desperation seeks and obtains a variance. Conceptually, perhaps P
has here "exhausted" his alternate remedy in that he has sought a re29. Appeal of Jennings, 86 Pitts. L. J. 282 (C. P. Allegh. Co.), aff'd 330 Pa. 154,
198 AtI. 621 (1938).
30. Evidence of other variance grants "should not have been received or, being
received, should not have been considered . . ." Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98,
102, 56 A. 2d 210, 212 (1948). See also Hasley's Appeal, 151 Pa. Super. 192, 30 A.
2d 187 (1943) ; Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 Atl. 308 (1929).
31. Hasley's Appeal, 151 Pa. Super. 192, 30 A. 2d 187 (1943).
32. 358 Pa. 555, 57 A. 2d 878 (1948).
33. One seeking a variance talks "abattoir" while one opposing it argues
"slaughter-house."
34. Cf. Petition of Stott, 58 Montg. 372 (Pa. 1942). But shouldn't reclassification by amendment of the ordinance be a more proper remedy? See Appeal of Jennings, 86 Pitts. L. J. 282, aff'd 330 Pa. 154, 198 Atl. 621 (1938).
35. Friedman v. Exley, 57 Pa. D. & C. 586 (1946).
36. Kessler's Appeal, 21 Pa. D. & C. 218 (C. P. No. 5 Phila. Co. 1934); cf.
Lower Merion v. Frankel, 358 Pa. 430, 57 A. 2d 900 (1948).
37. See note 34 supra.
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classification
of his district and yet has had no relief in a year of wait3
ing. 8
In an exceptionally technical opinion the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Kurnzan v. Zoning Board 39 sustained the revocation of a use permit because a bay window encroached upon the 15 foot minimum side-yard
allowance by thirty inches. Basing its decision primarily on the ground
that the bay window could be removed at small expense, the court denied
a rabbi the use of his home as a Sunday School 40 until the bay window was
removed. Ironically enough, the bay window during the other six days of
the week conformed to the ordinance since a ten foot side yard requirement
obtained for one-family dwellings. The rationale is that by virtue of the
inexpensive option of removing the errant bay window, the petitioner is
unable to establish such "unnecessary hardship" as to entitle him to a
variance.
For the first time, the highest court of Pennsylvania recently in
Crawford's Appeal held that a zoning board committed error in denying
a variance. 41 P had a garage with a second story already equipped as
a dwelling 42 and wanted to convert the garage into a home, but in order
to conform to the estate-like pattern of the zoning ordinance, he would
have had to move the building several feet and cut down six old trees
in the process, at a total cost of $3500. On these facts the court found
such hardship as to preclude the refusal of a variance. The result is sound
and does not violate basic zoning principles, but nevertheless it should
be interpreted narrowly. Since the court placed great emphasis on the
fact that one side yard greatly exceeded the minimum size requisite, 43 and
took stock of the fact that a dwelling was sought, 44 it would seem extremely
doubtful that Crawford's Appeal could be cited as authority for the granting of use variances or side-yard variances in buildings other than homes.
A further basis for granting a variance presents itself where the board
has authorized a building permit, and, in reliance thereon, a property
owner expends money in erecting a building or in altering an existing
building. It would seem that even if the permit was improperly granted,
if the property owner in good faith commenced construction he should be
permitted a variance to protect his vested right.45 However, in a recent
dictum the Supreme Court suggested that if a variance was improperly
granted, the board not only had the right but the duty to revoke it.46
Generally, experience reveals that the vested right argument is raised
more frequently in the field of non-conforming uses where the issue of
fact is: was this non-conforming use in existence at the passage of the
ordinance ? 47

38. In Caspar v. Exley, 45 Pa. D. & C. 664 (C. P. No. 2 Phila. Co. 1942), petitioner had contracted to buy an abandoned school property in a commercial neighborhood. Under the city zoning ordinance all school properties, no matter where situated,
were made special residential "districts." Petitioner was allowed a variance after
waiting a year for the city council to reclassify the old school lot.
39. 351 Pa. 247, 40 A. 2d 381 (1945).
40. See the earlier case of Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Board, 351 Pa. 77,
40 A. 2d 423 (1945), where the same rabbi, under a broad interpretation of the
ordinance, was permitted to use his dwelling as a Sunday School. Presumably, the
bay window did not exist at that time or else the intervening club had not discovered
the defect.
41. 358 Pa. 636, 57 A. 2d 862 (1948).
42. Cf. Triolo v. Exley, 358 Pa. 555, 57 A. 2d 878 (1948).
43. Crawford's Appeal, 358 Pa. 636, 642, 57 A. 2d 862, 865 (1948).
44. Aid.
45. See Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 160-162, 149 Atl. 195, 197-198 (1930).
46. Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 102, 56 A. 2d 210, 212 (1948).
47. See Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 160-162, 140 Atl. 195, 197-198 (1930).
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In passing, it should be pointed out that very few cases have ever
turned on the competency of a third party intervener to complain. 48 The
statutes provide that "any person . . . aggrieved by any decision of
the board of adjustment, or any taxpayer . . ." may appeal. 49 While
some early lower court decisions dismissed appeals by interveners on the
ground that they were not sufficiently "aggrieved parties" to be entitled
to appeal, 50 the modern practice is to allow almost everyone to appeal.
This is sensible as a practical matter, for anyone seriously contesting a
granted variance could undoubtedly find some neighbor to be the nominally
aggrieved appellant. Furthermore, zoning experts who lament the facility
with which some boards indiscriminately grant variances endorse any attempt to restrict the granting of variances. 51
Special Exceptions. As hereinbefore indicated, few cases contesting
the granting of special exceptions have found their way into court. 52
While Mr. Justice Horace Stern in In re Devereux Foundation,5 3 defined
a special exception, the court was not there confronted with one, nor has
it been in any such cases before or after the Devereux case. Logically, the
petitioner should not have to show "unnecessary hardship" in special exception situations, since the enabling statute expressly lists that factor as
the requisite for a variance. 54 He must, however, show to the satisfaction
of the board that the circumstances obtaining in his case fit into those
set forth in the relevant portion of the local zoning ordinance. He must
further show that granting the exception will not be detrimental to the
community or other property owners. Generally speaking, if the enumerated circumstances exist, the special exception ought to be allowed, absent
an affirmative showing that the permit would be detrimental to the community. 55
Attaching Conditions When Granting Variances. It has been suggested by one authority that, if a variance or exception is to be granted,
the board coula, if it wished, impose conditions upon the permit and that, if
a variance or exception were to be granted permitting a gas station in
a residential area which was predominantly colonial in style, the board
could properly require the gas station owner to build his station along
colonial architectural lines. 56 Undoubtedly, the boards themselves effect
many satisfactory compromises through imposition of such conditions. 7
One court justified the qualifying of a variance by noting that the administrative body was entitled the board of adjustment.58 Although no
case has come up, courts might disapprove the imposition of a condition
upon a variance if the condition bears no substantial relation to public
48. In Appeal of Dieterle, 25 Mun. 159 (Pa. 1933), an appeal of an intervener
was 49.
dismissed
because he lived in adjoining borough.
§ 15211.7.
50. Appeal of Dieterle, 25 Mun. 159 (Pa. 1933) ; Appeal of Kalina, 75 Pitts. L. J.
617 (C. P. Allegh. Co. 1927).
51. See Editorial, 11 Am. Soc. PLANNING OFFICIALS 57 (1945).
52. Appeal of Landes, 58 Montg. Co. 396 (Pa. 1942) (day school for girls in a
residential district).
53. 351 Pa. 478, 41 A. 2d 744; appeal diszismsed 326 U. S. 686 (1945).
54. § 15211.7.
55. See Preliminary Distinctions, supra.
56. BAssETT, ZONING 129 (2d ed. 1940). While no upper court in Pennsylvania
has passed on the question some lower court decisions have upheld such conditions.
See Appeal of Landes, 58 Montg. Co. 396 (Pa. 1942); Appeal of Kalina, 75 Pitts.
L. J. 617 (C. P. Allegh. Co. 1927).
57. Appeal of Costolo, 93 Pitts. L. J. 43 (C. P. Allegh. Co. 1943).
58. See Appeal of Houlden, 86 Pitts. L. J. 115, 117 (C. P. Allegh. Co. 1937).
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health and safety. Probably, no property owner will ever appeal from such
a forced compromise unless he feels his "hardship" case is so good that
it entitles him to an unqualified variance as a matter of right.
III. REVIEW
Statutory Provisions. As pointed out earlier, the zoning enabling
acts in nearly uniform provisions allow a review of decisions of the board
of adjustment. 59 In the words of these statutes "any person . . . aggrieved by any decision of the board . . . may present to a court of
record a petition . . . setting forth that such decision is illegal . ." 60
For our purposes, it must be understood that the "petitioner" here is not
necessarily the "petitioning property owner" referred to in the last section. 61 Here, the aggrieved party may be either the property owner who
has sought a variance and lost, or an intervener who opposed the granting
of a variance which was in fact granted. Thus "upon the presentation
of the petition . . . the court shall . . . issue a writ of certiorari
directed to the board of adjustment." 62 The Board is required to make
a return setting forth the papers (applications, etc.) acted upon by it and
such other facts as are pertinent to show the reasons for its decision. The
reviewing court is expressly empowered to take additional testimony of
for that purpose if it deems it necessary to
its own or appoint a master
63
arrive at a proper decision.
That the court may itself take additional testimony raises an interesting problem in those instances where the lower court reverses a finding
by the zoning board of adjustment. What weight preference should an
upper court on appeal give to the conflicting findings of fact? Since
the statute expressly permits the lower court to take its own testimony,
the logical inference is that the courts are not to be irretrievably bound by
the findings of fact of the board. 64 On the other hand, the judiciary in this
field has been disposed to ask only whether there was at least some evidence to support the board's finding. This results in the regarding of a
board's finding of fact in the same light as a jury's verdict. 65
Obviously presenting fewer difficulties are questions of law involving interpretations of the zoning ordinance. In such cases, lower courts
feel unfettered by any interpretations the board has made. There are no
presumptions of correctness here.
Manifest and FlagrantAbuse of Discretion. In no other field of administrative law is the following dogma so well accepted: the ruling of the
board should not be overruled in the absence of a manifest and flagrant
abuse of discretion.66 Until recently, 67 the dogma seemed to be the rally59. § 15211.7.
60. Ibid.

61. See II. Exercise of Discretion, supra.
62. § 15211.7.

63. Ibid.

64. See Brosnan's Appeal, 129 Pa. Super. 411, 195 Ati. 469 (1937), aff'd 330 Pa.
161, 198 AtI. 629 (1938).
65. But cf. Gish v. Exley, 153 Pa. Super. 653, 655, 34 A. 2d 925, 926 (1943),
where the court said: 'We are confined in our review, in such a case, whether on
certiorari or appeal, to ascertaining whether there is any evidence to sustain the findings of fact by the court below and to determine whether it exercised proper legal
discretion." (Italics added.)
66. Fleming v. Prospect Park Board of Adjustment, 318 Pa. 582, 178 AtI. 813
(1935); Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 Atl. 308, reversing 77 Pitts. L. J. 513

(C. P. Allegh. Co. 1929).
67. In Crawford's Appeal, 358 Pa. 636, 57 A. 2d 862 (1948), the supreme court
overruled a zoning board which had refused to grant a variance.
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ing point of the upper courts. It is indeed convenient verbiage for courts
already inclined to sustain the board. On the other hand, it may grow
cumbersome when the court feels that the board made a mistake, for, in
reversing the board, the court is then obliged to exaggerate the mistake as a "manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion."
Because of the conclusive nature of the evidence presented where the
governing factor is endangerment of public welfare, courts have generally
sustained findings of the board. In such cases where variances were
refused, many property owners were available to testify that they objected
to the variance sought and that they would be harmed thereby.6 8 Likewise
where the board has granted a variance, the evidence usually supports
the finding that the public has not been harmed, 6 e. g., the area in which
the variance is sought is already industrial to the extent that the use
variance sought cannot do any harm. 70 Of course, if the sole ground
on which the board grants a variance is that it will not be detrimental to
the neighborhood, the decree is doomed to reversal since no hardship has
been shown. Thus, where a side-yard requirement is relaxed just because
the adjoining lot had an extra-large side yard,
the board has acted im71
properly and on appeal would be reversed.
Generally, where the issue on which the case turns is whether there
has been "unnecessary hardship," the courts on review will scrutinize the
facts very carefully, and it is here that the chances of reversal of the
board's decree are greatest. Reversal will finally be made either because
the complete record does not support the board's conclusion on the issue
of hardship, or because the record and reasons given by the board are almost or completely non-existent. 72 In the first category are the many
cases which have articulated the negative "tests" for hardship. 73 A unique
addition to those cases has been Crawford's Appeal 74 where both the board
of adjustment and lower court were unable to find hardship. Such inadvertence was termed "a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion within
the meaning of our decisions." 75
Discrimination is often argued as grounds for reversing a board of
adjustment, but rarely has it been argued successfully.76 Thus a board
was found not to haveabused its discretion in refusing to allow P to change
68. Bennett's Appeal, 81 Pitts. L. J. 459 (C. P. Allegh. Co. 1932).
69. Triolo v. Exley, 358 Pa. 555, 57 A. 2d 878 (1948); Philadelphia Fairfax
Corp. v. McLaughlin, 336 Pa. 342, 9 A. 2d 538 (1939). Cf. Petition of Stott, 58
Montg. Co. 372 (Pa. 1942), where the same reasoning was used to reverse a board
which had refused to grant a variance.
70. Triolo v. Exley, supra, note 69.
71. In Goehring's Appeal, 75 Pitts. L. J. 112 (C. P. Allegh. Co. 1926), the
granting of a side-yard variance was reversed where the only ground for granting
it was that the side yard of the adjoining property was extra large. Such a decision
is especially desirable since the adjoining property owner might some day want to
build on the unused large side yard.
72. See discussion, infra, p. 20.
73. Junge's Appeal (No. 1), 89 Pa. Super. 543 (1926); People ex rel. Werner
v. Welsh, 212 App. Div. 635, 209 N. Y. S. 454 (1st Div. 1925).
74. 358 Pa. 636, 57 A. 2d 862 (1948).
75. § 15211.7 provides: "Costs shall not be allowed against the board unless it
shall appear to the court that it acted with gross negligence or in bad faith or with
malice in making the decision appealed from." The court made each side pay its own
costs, an implication that the costs test is by no means coextensive with the broad
"manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion" dogma.
76. So, in Hasley's Appeal, 151 Pa. Super. 192, 30 A. 2d 187 (1943), the court
refused to overrule the board which had refused appellant's petition for a variance
to establish a nursing home, notwithstanding the fact that a similar variance had been
granted to another.
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even though the
his non-conforming gas boiler to a coal-burning boiler
77
same board had allowed a competitor to burn coal.
One of the reasons frequently articulated by the courts in reversing
boards of adjustment is that the board has failed to send up to the reviewing authorities an adequate record explaining how and why the action
was taken. 78 Many times, a board will grant a variance and on appeal
send up what amounts to a memorandum opinion, "variance granted."
Such ill-presented decisions may be reversed even though no other abuse
of discretion appears from the record.71 In other words, a board decision
will not be sustained if the record is so vague and inadequate as to disguise the reasons for the decision. 80
Constitutional Limitations. Operative zoning is regularly attacked
on either of two constitutional grounds. One of these is that a zoning
regulation or order violates the due process clause in that the restrictions
imposed on the use of property bear no substantial relation to the public
health and safety and cannot come under an exercise of public power. 81
This avenue of attack is most often used when substantive provisions of
a local ordinance are patently harsh and unreasonable, e. g., where the
town council amends its zoning ordinance solely to exclude a builder who
had already started to build under the existing ordinance.8 2 Technically,
the violation of the due process clause may result from the surcharging
or fining of a property owner who has refused to abide by the unreasonable
ordinance.
The administrative aspects of board of adjustment machinery bring
into play the second argument that giving the board the power to grant
variances from the terms of the ordinance is an improper delegation of
however, usually
legislative power to a legislative body. This argument,
83
has been unsuccessful in Pennsylvania zoning cases.
Interpreting the Ordinance. For purposes of symmetry it might be
said that an incorrect interpretation of the zoning ordinance by the board
is a "manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion" since the board is exceeding its power to "vary." Conversely, if the board fortuitously chooses a
"correct" interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the ordinance, it has
not "abused its discretion." Hence, if an ordinance expressly permits in
a certain district many uses of buildings, two of which are one-family
dwellings and churches, and the board "correctly" decides that the two
77. Appeal of Consolidated Cleaning Shops, 103 Pa. Super. 66, 157 A. 811 (1931).
78. "If such difficulties or hardships are present of such character as to move the
board to vary or modify the terms of the ordinance, the board should make a finding
to that effect, and state just what they are and how they affect the property, so that
the reviewing authority may consider them and pass upon them . . ." Appeal of

Heman Johnson, 93 Pa. Super. 599, 602 (1928).
79. In re Devereux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A. 2d 744 (1945); Fordham
M. R. Church v. Welsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 155 N. E. 575 (1927).
80. Application of Imperial Asphalt Corp., 359 Pa. 402, 59 Atl. 2d 121 (1948);
Cummer v. Narberth Board of Adjustment, 59 Pa. D. & C. 686 (C. P. Montg. Co.
1947); Elvan v. Exley, 58 Pa. D. & C. 538 (C. P. No. 6 Phila. Co. 1947).
81. See White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 264, 134 AtI. 409, 413 (1926); Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928).
82. Cf. Lower Merion v. Frankel, 358 Pa. 430, 57 A. 2d 900 (1948), where the
township was enjoined from passing a discriminatory amendment to its zoning
ordinance.
83. See Huebner v. Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, 127 Pa. Super. 28, 37,
192 Atl. 139, 142 (1937).
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uses may exist in the same building concurrently, it has not "abused its
discretion." 84
Practically, however, to call an interpretation of law an exercise of
discretion is an unhapppy misnomer since it might lead to the conclusion
that the board's interpretation of an ambiguous ordinance is conclusive
upon the courts. Lethargic courts might conclude that where one section
of an ordinance was ambiguous then it necessarily followed that the board
could do no wrong in construing it. Recognizing this, courts have held
that the board cannot render a zoning ordinance more strict by its exercise of discretion,8 5 nor can it grant relief from its strict terms by loose
interpretation. 6
IV. CONCLUSIONS
By reading and comparing reported cases on zoning, one is able to
perceive a few general judicial tendencies. First of these is an overall
effort on the part of the courts to sustain any reasonable action by the
local boards of adjustments.8 7 It is apparent that the courts will more
closely scrutinize the granting of a variance than the refusal of one. Similarly, grants of use variances will be more closely supervised than dimensional variances. 8
The broadest tendency of all is the insistence of
the courts to decide each case, especially "hardship" cases, on the peculiar
circumstances of the particular appeal. Such resolution is eminently desirable in view of the nature of zoning cases which require a careful
balancing of the rights of the individual on one side and the interests of
the community on the other.
Accepting the fact that zoning is relatively new and some degree of
uncertainty is to be expected, there are some weaknesses contributing to
the uncertainty which can be readily remedied.
Chief among these is the realization that far too many variances
are being granted by boards of adjustment, thus defeating the effect of
zoning. s° Here referred to are the Lountless grants of variances which
will never be appealed. A recent survey of twenty zoning boards across
the country reveals that two out of three applications for variances are
granted in those communities.9 0 Yet, the boards surveyed consider themselves strict.91
This situation may be alleviated by prompt amendment of the zoning ordinance itself, and by timely redistricting of the zoning map. As
has been suggested, the board has the right to recommend to the city
council changes in the ordinance, and alertness by the board in ascertain84. Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Board, 351 Pa. 77, 40 A. 2d 423 (1945).
85. Covenant Presbyterian Church v. Board of Adjustment, 94 Pitts. L. J. 151
(C. P. Allegh. Co. 1945).
86. Allen v. Zoning Board, 56 Pa. D. & C. 402 (C. P. No. 3 Phila. Co. 1946)
(board cannot effect a variance by granting a renewal of a temporary non-conforming
use) ; Brosnan's Appeal, 129 Pa. Super. 411, 195 Atl. 469 (1937), aff'd 330 Pa. 161,
198 Atl. 629 (1938). This point is emphasized in GuIDE FOR ZONING BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA (Institute of State and Local Government, U. of Pa.,
tentative draft 1948).
87. Triolo v. Exley, 358 Pa. 555, 57 A. 2d 878 (1948) ; Floersheim's Appeal, 348
Pa. 98, 34 A. 2d 62 (1943).
88. Apparently they are meted out more sparingly by the boards themselves. See
Administration of Zoning Variances in Twenty Cities, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, p. 70
(Mar. 1948).
89. Ibid. See also The Perversion of Zoning, 12 AM. Soc'Y. PLANNING OFFICIALS
41 (1946).
90. Administration of Zoning Variances in Twenty Cities, PUBLIC MANAGEMNT,
p. 70 (Mar. 1948).
91. Id. at 71.
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ing the
need for these changes can in many cases make variances unneces92
sary.

Boards and their solicitors can be blamed for another failing. Too
many of them fail to send up to the courts in cases of appeal, an adequate
record of the hearing before the board. 93 True, the statute does not
require testimony at these hearings to be under oath nor does the board
have to write an opinion. 94 However, in justice to the participants and
the community, the board should keep complete minutes of its meetings.
Much of the current uncertainty in zoning law can be obviated by a little
more industry on the part of the boards in their record keeping.
A final objection which could be expeditiously remedied is a general
ignorance and misuse of zoning terminology. A definitive opinion as in
Devereux Foundation 5 does much to clear the air. However, there persists a sloppy use of terms by both boards and courts. Here, the remedy
is twofold. The courts must be more accurate in their use of zoning
terms like "variance" and "special exception" and apply language of discretion only where discretion is indeed involved. Secondly, members of
zoning boards of adjustment should acquaint themselves with the proper
definitions of terms and then use them correctly.
While the enabling acts could be clarified in those passages dealing
with appeals from decisions of the zoning board, in general the board of
adjustment section is well-drawn and couched in terms sufficiently broad,
where broadness is of the utmost importance. Hence, remedy for zoning
confusion is not to be found in statutory amendment.
The general tenor of all of the 6-ections and remedies hereinbefore
referred to points to one simple but inevitable conclusion: education of
the boards and those dealing with zoning embodies most of the solutions
to zoning uncertainty. A few excellenf texts 96 have been written, and
many states regiTarly publish pamphlets defining the powers and describing the functions of the zoning boards of adjustment.T If this dissemination can be extended and kept up to date and if zoning boards will indulge
in a little self-education, the law of zoning may indeed become noted for
its certainty.
L. B. B., Jr.

Judicial Deference to the State Department on International
Legal Issues
The subjugation of time and space has brought the nations of the
world into a physical closeness unprecedented in the history of man. Yet
their spiritual kinship has retrogressed to the point where the international
community is hovering on the brink of disaster. The uneasiness of the
92. See GuIDE FOR ZONING BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA (Institute
of State and Local Government, U. of Pa., tentative draft 1948); PLANNING AND
ZONING POWERS AND PROCEDURES 42 (Pa. St. Planning Board 1938).
93. See Manifest and Flagrant Abuse of Discretion, supra.
94. § 15211.7.
95. 351 Pa. 478, 41 A. 2d 744 (1945).
96. BASSETT, ZONING (2d ed. 1940) is by far the best of all. Others are SMITH,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF ZONING (1937) (deals with New York law only); WILIAMS,
LAw OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING (1922). It is apparent that there is a real need
for an up-to-date text.
97. The monthly publication AMERICAN SOcIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS NzVs
LETTER devotes one section entirely to a current planning and zoning bibliography of
recent books, pamphlets and articles.
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years following the First World War has been reflected in the trend of
judicial decisions by national courts in the international field. More and
more, particularly in the United States, it has become the practice of
courts to abandon the field to the political branches of the government
whenever there is the slightest indication of a possible conflict of policy.
The strength of judicial stability no longer buttresses legal decisions in a
world which is sorely in need of such stability. Judicial functions have
become subject to the vagrant winds of political expediency. It is the purpose of this note to explore the development of "political" supremacy in
the decision of questions of international law by courts in the United
States and to evaluate its desirability in the complex world of today.'
I. DECISION OF FACT OR OF GENERAL POLICY
(a) Legal Result a Reflection of Executive Wishes
At an early period in the judicial history of the United States, it became the practice of the courts to abstain from the decision of questions
which were deemed to be "political" 2 by a process of "judicial self-limitation." ' In the field of international affairs, this was confined to a determination by the executive branch of certain "facts" about which it was
necessary for the court to inform itself in a particular case.4 Yet the custom whereby the courts would accept as conclusive the executive pronouncement as to who was the sovereign of a state, the existence of a state 5 or
whether a party should be entitled to diplomatic immunity 6 did not grow
up without judicial protest. 7 Once the concession had been made, however,
the first long stride toward executive pre-eminence had been taken, despite
judicial insistence upon the right to determine the legal consequences flowing from the ascertainment of the "fact." s But what were the legal consequences? International law, as it developed, automatically gave immunities in certain cases where a sovereign was directly concerned. Thus, once
it was settled that a vessel was a public vessel, owned and possessed by a
1. In general see JAFFEE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933);
POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1936); Dickinson, International Political Questions in the National Courts, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 157 (1925);
Field, The Doctrinw of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv.
485 (1924); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REv. 338 (1924).
2. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829).
3. Finkelstein, supra note 1.
4. "In determining whether a particular group exercising governmental functions
in a foreign country is or is not 'The Government' of that country, or whether a
particular individual represents in a diplomatic or other capacity the Government of a
foreign country, the courts have customarily and properly turned to the executive for
information. This is too familiar a proposition to require citation of authority."
Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L.
168 (1946). See also DICKINSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANGLO-AMERICAN COUNTRIES (Issued for use in summer semester
for international law teachers at the University of Michigan 1932), at p. 18.
5. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
6. United States v. Liddle, 26 Fed. Cas. 936, No. 15598 (C. C. Pa. 1808) ; For a
recent case, see Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A. 2d 226 (Municipal Ct. of Appeals D. C.
1945). Examples of other fact-determinations made by the executive are numerous.
The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 408 (S. D. N. Y. 1885) (whether a group should be
recognized as a belligerent); United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 99 (S. D. Calif.
1891k (whether a group was considered a de facto government).
c• Consul of Spain v. The Concepci6n, 6 Fed. Cas. 359, No. 3137 (1819). The
court stated that the fact of national independence could be determined by the courts
from history and that "no explicit official recognition" was necessary.
8. See Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 158, 147 N. E. 703,
705 (1925) ; Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E.
917 (1924).
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foreign government,9 or that the diplomatic agent of a state was immediately
affected, 10 the legal result was definitely predictable. There were still areas
in which the courts were free to apply the law germane to the particular
case as where a counter-claim against a sovereign plaintiff was involved,',
but the limiting process had begun. Whether consciously or not, the law
upon which the immunity cases were based developed as a reflection of the
executive attitude,' 2 and it is with this fundamental principle in mind that
the evolution of the modern American judicial viewpoint is to be traced.
On looking back, it can readily be perceived that these legal decisions by the
executive branch on a limited scale, were an augury of later developments,
although unrealized as such during the era of their growth.
Recognition Cases in American Courts: The cases involving the recognition or non-recognition of another state or government' 3 indicate
clearly that the legal product was a direct concomitant of the executive
attitude.' 4
In attempting to achieve harmony with the political
branches of the government and still retain some semblance of logic, the
courts have been guilty of somewhat incredible legal gymnastics. Unrecognized governments have been unable to sue in our courts.' 5 In
some instances, this was carried so far as to allow the representative of
the recognized government, which had been out of control for a number
of years, to sue in the name of the State.'6 In contrast, recognizing
9. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) ; see United States v.
Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 209 (1882).
10. In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403 (1889).
11. Dexter & Carpenter Inc. v. Kunlig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. 2d 705 (C. C. A.
2d 1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 896 (1931), discussed in Note by Jessup and Deak,
25 As. J.INT'L L. 335 (1931).
12. See Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch
116, 139 (1812) : "A sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign
power, to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose cannot intend
to subject his minister in any degree to that power; and therefore a consent to receive
him implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges which his principal intended he should retain-privileges which are essential to the dignity of his sovereign,
and to the duties he is bound to perform."
13. For an excellent analysis of the various problems in the recognition cases, see
JAFFEE, op. cit. supra note 1. For more restricted discussions of the legal consequences
of recognition or non-recognition see Borchard, The Unrecognized Govermnent in
American Courts, 26 Am. 3. INT'L L. 261 (1932); Connick, The Effect of Soviet
Decrees in American Courts, 34 YALE L. 3. 499 (1925) ; Fraenkel, Turistic Status of
Foreign States, Their Property and Acts, 25 COL. L. Rav. 544 (1925). Note, De
Facto Governmnts-The Significance of Their Acts in Our Courts, 8 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 119 (1933).
14. See paper by F. A. Mann, read before The London Grotius Society, reported
in Volume 29 of TRANSACT
S OF THE GRonus SocIEr (1943), at p. 156 and passim;
see also

NOEL-HENRY, GOUVERNEMENTS

DE FAIT DEVANT LA JUGE

(1927), p. 138

and passin.
15. Republic of China v. Merchant's Fire Assurance Corp., 30 F. 2d 278 (C. C.
A. 9th 1929) (suit by unrecognized government was dismissed; pending appeal, the
government was recognized and the decree of dismissal was reversed); Russian
Socialist Fed. Soy. Rep. v. Cibrario, 198 App. Div. 869, 191 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1921),
235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
16. Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 293 Fed. 135 (D. C. N. Y.
1923); Other cases allowing the old government to sue, but without as much time
elapsed between the changes of government, were Agency of Canadian Car and
Foundry v. American Can, 253 Fed. 152 (S. D. N. Y. 1918), and Government of
Mexico v. Fernandez, Superior Court, Essex County, Mass., reported in 17 AM. 3.
INT'L L. 743 (1923).
See also The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E. D. N. Y. 1921) and
The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294 (N. D. Calif. 1920), commented on by Borchard supra
note 13, at 266, where he states that the justification of the decisions might have been
that it was not clear at the time of the decisions which was the government of Russia.
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the realities of the situation, actions against unrecognized governments
were not permitted in our courts.' 7 Of peculiar perplexity has been
the problem of the effect to be given the laws of an unrecognized government where private rights are involved. A long series of cases in the
8
courts of the United States held that such laws could be of no effect.'
The difficulties created by the Soviet nationalization decrees 19 forced
an alteration of this position, and the courts began to talk public policy
of the forum 20 until finally they had acknowledged the existence of the
factual element of control by a State over its own territory.2 1 That
the solution is still unreached is evidenced by the complex problem of the
effect to be given outside the Russian state to the numerous confiscatory
decrees of the Soviet government. 22
Prior to 1933, the American
courts, by means of varied legal rationales, 23 refused to give any
extra-territorial effect to such decrees. 24 But the case of United
States v. Pink25 effectively hindered the United States courts from
applying any law which might have grown up on the subject and made
recognition the ultimate test of the validity of such decrees, 26 consequently broadening the power of the executive branch to a point far
17. Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. 2d 202 (S. D. N. Y. 1929);

Wulfsohn v. Russian Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep., 118 Misc. 28, 192 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1922

202 App. Div. 421, 195 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1922), 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923).
18. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925);
Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Reinsurance Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E.
369 (1925); See Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 165, 145 N. E.
917, 918 (1924).
19. By means of "nationalization," the assets of almost all corporations in Russia
were confiscated and their debts declared to be cancelled. Many of these corporations

had branches in foreign countries. The problem of how these decrees operated on
assets both in and outside of Russia has been extensively discussed. See Wohl,
Nationalirationof Joint Banking Corporationsin Soviet Russia, 75 U. OF PA. L. REv.

385 (1927) ; Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of Nationalized Russian
Corporations,39 YALE L. J. 1130 (1930).

20. See Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank,

253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930); Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York,

239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924), where justice Cardozo stated that acts of an

unrecognized government might be deemed valid when "violence to fundamental principles of justice or to our own public policy might otherwise be done." See Appication of Soviet Laws and Exception of Public Order,21 Am. J. INT'L L. 238 (1927).

21. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E.
679 (1933). Plaintiff sought an accounting claiming that the confiscatory decrees
of the unrecognized Soviet government by virtue of which plaintiff's oil lands were
confiscated and the oil sold to defendant, had no legal effect. The court held that
plaintiff could not recover, stating: "To refuse to recognize that Soviet Russia is a

government regulating the internal affairs of the country is to give to fictions an air
of reality which they do not deserve . . ." For a more recent case affirming the
same proposition in regard to a recognized government see McCarthy v. Reichsbank,
20 N. Y. S. 2d 450 (1940).
22. See Note, Effect of Soviet Recognition Upon Russian Confiscatory Decrees,
51 YALE L. J. 848 (1941).
23. Cf. Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank,

253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930), and Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y.
158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924).
24. James & Co. v. Russia Insurance Co., 247 N. Y. 62, 160 N. E. 364 (1928);

See also Bourne v. Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925).
25. 315 .U. S. 203 (1941).
26. United States v. Pink, supra. The United States recognized The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on November 19, 1933, and on the same day, the President
accepted from M. Litvinov an assignment of all claims due from American nationals
to the Government of Russia, as part of the final settlements of claims between the
two countries. In this case, the United States, as assignee of The Russian Government, claimed certain moneys which had belonged to the New York branch of a
Russian insurance company and which remained after payment of all domestic creditors. The Supreme Court held (two justices dissenting) that the Russian legislation
should be given extraterritoricdeffect.
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beyond that of any it had hitherto possessed. This emphasis upon the
potency of recognition has continued, as is evidenced by the refusal of
the courts to give any extra-territorial effect to the Russian decrees involving Estonian property. 27 The severe criticism which the legal
results of the recognition cases have received is indicative of the confusion
which has existed because of judicial deference to real or conjectured
political persuasions. 28
The English courts, as the American, have
been unduly entranced by the magic word "recognition" 2 9 but they
have not carried it to the extreme of United States v. Pink.30 Nor
have they borne the executive power beyond fact-determination. In the
United States, however, the Executive has not been so limited, and it is
apparent that the transfer to it of primarily judicial functions is still in
the process of growth. It is to be noted, however, that in the cases
that have been discussed so far, the decision by the executive branch was
of a specific fact, or of its general policy toward a state or a government,
which policy would not vary because of the particular case but only because of a general change of governmental attitude.
(b) Hints of Further Expansion
During the years preceding the last decade, when the State Department was still confined to purely factual determination,3 1 some courts
were giving warning signals of a later broadening of executive-legal power
in their opinions. Such warnings went unnoticed in the general stream
of judicial thought, but on re-examination stand out as minor landmarks
in the development of a legal principle. It is true that, until the present
decade, there have been only two recorded cases in which the Executive
specifically requested dismissal of a suit against a foreign sovereign,3 2
for want of jurisdiction. In both cases, the immunity was granted. 33
But it is not only with the specific requests by the Executive in this
period with which we are concerned, but also with the indications of a
willingness by the courts to place a self-imposed limitation upon their
legal jurisdiction. The unique problems created by the entrance of governments into the commercial field" called for a re-evaluation of some
27. The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431 (C. C. A. 3d 1944); The Signe, 39 F. Supp. 810
(E. D. La. 1941) ; The Kotkas, 35 F. Supp. 983 (ED. N. Y. 1940) ; A/S Merilaid
Co. v. Chase National Bank of New York, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 377 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
County, Spec. Term 1947) (the court distinguished United States v. Pink by stating
that there the government of the United States, as representing all the states, had
exercised its power to settle our international relations, and that the states were bound
by the agreements resulting therefrom) : See Briggs, Non-Recognitio in the Courts:
The Ships of the Baltic Republic, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 585 (1943).
28. JAFFEE, op. cit. supra note 1; Borchard, supra note 13; Note, Effect of Soviet
Recognition Upon Russian Confiscatory Decrees, 51 YALE L. J. 848 (1941).
29. Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless Ltd. (2 cases) (No. 1) [1928] Ch. 545,
(No. 2) [1939] Ch. 182; (action by original recognized sovereign dismissed after
recognition of Italy as sovereign of Ethiopia) ; The Arantzazu Mendi [1938] P. 233.
30. Supra notes 25 and 26.
31. Supra note 4.
32. See Deak, The Plea of Sovereign Imnmmnity and The New York Court of
Appeals, 40 CoL. L. Rlv. 453, 461 (1940).
33. Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) ; Hassard v. United States of
Mexico, 173 N. Y. 645, 66 N. E. 1110 (1903) (United States attorney, under instructions from the Attorney-General, moved to dismiss an attachment by the plaintiff
against The Republic of Mexico and the States of Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosi).
34. A recent brief discussion of these problems is contained in Kuhn, The Extension of Sovereign Immatity to Government-Owned Commercial Corporations,39 Am.
J. INT'L L. 772 (1945). For a more lengthy analysis of the earlier cases, see Hervey,
The Inmunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commniercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution, 27 MIcH. L. REv. 751 (1929).
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of the basic principles of international law. What was the status of a
government-owned vessel leased to a private individual for commercial
purposes? 35 Was a corporation owned in part by a foreign state
immune from suit? 36 Questions of policy became predominant, and
the courts hesitated to expand or limit the fundamental concepts of international law without some indication of what would be the best national
policy to pursue. And so they began to look to the executive branch for
a hint of the course they should follow. The language in United States v.
Deutsches Kalysyndicat Gesselschaft3 7 illustrates the trend of judicial
thought 3 s-a specific request by the executive for dismissal of the
suit would be honored if made. 39 The fear of political complications
by taking jurisdiction was also apparent. 40 In at least one instance,
the legal decision was based upon a negative inference from a lack of any
41
Yet these were
enunciation of policy by the State Department.
only scattered cases. The time had not yet come for a clear abandonment of the field by the courts. The State Department itself asserted in
numerous cases that it did not desire to make legal decisions and that this
function properly belonged to the courts.4

II.

DECISION OF THE SPECIFIC CASE

Recognition and Allowance-The Navemar: This, then, was the situation at the time of the decision in the case of The Navemar 4 3 involving
a suit in admiralty to recover possession of a vessel seized by the Republican Government of Spain. The State Department had refused to
present the suggestion of immunity requested by the Spanish Ambassador.
The Supreme Court of the United States, 44 in arriving at its decision,
35. The Maipo, 252 Fed. 627 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
36. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F. 2d 199 (S. D.
N. Y. 1929) (Action to enjoin anti-trust law violations against corporation in which
the French Government owned a majority of the stock); Coale v. Societd Cooperative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F. 2d 180 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (execution against
property of corporation organized by Swiss government which retained the right to
appoint seven of seventeen directors, to approve the charter, amendments and rules
made by the directors, and to receive any net earnings remaining after payment to the
subscribers of 6% interest on the capital).
37. 31 F. 2d 199 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
38. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts as indicated in note
36 supra. The court stated at p. 203, ". . . Though the Ambassador has brought
the pendency of this suit to the attention of the State Department . . . the Secretary
of State has not made any suggestion to this court. The suit was brought by the
Attorney-General. These facts indicate that the Executive . . . is of the opinion
that this suit is not . . . against the Republic of France, or any representative of
that republic."
39. See The Florence H, 248 Fed. 1012, 1017 (S. D. N. Y. 1918), where L. Hand,
J. indicates that a suggestion from the Secretary of State would alter the court's
consideration of the case; The Attualita, 238 Fed. 909, 911 (C. C. A. 4th 1916);
Molina v. Comisi6n Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N. J. L. 382, 385, 103
Atl. 397, 398 (1918).
40. In Molina v. Comisi6n Reguladora del Mercado Henequen, supra note 39,
the State Department, in response to a request from the court for information, indicated that it did not consider that political subdivisions (involved here) of a foreign
government should be entitled to immunity when engaged in commercial transactions.
The court then declared: "This very sensible position of our government mdkes it
clear that the present case is free from any political complications . . ." Id. at 384.
41. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F. 2d 199 (S. D.
N. Y. 1929). See note 38 supra.
42. See cases collected in II HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
c. 7 (1941).
43. 303 U. S. 68 (1938).
44. Opinion by Justice Stone.
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stated: "... if the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive
branch, then it is the duty of the courts to release the vessel on appropriate suggestion by the Attorney-General. .

.

."

45

The reper-

cussions of this statement have been far-reaching.4 6 The pace at
which judicial functions were being transferred to the executive was suddenly accelerated, despite logical indications that the Supreme Court did
not intend its language to mean that the Department of State should decide claims on their merits before forwarding them to the courts,47 for this broad interpretation was seized upon by the courts in announcing
subsequent decisions on the subject. Such an analysis was in keeping with
the general trend of judicial thought which had increasingly feared the decision of "political questions." 48 What then have been the recent developments as a result of The Navemar?
At last the courts have come to a point which they had been approaching through the course of many years. The executive branch, through the
medium of the State Department, is deciding, not the general policy or
the single fact, but the specific case before the court. By what means
has this result been achieved?
By Explicit Request: One method has been for the State Department
to indicate specifically in what manner it desires the legal question to be
decided. 49 In the first one hundred and sixty-seven years of the existence
of the United States as an independent nation, only two recorded cases
showed such specific requests. 50 Now there have been two more in the
past six years. 51 The implications are apparent. The executive branch
has become increasingly aware of the effectiveness of a statement that a
political consideration is involved. In the most recent case, The Beaton
Park,52 the State Department flatly announced: "The State Department
has advised the Canadian Embassy that the claim of sovereign immunity
would not be allowed. .

.

.

The position of the United States Govern-

ment is due to the fact that the War Shipping Administration has a substantial claim against the Beaton Park . . . for . . . loss . . . of the

Tugboat Mobile Point. The United States Government is not prepared to
prejudice that claim by recognizing or allowing any claim of sovereign immunity for the Beaton Park." 53
45. Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 74 (1938).
46. From subsequent decisions it seems as though the courts had been waiting
for some such indication by the Supreme Court. The decision in TiW Navemar proved
to be the peg upon which the courts could hang their justification for remaining
aloof in numerous "political" cases.
47. See Deak, supra note 32 at 462, where he states that it can be assumed that
the Supreme Court was well acquainted with the practice, the language used, and
with the results of suggestions by the State Department which left the jurisdictional
question to be decided by the court using principles of international law.
48. Mann, mipra note 14, at 159.
49. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W. D. Wash. 1946)- Anderson v. N. V.
Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. 502 (1942).
50. See note 33 supra.
51. See note 49 supra. In Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij,
289 N. Y. 9 (1942), the State Department indicated the policy considerations involved
in the case and then declared: ". . . it would be highly desirable that this Court . . .
confine itself to giving effect to the announced policy of the United States
without expressing any view . . . as applied to persons and circumstances other
than those referred to in the statement of policy set forth in that communication.
It is submitted that the policy announced . . . is dispositive of the controlling issues
herein." Id. at 18.
52. 65 F. Supp. 211 (W. D. Wash. 1946).

53. Id. at 212.
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What is to be expected, however, from a statement short of such a
definite indication of policy? It is apparent that the two branches of the
government are fast approaching a situation in which the runic effect of
words will play a predominant part. If the claim is "recognized and
allowed" 54 the courts have indicated clearly that they will take no further
consideration of the cause.55 This is true, not only in a case where the
legal result might very well be the same if the court decided the issue,5 6
but also where a new problem is presented and a new international legal
principle is in the process of being developed.57 Can it be said that the
State Department is properly equipped to perform this function?
By Implicaton--"Accepts as True": A refinement upon the use of
"recognition and allowance" was made in Sullivan v. The State of Sao
5
Paulo, 8 in which action was brought on a bond issued by one of the
states of the federated state of Brazil. In answer to a request for information from the court, the State Department declared that it "had no
doubt" 59 as to the accuracy of the statements of the Brazilian Ambassador, 0° but indicated in a subsequent letter 6 that its statements were not
intended to imply that it had "recognized and allowed" the claim, even
though the Department felt that immunity should be granted. Despite
this statement, and against a line of foreign cases and an American case
which had reached the opposite legal result, 6 2 immunity was granted, the
court saying: ". . . if the word of a sovereign is not to be questioned
where accepted by the executive, then the rule applies equally to the case
where the executive accepts as true 63 only the facts, and by reason of lack
of desire to usurp judicial functions does not pass upon the ultimate legal
65
"accepts
question of immunity." 64 Thus, by virtue of this decision,
as true" is held to be equivalent to "recognized and allowed," and a
54. Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68 (1938).
55. Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1943) ; Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos
Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A. 2d 57 (1945) ; Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v.
Petroleos Mexicanos, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Fields v. Predionica I
Tkanika A. D., 265 App. Div. 132, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 874 (N. Y. 1st Dept. 1942).
56. Matter of United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N. Y. 264, 56 N. E. 2d
577 (1944). The question involved here was the claim of immunity from suit made
by a Mexican corporation which alleged that it was a government instrumentality.
57. Curran v. City of New York, N. Y. L. J., Jan., 1948 at p. 16. Suit was
brought by a taxpayer to declare invalid certain grants of land to the U. N. 0. and
exemption of the site from taxation. Defendant, Lie, Secretary-General of the United
Nations, moved for dismissal claiming no jurisdiction over him, as provided in the
International Organizations Immunities Act (see note 85 infra). Upon "recognition, certification and allowance" by the State Department, the complaint was dismissed, the court saying that there was no longer any question for independent
determination-without considering the terms of the Act in any way whatsoever.
58. 36 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
59. Id. at 504.
60. This statement was made in a letter from the State Dep't dated October 24,
1940. The Department further stated that the ultimate legal question of sovereign
immunity was to be left for the determination of the court.
61. The second letter was sent a month later on November 22, 1940.
62. See Note, Immunity From Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and
Obligations, 50 YALE L. J. 1088, 1092 (1941), where the writer refers to the American
case, Leubrie v. State of Sao Paulo, 97 N. Y. L. J. 2160 (April 30, 1947), and to
the collection of European cases in Draft Convention on the Competence of Courts
in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J. INT'L. L. at 483-488 (1932).
63. Emphasis added.
64. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 505 (1941), aff'd 122 F.
2d 355 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
65. The opinion of the appellate court in the instant case contains an extensive
discussion of the various immunity cases, particularly in regard to state subdivisions.
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radical extension of sovereign immunity was made. 66 Subsequent decisions
in another court have followed the Sao Paulo doctrine in their application
of "accepts as true," 67 thereby abdicating judicial functions in the absence
of a categorical pronouncement by the Department of State.
This breaking-down process has continued. The mere presence of a
declaration by the Nicaraguan Legation that "the defendant corporation . . . is . . . an instrumentality of the Government of Nicaragua,
and has been so recognized by Your Excellency's Government . . ." 68
incorporated into the communication from the Secretary of State to the
Attorney-General requesting representation to the court of the position
of the Nicaraguan Government, has been considered tacit assent to the
truth of the averment and a further equivalence to "recognition and allowance." 69 Therefore, the court would not consider the legal problem
raised by plaintiff's contention that the Republic of Nicaragua had waived
immunity from suit 7 0 -a far cry from earlier judicial assertions that the
question of such a waiver was a purely judicial one.71
By Implication--"a matter of comity": In the progression from the
extreme of a definite request for a certain legal result to the opposite
extreme of no statement at all by the Executive, the recent cases indicate
that the use of a third type of language by the State Department will also
cause a different legal effect from what might otherwise occur if the prin-

ciples of international law were properly applied.

If the suggestion by

the Department of State is presented "for such consideration as the court
may deem necessary and proper" 72 or "as a matter of comity," 73 it is
considered as a mere transmission of the claim to immunity which will not
preclude the court from considering the allegation upon which the claim
is based.74 Despite the contention of the courts that such language per66. The majority of opinion in the circuit court indicated that the result here was
a "rather radical extension of sovereign immunity, one for which direct precedent
appears to be lacking." Id. at 358. Judge Hand, concurring, preferred to limit the
holding to the necessity of putting national Brazilian credit on a firm basis which
could not succeed if Brazilian credits could be attached by our nationals, rather than
holding without more that each of the Federated States of Brazil was immune from
suit. Nevertheless, the latter is exactly what was held.
67. The Maliakos, 41 F. Supp. 697 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); American Tobacco Co.
v. the Ioannis P. Goulandris, 40 F. Supp. 924 (S. D. N. Y. 1941). (Both of these
cases were libel actions against Greek ships for cargo damage to tobacco shipped
from Greek ports.)
68. Miller v. Ferrocarrill del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 256, 18 A. 2d
688, 690 (1941).
69. The court stated that by reason of the "suggestion," no question was raised
for judicial determination. Id. at 258, 18 A. 2d at 691.
70. Id. at 258, 18 A. 2d at 692. "Since the case was properly dismissed
the court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the contention of the plaintiffs . .
Therefore, the cases of Coale v. Socit6 Co-Operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.
2d 180 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) and United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,
31 F. 2d 199 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) were held not to be in point. (See notes 36 and 37
supra and text references thereto.)
71. Dexter & Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jamvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. 2d 705 (C. C. A.
2d 1930), cert. denied-283 U. S. 896 (1931); Matter of United States of Mexico v.
Schmuck, 293 N. Y. 264 (1944).
72. Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189,
20 N. Y. S. 2d 825 (1st Dep't 1940) ; Lamont v. Travelers Insurance Co., 281 N. Y.
362, 24 N. E. 2d 81 (1939).
73. Ulen Co. v. Bank Gospodarstua Krajowego, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (App. Div.,
2nd Dep't 1940).
74. "As the executive branch . . . does not indicate that it takes any position
as to Roumania's claim of sovereignty, this court must determine such claim in the
manner it deems proper upon the facts and the law." Hannes v. Kingdom of
Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 825 (1st Dep't
1940).
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mits them to analyze the legal issues further, it is to be noted that the
immunity has uniformly not been granted, 75 a clear manifestation that the
Executive can prevent the immunity by the use of appropriate language.
Where there is no statement at all by the executive branch, the
intimation is that, in a doubtful case, the immunity from suit will not be
awarded, 76 and at least one court has definitely declared that immunity
should be restricted to cases in which the State Department has clearly
77
shown that it desires t1he exemption from suit to be granted.
The Attitude of the Supreme Court: Whatever doubts may have
existed with regard to the effectiveness of a statement of "recognition and
allowance" or of the significance of its absence in a State Department
communication, 78 they have been forcefully resolved by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman 79
where the problem arose of the immunity from suit of a vessel owned by
the Mexican government, but not in its possession, being used for commercial purposes by a private corporation. Previous cases had allowed
immunity where the vessel was owned and' possessed by the sovereign.8 0
That immunity was not extended here, the reason being that: "It is
not . . . for the courts to deny an immunity which our Government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
Government has not seen fit to recognize." s
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, stated that such a procedure would place responsibility for the
conduct of our foreign relations "where power lies." 82 It would seem
to follow from these opinions that transient diplomatic relations are to
determine
legal issues, a situation which can only lead to inconsistent de13
cisions.

The Precluding of Attention to Congressional Acts: An interesting
problem in relation to the expansion of executive-legal power has been
4
created by Westchester County v. Ranollo,8
a case arising under the International Organizations Immunities Act85 which provides that the
privileges and immunities extended therein to members of international
75. Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 825
(lst Dep't 1940) ; Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstua Krajowego, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 201
App. Div. 2nd Dep't 1940) (defendant claimed to be an instrumentality of the
Polish government, in action to recover amount unpaid on interest coupons of bonds
issued by defendant-immunity not granted); Lamont v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. 2d 81 (1939), discussed by'Deak, supra note 32. (Action
for a voluntary accounting brought by the International Committee of Bankers on
Mexico, organized under an agreement with Mexico, to determine rights of bondholders and others including the Mexican Government. The Mexican Government
appeared specially to move for dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity. The
motion was denied.) ; The Anghyra, A. M. C. 1495 (1941) (reported in LAUTERPACHT,
ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW CASES,

1941-42 at p.

223). (Claim of sovereign immunity for Greek merchant vessel denied.)
76. Plesch & Socit6 Haitenne de Banque et de Placement v. Banque Nationale
de la R~publique D' Haiti, reported in N. Y. L. J. for March 19, 1948.
77. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (City 'Court of New
Rochelle 1946).
78. Deak, supra note 32 at 460, where he indicates that the implications of The
Navemar were not clear at the time of his writing (1940).
79. 324 U. S. 30 (1945).
80. Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1943) ; Berizzi Brothers Co. v. The Pesaro,
271 U. S.562 (1926).
81. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 35 (1945) (Italics supplied).
82. Id. at 42.
83. Cf. Note, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 441 (1946).
84. 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (1946).
85. 59 STAT. 669, 22 U. S. C. A. § 288 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
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organizations 31 may be withdrawn or limited by an executive decree of
the President." After being arrested for speeding, a claim for immunity
under the Act was brought by the driver for the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, claiming that he was acting in his official capacity. 88 Immunity was denied on the ground that to free the defendant as a matter
of law would be carrying immunity too far, and that if immunity were
absolutely necessary to assure the proper deliberations of the organization,
it was a "circumstance that could be readily brought about if the granting
of immunity were restricted to those cases where our own State Department certified that the exemption . . . was in the public interest." 89
Undoubtedly, immunity could have been granted under the Act. 90 The
consequence of this decision is to preclude interpretation of the Congressional Act involved and to throw upon the State Department the onus of
making an ex parte determination of the cause.
III. SUMIARY OF THE GROWTH

The Ranollo case is only one more step in a long series of decisions
in which political considerations have played a predominant part. What
then is the limit to which the executive branch can go in deciding a
specific case? Until the decision in The Navemar, the development of
executive control was slow. The executive was permitted to determine
specific facts or general policies, but the legal consequences were resolved
by the courts. The law as it developed was a reflection of what the
courts believed that the makers of international policies would want-but
a body of international law did mature. Through a gradual process of
self-limitation, foreshadowed by dicta in a substantial number of cases following the First World War, the judicial function has been subordinated to international policy considerations. The decision in The Navenzar
led to a progressive exercise of judicial powers by the Department of
State, the end of which cannot yet be foreseen. The "recognition and
allowance" doctrine was broken down by judicial extensions in the courts'
efforts to avoid "political" determinations. The advancement from "recognition and allowance" to "accepts as true" to "a matter of comity" has
been a series of easy steps. Now the limitations of a Congressional Act
are no barrier to executive assumption in a field predominantly judicial. 91
86. Examples of some of the varied international organizations which are included
within the provisions of the Act are the International Labor Organization, The Pan
American Union, The International Monetary Fund and The United Nations.
87. Section 288: "The President shall be authorized, in the light of the functions
performed by any such international organization, by . . . Executive order to withhold
or withdraw from any such organization or its officers or employees, any of the . . .
immunities provided for . . . or limit the enjoyment . . . of any such . .
immunity."
88. Section 288 d(b) provides for immunity from legal process of employees of
named international organizations, relating to acts performed by them in their official
capacity, except in so far as immunity is waived by the foreign government or international organization concerned.
89. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31, 35 (City Court of New
Rochelle 1946).
90. Defendant was acting in his official capacity as an employee at the time of
his arrest. The United Nations is one of the international organizations provided
with immunity from process under the Act. If the purpose of granting immunity
here is based upon the same principle as the granting of other diplomatic immunities,
namely to facilitate the uninterrupted performance of diplomatic duties, then, clearly,
immunity applies to the present case.
91. Curran v. City of New York, reported in N. Y. L. J., Jan. 2, 1948, p. 16;
Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (City Court of New Rochelle

1946).
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In the area of treaty interpretation, the influence of the executive branch
has remained more consistent with the practice followed in other States,91
which, with the exception of France, 93 give great weight to the executive
interpretation, but do not consider it binding.94 But generally, the ideas
pervading the public policy of the Executive are now being given overwhelming weight and the subordination of the judicial branch has almost
been completed. Why has this come about?

IV.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SHIFT OF CONTROL

The achievement of this product of policy considerations has primarily
rested with the courts which have maintained a narrow concept of their
function.95 It has fundamentally stemmed from the broader judicial policy
of abstaining from the decision of questions with a "political" taint-an
early outgrowth of our legal system. The Supreme Court has said that
historically, international powers were not carved from the legislative
powers possessed by the original states in the Union but came from the
Crown to these states in their collective capacity, with narrow limitations
as to the branch of government which might exercise the power.96 Perhaps for this reason, the courts have not been so insistent upon the maintenance of the delicate balance of functions which is found in the internal
workings of our constitutional system.9 7 But of practical importance has
to promote harmony
been the fear of a conflict of policy, of trying "...
of action and uniformity of decision." 98
Yet there has not been a complete abandonment by the courts. Some
still evince a desire to apply legal reasoning in the face of a possible
"political" difficulty, as was done in Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co.99 Such
92. See ALLEN, THE POSITION OF
(1933); MASTERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW

FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS
IN NATIONAL COURTS (1932).

93. The French courts have gone even further than the American courts in
relation to the interpretation of treaties. The Executive branch is often relied upon
exclusively for this interpretation. See La Compagnie des Services Contractuels v.
Tito Landi, reported in LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 1935-1937, Case No. 216.
94. See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U. S. 433, 442 (1921) ; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S.
447, 468 (1913).
See also V HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNAT'L LAW, at 267
(1943).
95. JAFFEE, op. cit. mpra note 1, at 235.
96. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 316
(1936). The validity of the historical analysis here is open to serious question.
DODD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 418 n. 1 (3d ed. 1941).
97. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
98. Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 533 (1921). This fear is clearly illustrated
by the recent decision in Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Co.,
333 U. S. 103 (1948). The Supreme Court refused to allow judicial review of an
order of the Civil Aeronautics Board giving a certificate of convenience and necessity
to a domestic carrier wishing to engage in the operation of an airline abroad, which
order had been approved by the President as required by the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, 52 STAT. 1014 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §601 (1940). §601 provides for Presidential approval as to ". . . . any certificate authorizing an air carrier to engage in
overseas or foreign air transportation . . . or any permit issuable to any foreign air
carrier." But § 401, providing for judicial review, makes an exception only in favor
of "any foreign air carrier, subject to approval by the President." This section was
amended from ". . . . an order in respect of foreign air transportation . ...," a
clear indication that the exception was not to apply to citizen carriers engaging in
overseas air transport. The words of the statute, in the light of the previotis amendment, clearly indicate that some judicial review was to be allowed in a case of this
sort, but the Court, fearful of a "political question," not only denied review of Presidential discretion, but also of that part of the order coming from the Board alone.
99. 164 F. 2d 924 (C. C. A. 2d 1947). Here the court decided that the leased
bases in Bermuda were "possessions" of the United States insofar as the application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act was concerned, despite a State Department com-
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an approach, however, is found much less frequently since the decision in
The Navemar.
But the reapportionment of functions has not been solely a result of
judicial abnegation. The State Department, by specific request 0 0 and
by the use of felicitous language in its communications '01 has adapted itself to this readjustment of powers. In problems of taxation 102 as well
as in the determination of the effect of treaties 103 the State Department
has indicated a willingness to assert its position. Nevertheless, the basic
responsibility for the realignment of control rests upon the courts.
V. EVALUATION

Realization of the problem is not sufficient. There remains the further
task of evaluating the desirability for this reallocation of power, particularly with respect to the uncertainty of world affairs today. What are the
fundamentil policy considerations which would encourage or restrain any
extension of 6xecutive-legal determinations?
The primary desire to avoid embarrassment, "reinforced with nineteenth-century notions of the 'will' of the state as a moral entity," 104 has
been at the root of this legal growth. Upon no other sound basis can it
be justified. Yet it is submitted that countervailing policy considerations
far outweigh those in support of the trend. The attempt not to embarrass
the executive may result in real embarrassment by forcing an unwilling
executive to commit itself, where a decision by an independent judiciary

could be explained away. 10 5

Responsibilities are placed upon the State

munication which did not decide the issue. The court could have inferred from this
lack of an affirmative statement that the bases were not to be deemed "possessions"
for this purpose, but refused to do so. The communication from the State Department was couched in the following language: "The Bases in Bermuda were obtained
under the same circumstances as the other bases obtained from Great Britain . . .
This Government has not made any claim that the bases in Bermuda are territories or
possessions of the United States and there would therefore appear to be no reason for
any ruling or opinion on the matter." Id. at 928.
100. See note 49 supra.
101. See p. 86 supra.
102. T. D. 2076, INT REV. (April 17, 1931), discussed in HAcKWORTH, op. cit.
supra, note 42 at 475. The Nicaraguan government requested a refund of taxes paid
by a government-owned corporation. The State Department requested the Secretary
of Treasury to grant the refund, which was allowed.
103. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S DEC. B-75377, reported in 16 U. S. L. WEEK 2482
(April 13, 1948). Action was brought by Finnish shipowners to recover the balance
due them under Act of June 6, 1941 for requisition of their ships. Article 29 of the
Finnish Peace Treaty, to which the United States was not a signatory, provided for
waiver of such claims against "any of the United Nations whose diplomatic relations
were broken off during the war, and which took action in cooperation with the
Allied and Associated Powers." The State Department informed the shipowners
that it would not invoke the treaty in regard to these claims. The opinion of the
Comptroller General indicated disapproval of imposing such a large obligation (at
least four million dollars) upon the United States in the absence of express statutory
authority.
104. JAFFEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 232.
105. The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] A. C. 256. This was a clear case where the
Executive desired not to commit itself. The question had arisen as to whether the
Franco Government of Spain was recognized as a foreign sovereign state. The reply
to inquiry was confusing: "His Majesty's Government recognizes the Nationalist
Government as a Government which at present exercises de facto . . . control over

the larger portion of Spain . . . The Nationalist Government is not a Government
subordinate to any other . . . in Spain. The question vhether the Nationalist Government is to be regarded as that of a foreign sovereign State appears to be a question
of law to lie answered in the light of the preceding statements and having regard to
the particular . . . circumstances with respect to which the question is raised."

Id. at 258.
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Department which, in many cases, it does not desire to handle, 10 and the
burden of which could be more readily borne by the courts through the
use of judicial processes. The mere fact of a "political" question does not
inescapably lead to an improvement in international relations. Rather it
has been pointed out that it tends more to a policy of "perpetual appeasement which may lead to widespread abuse." 107 Nor will a judicial decision bind the political branches. 08 As one writer has shown, the courts
do make many decisions which, by definition, may be deemed "political." 109 It is important to realize that the State Department is ill-equipped
to carry out judikial processes, and the performance of such functions has
led to a defining of private rights by means of ex parte determinationshardly a desirable result under our form of government.
The impracticability of extending the practice is shown by the
numerous inconsistent decisions which have resulted. Even if United
States v. Pink 110 is to be considered an aberration because of the peculiar
circumstances involved, the practice since has not shown any return to
predictable results."' Despite the presence of policy considerations, there
must be sufficient certainty to protect private rights in international commercial matters. The extension of immunities, particularly in regard to
foreign government owned corporations, gives a favored position to foreign
instrumentalities and may well be a threat to free enterprise." 2 But aside
from the desirability of one set of legal results as against another, at least
if the results which would arise from a particular set of facts were known,
the parties dealing with one another would be protected by their knowledge
before unalterably committing themselves.
VI. SUGGESTIONS
The judicial branch should not be forced to vary with every changing wind of foreign policy. Perhaps a complete reversal of the trend is not
possible, but it is feasible to place definite limitations upon any further
shift of control. The Judiciary should restrict itself to deferring to the
Executive only in cases where the need for such deference is clear because
of a real danger to the general welfare, and should not be based upon
vague judicial premonitions of such harm. The present results have been the
offshoot of an over-active judicial imagination; many of the results would
106. See note 42 supra.
107. Kuhn, supra note 34 at 774.
108. For example, it is apparent that if a foreign non-recognized government
desired recognition, recognition by a court would not serve as a satisfactory substitute
for official recognition by the political branches. Nor would non-recognition by our
courts necessarily result in an unrecognized government trying harder for recognition.
Cf. NOEL-HENRY, GOUVERNEMENTS DE FAIT DEVANT LE JUGE, supra note 14.
cit. supra note 1, at 235.
109. JAFFEE, o.
110. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
111. Cf. The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431 (C. C. A. 3d 1944) ; see also the remaining
cases supra note 27. For example, one of the principles of international law which
has evolved through the course of many decisions in the various States is that no
court will adjudicate the validity of official acts of another State done within its own
territory. McCarthy v. Reichsbank, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 450 (1940). A recent decision,
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (C. C. A. 2d
1947), has indicated that if the State Department had so requested, the official acts
of another government done within its own territory would be retroactively invalidated. The Nazi Government had taken property from the plaintiff under duress.
Defendant was a Belgian corporation to which the property had been transferrea
with knowledge of the duress. See 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 427 (1948).
112. Kuhn, supra note 34 at 775.
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have been different had the realities of the situation been analyzed. As
has been pointed out in a discussion of "public policy" in the field of
private law, ".

.

we are not . . . authorized to establish as law

everything which we may think for the public good, and prohibit everything which we think otherwise." 11 Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in
United States .. Pink, has indicated a course the courts would do well to
follow: "It is indispensable to the orderly administration of the system
that . . . alteration of powers and the consequent impairment of state

and private rights should not turn on conceptions of policy which, if ever
entertained by the only branch of the government authorized to adopt it,
has been left unexpressed. It is not for this court to adopt policy, the
making of which has been by the Constitution committed to other branches
of the government. It is not its function to supply a policy where none
has been declared . .

.

and none can be inferred."

114

Yet it is clear

that there can be no rigid rule set down whereby the Judiciary can invariably delineate the scope of its function. Rather it depends upon judicial
disposition and spirit.
For its part, the State Department should declare in unmistakable
terms when it desires that policy factors should be overriding. The attempts of the Department to achieve a legal result without actually committing itself are without justification. The solution does not rest with
one branch alone. The progress of the American constitutional system
has shown that the three divisions of the government are capable in themselves of maintaining their necessary, integrated, delicate balance. These
two branches of government can work in proper harmony if they so desire, and thereby maintain the necessary continuity of the social and
economic order which must survive temporary international upheavals.
Despite the suggested limitation upon the Executive, this is not the
real answer. As long as policy governs any legal solutions, there will be
inconsistencies. Under the present system, also, if relief is denied in the
national courts, the procedure whereby the claimant may obtain redress
is expensive, slow and cumbersome. 115 Therefore, the only real answer is
a system of readily accessible 116 international courts, just as the only real
answer in the United States was a system of federal courts. 117 Only
courts of this nature can be free from subservience to the national policy
113. Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1, 123 (1853).
114. 315 U. S. 203, 256 (1942).
115. In the absence of a specific treaty providing otherwise, exhaustion of
remedies in the courts of the defendant nation is a prerequisite to the exercise of
diplomatic remedies. Even then the claim is carefully scrutinized by the State De-

partment before being pressed as a claim brought by the United States Government.
When all these requirements are coupled with the requisite that the claimant possess
the necessary "nationality," it is apparent that the remedy provided is often inadequate.
Once a State has taken up a case before an international court on behalf of its
claimant subject, then, in the eyes of the court, the State is the sole claimant.
Mavrommatis (Greece) v. Great Britain, Permanent Court of International Justice,
Ser. A, No. 2 (1924) at 63; see Borchard, The Protection of Citizensr Abroad and
Change of Original Nationality, 43 YALE L. J. 359 (1934), where he states the policy
bases behind the requirement and evaluates its desirability.
116. Under the present Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 34
§ 1, only States may be parties in cases before the Court. Therefore, no ready means
appears to be available within the present United Nations framework whereby a
private party may bring direct action against a State.
117. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). "The Constitution has
presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies and state
interests, might sometimes obstruct or control the regular administration of justice."
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of any individual State, 118 and be able to provide a remedy co-existent

with the right.
C.B.R.

Non-Patentable and Non-Copyrightable Business Ideas
For one who has originated a novel business idea the law affords his
discovery only an uncertain protection at best. The patent and copyright
laws extend almost no protection to such an intangible, and it may well
be that if the inventor of the idea is to profit by his discovery at all, it will
be only by selling it to some interested business enterprise-usually a
difficult transaction to negotiate, and just as difficult to enforce, in the
event of ensuing litigation.
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." This authority is sufficiently broad
so that Congress could, if it were deemed desirable, enact legislation
affording protection to ideas, but neither the patent nor the copyright laws
have been extended this far, and the courts universally hold that an intangible idea is not subject to either patent or copyright protection. Of
course, it is possible by embodying one's idea in a mechanical device to
protect the idea through the medium of that device, and the inventor can
obtain a right of exclusion for his idea by taking out letters patent, providing the requirements of patentability have otherwise been met. However,
unfortunately for their proponents, business ideas are rarely capable of
being reduced to any concrete form, and the courts have steadfastly refused to accord them protection under th6 patent or copyright laws.
Under the patent laws, inventions patentable include "any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter." ' Frequently,
the argument is advanced that a business idea should be patentable as a
"machine," but seldom with any success. In one of the leading cases,
Fowler v. City of New York, 2 plaintiff had taken out letters patent on a
"bi-transit subway system," an elaborate plan for handling the subway
traffic in New York City. In essence, it consisted of an arrangement of
tracks, two for express trains and two for locals, upon which trains would
run in the same direction, together with "island" platform stops between
the local and express tracks, thereby enabling a passenger to board a
local train, ride upon it to the nearest express stop, cross the platform
to an express train, and continue on it to his destination. When the
New York City subway system commenced using substantially the same
arrangement, plaintiff brought suit for infringement, arguing in support
of his patent that his "bi-transit" system was patentable as a "machine"
under the language of the statute. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's bill on the ground that the patent
on which the bill was based was void for lack of patentability. According
118. See Borchard, supra. note 115 at 359, where he states (in reference to
arbitral tribunals) : "They reflect the impartial view of what is soundest and best in
the living law, when put to the test of conflict; and while constituting only one manifestation of international life, such decisions are likely . . . to be as detached as so
political a subject permits."
1. REv. STAT. §4886 (1875), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §31 (1946).
2. 121 Fed. 747 (C. C. A. 2d 1903).
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to the court: "Conceding, arguendo, that a plan such as is disclosed in
the Carpenter patent may, if new and useful, be patented as a machine, it
is manifest that no mere abstraction, no idea, however brilliant, can be
the subject of a patent irrespective of the means designed to give it
effect." 3
Nor will the plaintiff succeed by arguing that his idea is patentable
as an "art." In Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. 4 plaintiff
filed suit for infringement as assignee of letters patent on a "method of
account-checking" designed to prevent frauds and peculation by waiters
and cashiers in restaurants. The plan was based on the use of a system
of waiter badges, numbered checks, and blank account slips designed to
give an accurate check of all cash receipts against orders placed in the
kitchen. In affirming a decree dismissing the complaint, the court remarked: "In the sense of the patent law, an art is not a mere abstraction.
A system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of the
term, an art. Advice is not patentable." 5
If the inventor of the business idea seeks to have his idea protected
under the copyright laws,6 he will be equally unsuccessful. For the protection afforded by the copyright laws looks not to the abstract idea, 7 but
to the form in which that idea is expressed. It is protection of the originality of expression, 8 the distinctive word order, 9 the literary style of the
author, at which the law aims, rather than the novelty or ingenuity of
the idea. Where an idea is embodied in some concrete form, the right of
property in the form is recognized. But the idea itself, once it has been
disclosed, is considered to be public property,' 0 and no individual will be
accorded an exclusive property right therein. Thus, where the plaintiff
had devised a plan for consolidating a complicated system of freight tariff
indexes, setting forth his plan in a copyrighted pamphlet, it was held no
infringement of the copyright where defendant published a similar
pamphlet, incorporating substantially the same plan.,- According to the
court, "The appellant's copyrights . . . protect his ideas when expressed
as he expressed them . . . But the appellant has no monopoly upon

information, or the purveying of information by a broad general method.
He must be protected in his choice of expression, and his copyrights held
to that." 12 Similarly, it has been held that the copyright laws give no
protection to such ideas as movie theater "Bank Nights," 13 bookkeeping
systems, 14 a system of letter file indexes, 15 a short hand system,1 6 sales
method,'1 or the Culbertson bridge system.' 8
3. Id. at 748.

4. 160 Fed. 467 (C. C. A. 2d 1908).
5. Id. at 469.

6. 35

STAT. 1076 (1909), as amended, 17 U. S. C. § 5 (1946).
7. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 690 (C. C. A. 2d 1926); Johnson v. Donaldson,
3 Fed. 22 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880).
8. Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
9. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879).
10. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F. 2d 958 (C. C. A. 1st 1936).
11. Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F. 2d 694 (C. C. A. 2d 1929).
12. Id. at 696.
13. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F. 2d 958 (C. C. A. 1st 1936).
14. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S.99 (1879).
15. Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co., 82 Fed. 314 (C. C. A. 7th

1897).
16. Brief English Systems, Inc. v. Owen, 48 F. 2d 555 (C. C. A. 2d 1931).
17. Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Ass'n, Inc., 64 F. 2d 575 (C. C. A. 6th
1933).
18. Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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In the main this refusal to extend patent or copyright protection to
intangible ideas is influenced by the immense administrative task that
would result from such a step. Ideas are too intangible, it is said, to be
the proper subjects for protection. 19 There would be no way of ascertaining who conceived the idea first-of determining how much of the idea
was original with its proponent and how much had been borrowed from
other members of society. The effect would be to usher into the courts
a torrent of infringement suits. 20 The litigants would be confronted with
great difficulties of proof. Moreover, it can be argued that to give a
statutory right of exclusion to the proponent of an idea would have the
effect of stifling independent thought and accomplishment by others. To
allow the patent or copyright of intangible ideas would so narrow the field
of thought as to tend to the detriment of society as a whole. Public policy
dictates that people be free to think and that ingenuity be unhampered.
It is only because of such powerful considerations as these that the courts
are not swayed by the appealing argument of the inventor that he and
he alone should profit from his idea.
Being unable to obtain the protection offered by the patent or copyright laws, the only course open to the originator of a business idea is to
endeavor to sell his idea to a corporation or some other business enterprise. Undoubtedly, large business activities are usually amenable to
securing worthwhile suggestions, but there are certain practical difficulties
involved which will quite frequently lead the individual to a stalemate in
his negotiations with the company. For one thing, implicit in any negotiations between the two parties is a fundamental conflict of interests. The
corporation carefully avoids making any commitment which might later
involve it in litigation, whereas the individual is reluctant to disclose his
idea without first obtaining assurances from the company that he will receive adequate remuneration if his idea is used. As we shall see, if the
corporation does anything that might possibly be construed as a promise
to pay for the suggestions, it may be held liable on a quantum meruit
basis. 2 1 Furthermore, it frequently happens that the very idea which the
individual submits is one which may have already been considered by
the company, yet not used for one reason or another. If the company
eventually does decide to use the idea (even though originated by its own
staff), it risks a piracy suit. And the burden falls upon the company to
prove that it had already considered the idea before being approached
by the plaintiff, often a difficult task.
From the point of view of the proponent of the idea, it behooves him
not to disclose it before exacting from the corporation a promise to compensate him if the idea is used. For once the idea has been revealed it
is generally held that all rights in it are relinquished.2 2 Like animals
ferae naturae, it is said that ideas upon release from confinement in the
brain become common property. Thus, where the originator of a plan
for combining the lead interests in the country voluntarily disclosed his
19. As Lord Brougham said: "They (ideas) are of too unsubstantial, too
evanescent a nature, their expression of language, in whatever manner, is too fleeting
to be the subject of proprietary rights. Volat irrevocable verbitrn, whether borne on
the wings of the wind or the press, and the supposed owner instantly loses all control
over them." Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 814, 965, 10 Eng. Repr. 681, 740
(1854).
20. The "floodgate of litigation" argument, while often a specious make-weight,
is certainly germane here.
21. Ryan & Associates v. Century Brewing Assn., 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053
(1936).
22. See Comment 20 HARv. L. REV. 143 (1906).
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idea in order to obtain financial assistance in perfecting it, it was held
that his voluntary disclosure ended all his rights in the plan 23-this,
despite the fact that the recipient of the plan subsequently made a fortune
by putting it into operation.
For some years courts have recognized that the use of ideas may be
protected24 by express contract. In Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society,

one of the leading cases, the court, speaking of ideas, said:

•. it is obvious that its originator or proprietor must himself protect it from escape or disclosure. If it cannot be sold or negotiated or
used without disclosure, it would seem that some contract should guard
or regulate the disclosure, otherwise it must follow the law of ideas and
become the acquisition of whoever receives it." 25 But this is not to say
that any idea at all is a proper subject of a contract of sale. For unless
the idea is novel and original or a new application of an idea which
has already been disclosed, the contract will be held to be void for lack
of consideration. 26 Thus, where plaintiff had contracted with the New
York, New Haven and Hartford RR. to sell to it the idea of selling advertising space in its passenger cars, 27 recovery was denied on the ground
that the idea was neither new, novel or valuable. Said the court: "Upon
communication to the defendant it at once did appear that the idea was
not original with the plaintiff, but was a matter of common knowledge,
well known to the world at large. He had thought of nothing new, and
had therefore no property right to protect which would make his idea
a basis of consideration for anything.

.

.

.

To furnish a consideration

for a contract of this kind the plaintiff must upon his proposition either
offer a new idea to be protected by the contract, or if the idea is common,
he must present a specific method of his own for the use and application
by the defendant of the common idea." 28
In the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff will be unable to show
an express contract and must rely on some other theory to establish his right
to recovery. Most frequently, he will endeavor to show that an implied
contract has arisen by virtue of the company's actions, although other
theories might be used.29 Regardless of what theory is adopted, however,
the chances of recovery, in the absence of an express contract, are uncertain indeed. For one thing, it is said that the idea must be in sufficiently
concrete form. The courts, of course, have recognized the difficulty in
laying down any fixed standard for measuring abstractness. "Each case
of this nature must of necessity depend upon its own facts. A line of
demarcation dividing the novel, new, and concrete from the abstract is
incapable of exact determination. Whether an idea is novel and whether
its form is concrete are matters of degree." 30 Unfortunately, adherence
to this requirement has resulted in defeating recovery by the proponent
of an idea far more than it has allowed it. Moreover, in view of the many
and conflicting decisions on this point, it is difficult indeed for the plaintiff
23. Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 Atl. 436 (1906).
24. 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892).
25. Id. at 267, 30 N. E. at 507.
26. Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574 (2d Dep't
1922), aff'd 235 N. Y. 609, 139 N. E. 754 (1923).
27. Masline v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639
(1921).
28. Id. at 711, 112 Atl. at 641.
29. These include quasi-confract and breach of a confidential relationship. There
is no recorded case where recovery in tort has been allowed.
30. Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 268, 38 A. 2d 61, 64

(1944).
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to foretell with any degree of certainty whether his case will ever be
allowed to get to a jury. If the plaintiff's idea can be definitively expressed, as in the case of an advertising slogan, the court will usually
imply a promise on the part of the defendant company to pay for the use
of the slogan. 3 . Yet in the absence of some slogan, writing, or mode of
expression by which it can be ascertained that the company was using the
plaintiff's invention, chances of recovery are slim. In Alberts v. Rentington Rand, Inc. 32 plaintiff submitted to the defendant company the suggestion that the company issue charts or graphs of the directions in which
hair grows on the individual's face to give to customers as an aid in the
sale of razors. Although the company subsequently adopted such a
scheme, the court refused to imply a contract with the plaintiff, holding
that the idea had not been reduced to sufficiently concrete form. Yet
if plaintiff had submitted sample graphs which had been utilized by the
company a different result might well have obtained. Similarly, ideas
for the production and staging of a miniature railroad at the New York
World's Fair,33 a radio program of dance music played by different groups
3
of musicians in different cities each week with prizes for the best groups, '
a ship-to-shore radio communication service for travelers with prepared
35
and an advertising
forms of messages transmissible at nominal rates,
36
have been held not
idea that Camel cigarettes are slower burning,
sufficiently concrete to warrant implying a contract. On the other hand,
at least one court has adopted a far more liberal view on the requirement
37
the
of concreteness. In Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Meyer
plaintiff submitted the idea for an advertisement showing two men in
working clothes one offering the other a package of cigarettes, the latter
replying, "No thanks; I smoke Chesterfields." Two years later the defendant company ran an advertisement showing two golfers, one with
an open cigarette case, and the other with a pack of Chesterfields, with
the slogan, "I'll stick to Chesterfields." Recovery on the basis of an implied contract was allowed, the court observing that "while we recognize
that an abstract idea as such may not be the subject of a property right,
yet when it takes upon itself the concrete form which we find in the instant case, it is our opinion that it then becomes a property right subject
to sale." 3s Inasmuch as the idea was contained in but one sentence,
unaccompanied by any drawing or illustration, the court's finding that the
idea was "concrete" is open to question, though it would seem that
the decision was a desirable one.3 9 However, in the light of subsequent
decisions, it would appear that other courts have40been reluctant to follow
the liberal result reached by the Indiana court.
31. Healey v. R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., 251 App. Div. 440, 297 N. Y. Supp. 165
(1st Dep't 1937), affd 277 N. Y. 681, 14 N. E. 2d 388 (1938) ; Ryan & Associates v.
Century Brewing Assn., 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053 (1936).
32. 175 Misc. 486, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 892 (1940).
33. Williamson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 258 App. Div., 16 N. Y. S. 2d 217
(2d Dep't 1939).
34. Bowen v. Yankee Network, 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. C. Mass. 1942).
35. Rodriguez v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N. Y. S.
2d 759 (1st Dep't 1940).
36. Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A. 2d 61 (1944).
37. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 206
(1935).
38. Id. at 430, 194 N. E. at 210.
39. The decision is criticized in a comment in 44 YA.. L. J. 1269 (1935).
40. Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A. 2d 61 (1944);
Alberts v. Remington Rand, 175 Misc. 486, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 892 C194fl
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Thus, it is apparent that the proponent of a new business idea has
no protection under the patent or copyright laws, and at best has only an
uncertain remedy in court for appropriation of his idea. It is doubtful
whether the patent or copyright lawys will ever be extended to include the
protection of bare ideas, chiefly because of the enormous administrative
difficulties which would accompany such a step. However, it would seem
that the adoption of a more liberal attitude by the courts toward the
protection of ideas would be desirable, whether based on implied contract, unjust enrichment, or breach of a fiduciary relationship. Equitable
protection of abstract ideas has been forthcoming in the field of trade
secrets, on the basis of breach of trust and confidence.41 It would seem
that such protection might well be given to business ideas.
W.D.H.

Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the
Overreaching Debtor
Encouragement of private adjustment of controversies in lieu of litigation, and protection of the individual who has relied on the integrity of such
an adjustment, are the two fundamental policies underlying the vitality of
the contractual doctrine of "accord and satisfaction." Based as they are
on faith in the principle of freedom of contract as a vital stimulus to individual endeavor, these policies have resulted in uniform enforcement of
such compromises. Yet recognition of the injustice of enforcement of
every contractual relationship has led to constant judicial delimitation of
the permissible pressures used in the bargaining process.' As part of this
development, there seems to be emerging a principle of law labelled "duress
by economic pressure," not yet frankly acknowleged, but implicit in many
decisions.2
There is need for articulation of this principle in the area of accord
and satisfaction. Expansion of mail communication and widespread
acceptance of the check as a method of payment together have produced
substantial modification of the doctrine. In turn, this change has exposed
and exaggerated a latent defect, the failure to compensate for disparity in
the economic bargaining power of the disputants.
Use of the check carries the accompanying legal consequences of the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction into dealings of every type, no matter
how unequal the positions of the parties may be. Out of this union of
modem methods and a legal doctrine which developed at a time when armslength bargaining was an economic fact rather than a figure of speech, has
emerged that anomalous creature, the overreaching debtor.
It is unfortunate that the courts have formed the habit of labeling
the parties "debtor" and "creditor" inasmuch as the image conjured up is
41. A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petrnleum Iron Works, 73 F. 2d 531 (C. C. A. 6th

1934).
1. For an excellent article tracing the theory of inequality in bargaining power

in its halting progress through various fields of law, see Dawson, Ecommic Duress-

An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. Rlv. 253 (1947).
2. Fuixuz, BASIC CONTRAcT LAW 260 (1947); see Dalzell, Duress By Economic
Pressure,20 N. C. L. REv. 341,. 360 (1942) : "So, in a few instances, the mere use of
unequal bargaining power to force a person in an unusually distressing situation to
agree to hard contract terms is treated as duress."
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deceptively inopportune. The positions of the parties to an accord and
satisfaction are frequently the reverse of the classic debtor-creditor relationship, with the creditor practically at the mercy of the so-called debtor.
Decisions in this field, which have been influenced by the doctrine
of economic coercion to achieve a just result, have relied on manipulation
of existing concepts, in lieu of outright denunciation of the evil. To ascertain the extent of this influence for the purpose of confuting the judicial
use of legal rationales, some review of the dominant concepts will be

necessary. 3

THE MECHANICS OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
The refinements developed with respect to checks primarily affect the
contractual component of mutual assent. Typically the check contains a
collateral stipulation such as "in full payment of all claims." Whatever
the language, it must clearly and unequivocally indicate the drawer's intent
that the payee accept it in full settlement of his demand. 4 The compact is
established when the obligee, fully aware of the obligor's intention, assents
thereto.5
It is at this point that the check has caused a profound extension of
the normal rule, for the law will imply the obligee's assent to the expressed
intent of the debtor from his exercise of dominion over the check, regardless of any contrary manifestation on his part. The only method by which
he can effectively overcome the implication is to return the instrument. 6
Obviously then, assent is a legal fiction in check cases, adopted by the
3. These elements are spelled out briefly in Moore v. Bartholomae Corp., 69 Cal.
App. 2d 474, 159 P. 2d 436 (1945) ; and at some length in Note, 78 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
549 (1930).
4. "Proof must be clear and unequivocal that the observance of the condition was
insisted upon, and must not admit of the inference that the debtor intended that his
creditor might keep the money tendered, in case he did not assent to the condition
upon which it was offered." Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 117
Ill. App. 622, 625 (1905), aff'd, 215 Ill. 244, 74 N. E. 143 (1905). The surrounding
circumstances should have considerable influence on the court's interpretation of the
language. Durkin v. Everhot Heater Co., 266 Mich. 508, 254 N. W. 187 (1934).
Examples of sufficient notation in commercial dealings are: "Indorsement of payee
will constitute receipt in full," Meyers v. Hirsch, 125 Misc. 261, 210 N. Y. Supp. 466
(1925) ; "In full of account," Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin, supra; "In full of all
demands to date," Goss v. Rishel, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1045 (1904) ; "To bal. acct.,"
Lafrentz v., Cavanagh, 166 Ill. App. 306 (1909).
5. This may be accompanied by a receipt, statement of account, voucher, or
release, to be signed and returned, but we are mainly concerned with the situation
wherein the check alone is involved.
6. Day-Luellwitz Co. v. Serrell, 177 Ill. App. 30 (1913). Otherwise since obligor
has power to impose any condition on his tender, retention of the instrument without
acquiescence in the condition would technically be a conversion of the obligor's property. Striking out the stipulation before cashing, protesting to the obligor or notifying
him of acceptance for account only have been thought not to modify the implication.
See, e. g., Schwarzenberg v. Mayerson, 2 F. 2d 327 (C. C. A. 6th 1924) ; Beck Electric Co. v. Nat'l Contracting Co., 143 Minn. 190, 173 N. W. 413 (1919) ; Ellis v.
Mansfield, 215 Mo. App. 292, 256 S. W. 165 (1923); Root & Fehl v. Murray Tool
Co., 26 S. W. 2d 189 (Tex. 1930). Retention for an unreasonable period of time is
generally regarded as assent. Seeman v. Noble, 294 S. W. 438 (Mo. App. 1927);
Hemingway v. Mackenzie, 137 Misc. 876, 244 N. Y. Supp. 48 (1930), aff'd, 230 App.
Div. 819, 245 N. Y. Supp. 766 (1930). Assent will also be implied though the check
is cashed by an unauthorized agent, though the creditor is illiterate, or unaware of
the legal consequences. Anderson v. Standard Granite Co., 92 Me. 429, 43 Ati. 21
(1899); Marx v. White Co., 143 N. Y. Supp. 1036 (1913), aff'd, 148 N. Y. Supp. 262
(1914) ; Schumacher v. Moffitt, 71 Ore. 79, 142 Pac. '353 (1914) ; Linn Co. v. Harris,
118 Ill. App. 5 (1905).
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courts to implement the policy favoring adjustment of controversies without
judicial intervention. 7
Considerable flexibility, however, is inherent in the- rule. For instance, a court may require more than the usual clarity of intent to be
expressed by the language on the check.8 And the issue of the creditor's
assent is sometimes regarded as a jury question 9 as is the question of
whether retention was for an unreasonable time. 10 These variations may
show a suspicion that the extension of the concept of implied assent to this
situation has propelled the law beyond the realm of honest compromise."l
Another sine qua non of the doctrine is the requirement that there be
an unliquidated or disputed claim. Thus the danger of the obligee being
taken by surprise is largely abated, inasmuch as the existence of a dispute
presupposes prior negotiation. But such a concept escapes exact definition
12
so that some jurisdictions prescribe merely that the dispute be bona fid'e,
while others require that the controversy be based on substantial grounds. 13
The requirement of consideration 14 leads to the result that payment
of part of a liquidated debt will not effect a compromise despite the creditor's assent because payment of a legal obligation is not consideration.
Much has been written of the unreasonableness of the rule, now generally
known as the rule of Foakes v. Beer,15 which prevents the two parties
from honestly reaching a binding settlement, and the courts have undermined its effectiveness by subtle interpretation of the concept "liquidated." 16 Nevertheless it retains much of its original vitality for reasons
7. The amount of litigation casts doubt on the effectiveness of this implementation.
However, the doctrine is a most available defense. See Note, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1413,
1419 (1934), for an opinion regarding increase of litigation in a similar situation.
8. Lovekin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 282 Pa. 100, 127 Atl. 450 (1925);
Hillestad v. Lee, 91 Minn. 335, 97 N. W. 1055 (1904).
9. St. Pierre v. Peerless Casualty Co., 77 N. H. 599, 92 Atl. 840 (1914) ; Robinson v. Detroit R. R. Co., 84 Mich. 658, 48 N. W. 205 (1891).
10. Rauh v. Wolf, 59 Misc. 419, 110 N. Y. Supp. 923 (1908); Fredonia Gas Co.
v. Elwood Supply Co., 71 Kan. 464, 80 Pac. 969 (1905) ; Patten v. Lynett, 133 App.
Div. 746, 118 N. Y. Supp. 185 (1909). One who makes a practice of issuing such
checks in the course of his regular dealings may well not be permitted to urge accord
and satisfaction. Pike v. Buzzell, 76 N. H. 120, 79 AtI. 992 (1911).
11. It should be remembered that the doctrine originated where the parties met,
discussed, and agreed upon the compromise. There was no possibility of one party
being taken by surprise as is possible by use of the check.
12. "It matters not whether there was a 'solid foundation for the dispute.' The
test in such cases is: Was the dispute honest or fraudulent?" Metropolitan Shirt
Waist Co. v. Kamione, 138 N. Y. Supp. 1067, 1068 (1913); Schuttinger v. Woodruff,

259 N. Y. 212, 181 N. E. 361 (1932); Sylvania Products v. Electrical Wholesalers,
198 Ga. 870, 33 S. E. 2d 5 (1945).
13. Penna. R. R. v. Cameron, 280 Pa. 458, 124 Atl. 638 (1924); Burns v. No.

Pac. Ry., 134 F. 2d 766 (C. C. A. 8th 1943) ; Harms v. Casualty Co., 172 Mo. App.
241, 157 S. W. 1046 (1913). Whether a debt is liquidated or not may even be left to
the jury. Duplantie v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 42 Ohio App. 112, 181 N. E. 656
(1932).
14. No difficulty arises with respect to unliquidated or disputed claims as the
promise of each to forego an opportunity to settle his claim by litigation is consideration for the other.
15. 54 L. J. Q. B. 130, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1882). This case established the principle in English law.
16. The legal theories used are: (1) When any part of a debt is unliquidated,
the entire debt is unliquidated; or payment of the conceded part will satisfy the entire
claim. The leading case espousing this view is Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Clark,
178 U. S. 353 (1900), where a much quoted statement was made denouncing and
expressly narrowing the rule of Foakes v. Beer to its exact facts. See also a discussion of this decision in the opinion of L. Hand, C. J., in Matlack Coal & Iron
Corp. v. N. Y. Quebracho Export Co., 30 F. 2d 275 (C. C. A. 2d 1929). Hand
criticizes the opinion as being hazy over what really constitutes a disputed claim:
then goes on to lay down the distinction that where several items under a claim, some
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which become apparent in the discussion of type-situations below, where
the cases have been separated into categories based on the economic
status of the parties.
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

Many varieties of disputes arise in this category from the nature of
business dealings, with contract interpretation, funning accounts, and warranties providing a fertile field for compromise. 17 Uniform application of
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is most desirable in that businessmen be encouraged to settle their differences with a minimum of interference and a maximum of finality.' 8 This permits retention of advantage
gained by greater foresight and business acumen. Whatever adjustment is
arrived at will generally be subject only to those forms of economic pressure by which exchange of goods and services is normally accomplished
in an individualist society. 19 Credit investigation facilities, legal counsel,
business knowledge and experience, and sufficient funds to render nugatory
the threat of expensive and time-consuming litigation are available to each
party. Infrequently has an obligor the opportunity
to force a disadvanta20
geous bargain on a hard-pressed creditor.
The indispensable requirement in this category should be that of a
dispute, which operates as notice to the obligee to expect an offer of compromise. Intangible factors, however, may have considerable effect on
judicial construction of the facts. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v.
Valley Supply Co. 2 1 illustrates avoidance of injustice, where the check was
finally cashed by the despairing creditor after several rejections. Although
technically a dispute existed, the court summarily adjudged otherwise,
of which are disputed, arise from a single promise, the entire claim is unliquidated;
while where two separate claims exist, payment of a conceded one is not consideration
for release of the other. Some jurisdictions refuse to follow this avoidance of the
rule. Robinson v. Leatherbee Tie & Lumber Co., 120 Ga. 901, 48 S. E. 380 (1904) ;
Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204, 103 N. E.
(2) An undisputed debt against which the debtor claims a set-off or
695 (1913).
damages which the creditor does not concede is an unliquidated claim. Ostrander v.
Scott, 161 Ill. 339, 43 N. E. 1089 (1896) ; Hull v. Johnson, 22 R. I. 66, 46 AtI. 182
(1900).
In several jurisdictions this rule has been expressly rejected by judicial
decision. Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 22 So. 189 (1897); Frye v. Hubbell, 74
N. H. 358, 68 Atl. 325 (1907) ; Brown v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798 (1899) ;
Weinrich v. Franklin Savings and Loan Co., 77 Ohio App. 1, 63 N. E. 2d 38 (1945).
17. Contract interpretation may give rise to an unliquidated claim. Breach of
warranty creates a right of set-off in the debtor. Barron Co. v. Fox, 84 Pa. Super.
46 (1924). Breach of any term of the contract gives the debtor a right to damages.
Minn. & 0. Paper Co. v. Register & Tribune Co., 205 Iowa 1228, 219 N. W. 321
(1928).
18. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Unadilla Motor & Supply Co., 126 Misc. 292, 213
N. Y. Supp. 81 (1926); Hanley Co. v. American Cement Co., 108 Conn. 469, 143
AtI. 566 (1928).
19. A typical case is Schnell v. Perlmon, 238 N. Y. 362, 144 N. E. 641 (1924),
in which the New York court reviewed many decisions in the field, where a purchaser
of goods refused to pay the contract price because delivered in unsound condition and
not as warranted, and seller's acceptance of payment for contract price less amount
deducted for damaged goods constituted an accord and satisfaction. The same court
in one of the few opinions articulating the point said, "The law wisely favors settlement, and when the parties are in a position to deal with one another at am's length,
as these parties were, the law will support their settlement." (italics added) Simons
v. Supreme Council A. L. H., 178 N. Y. 263, 266, 70 N. E. 776 (1904).
20. Hard-pressed business debtors are more numerous. Hazelhurst Oil Mill &
Fertilizer Co. v. U. S., 42 F. 2d 331 (C. C. A. 4th 1930); Pittsburgh Steel Co. v.
Hollingshead & Hflei, 202 Ill. App. 177 (1916).
21. 119 W. Va. 645, 195 S. E. 596 (1938).
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probably on the basis that it was not bona fide or honest and substantial.
Implied assent was not inferred under these circumstances. 22
Courts should be unwilling to ignore normal business practice. A businessman who handles a great many checks is accustomed to deposit them
without question as payments on account despite the notation "in full payment" appearing thereon, as such a notation is fairly common. In the absence of prior negotiations, he will presume that the drawer's accounts are
incorrect, in which case an adjusted bill crediting his account with partpayment will be sent. This idea is implicit in the decision of Ochs v.
Reynolds 23 where the court stresses the fact that plaintiff had no knowl24
edge of a dispute as to the account at the time the check was given him.
Not infrequently, however, the issue is confused by courts deciding it on
basis of the rule of Foakes v. Beer,25 or insufficient expression of the
debtor's intent. 26
The rule of Foakes v. Beer deservedly receives much criticism with
regard to this category of cases. However, it seems likely that the very
development of the concept of implied assent has been influential in retarding its disappearance. Certainly some safeguard is necessary to protect the obligee from unwittingly compromising an undisputed obligation.
Though this possibility has not prevented the exi~ience of any unusual
27
circumstances from being sufficient to avoid operation of the 2rule,
the
8
reason may lie in their effect of putting the creditor on notice.
The extent of the reliance interest of the discharged obligor also contributes to this limitation of the rule. He may be seriously inconvenienced
22. Accord, Smith v. Brandenburg Instrument Co., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 264 (1944)
(Where the defendant refused to return some defective steel forgings out of an order
delivered by plaintiff who cashed his check for the remainder on the basis that they
would be returned) ; Clare v. Freedman, 118 Conn. 68, 170 Atl. 477 (1934) (Plaintiff
relied on defendant's wilfully incorrect version of their account and cashed check for
corresponding sum); McKay v. Myers, 168 Mass. 312, 47 N. E. 98 (1897) (Plaintiff
accepted check purporting to balance account in full, being unaware that there was
any controversy).
23. 155 Pa. Super. 469, 38 A. 2d 728 (1944).
24. Penna. R. R. v. Cameron, 280 Pa. 458, 124 At. 638 (1924), illustrates the
point, lack of substantial dispute rendering the language of a check insufficient to
make the creditor aware that the debtor really intended the payment to be in full
settlement. Accord, Goldenster & Cohen, Inc. v. Butler Iron and Steel Co., 49 F.
Supp. 122 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1943).
25. MacDonald v. Irvanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 156 N. E. 740 (1927); Laroe v.
Sugar Loaf Dairy, 180 N. Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61 (1905).
26. Lighthouse for the Blind v. Miller, 149 Kan. 165, 86 P. 2d 508 (1939);
Dimmick v. Banning, Cooper & Co., 256 Pa 295 100 Atl. 871 (1917); Mack v.
Miller, 87 App. Div. 359, 84 N. Y. Supp. 440 (19035.
27. Courts compensate by narrowing the concept "liquidated obligation" to exclude
all but the most obvious debts, and through the adoption of any slight variation as
representing consideration for the new contract. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 120-130
(2d ed. 1936). Likewise, parties honestly compromising a liquidated debt may execute a sealed release which is effective, in the absence of fraud, in almost all states
despite the abrogation of the effect of a seal. Dreyfus & Co. v. Roberts, 75 Ark. 354,
87 S. W. 641 (1905) ; Recommendation of the New York Law Revision Commission
to the 1936 Legislature.
28. Or it may be that any corroborative facts from which the most probable
inference is that the creditor was aware of the debtor's intent is what the courts have
in mind. However, so much denunciation of the rule has occurred that most courts
have no particular reluctance in deliberately finding a circumstance to take the case
out of the rule. See Cantrall v. Waterman, 70 Cal. App. 184, 188, 232 Pac. 997, 998
(1924); Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARv. L. REv. 515, 525 (1899).
See also Ferson, The Rule in Foakes v. Beer, 31 YALE L. J. 15 (1921), in which the
writer suggests that Foakes v. Beer and the doctrine of consideration may not be
applicable to accord and satisfaction at all, that this is really the case of an executed
gift.
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by an unexpected demand for payment of the balance of an obligation he
believed cancelled. It may disrupt his business plans, affect the soundness
of his intervening decisions, and complicate his accounts. Against this, the
obligee may have received sufficient consideration for the discharge in
avoiding suit, keeping his assets liquid, and perhaps gaining goodwill. He
may compensate for such a loss through deduction from income tax base,
or by charging it off against doubtful accounts receivable.
In this category then, where the parties are economic equals, the principle of accord and satisfaction produces justifiable results and should be
given broader scope by abrogation of Foakes v. Beer, provided that some
29
safety-valve be developed to negative use of excessive economic pressure.
LANDLORD AND TENANT CONTRACTS

The cases in this classification line up heavily on the side of the landlord against whose suit as creditor the defense of accord and satisfaction is
urged. Leases are almost invariably written instruments with rental stipulated therein, the epitome of a liquidated debt inescapably controlled by the
rule of Foakes v. Beer. The result is frequently harsh disregard for the
reliance interest of the tenant.
A typical situation and solution occurred in Aston v. Alkow, 30 where
the two parties agreed to a reduction in rent for which tenant gave landlord
a check "Payment in full on all back rent as per agreement." Landlord later
sued for $1441, and the court dismissed the tenant's defense, even though
there was some doubt between the parties as to exactly what the previous
rental had been. 31
Note that in many cases the tenant is a businessman which would
seem to make the policies of the Commercial category applicable. Nevertheless there is little condemnation of the rule of Foakes v. Beer voiced in these
decisions. In fact, a right of set-off in the tenant as a result of repairs made
upon strength of landlord's promise of reimbursement, a circumstance regarded as rendering
the obligation disputed in business dealings, failed to
32
impress one court.
Seldom is much consideration given the disparity of bargaining power
between these parties, though the tenant was (before rent control) notoriously at a disadvantage under the landlord's relatively efficient remedies
of ejectment and distraint. Two possible explanations lie in the fact that
29. For instance, debtors are protected by the principle of "business compulsion,"
79 A. L. R. 658 (1931). Why not apply the same reasoning to necessitous creditors?
Some cases have avoided the problem of a liquidated claim by regarding as a question
of fact whether the creditor has by words or conduct agreed to the stipulated condition.
Goldsmith v. Lichtenberg, 139 Mich. 163, 102 N. W. 627 (1905); Bisbee v. Pulpit
Farm Dairy, 78 N. H. 372, 100 Atl. 672 (1917); Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v.
Prosser, 157 N. Y. 289, 51 N. E. 988 (1898). This is a relaxation of the concept of
implied assent. For a review of the Canadian experience with this approach, see 26
Canadian Bar Review, 721 (1948). Merely nullifying Foakes v. Beer without more,
drives courts to torturing the concept of bona fide dispute as in Sylvania Products v.
Elec. Wholesalers, 198 Ga. 810, 33 S. E. 2d 5 (1945) ; Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Rolaff, 110
F. 2d 491 (C. C. A. 8th 1940), in order to avoid an inequitable result.
30. 279 Mich. 232, 271 N. W. 742 (1937).
31. Note that this tenant was very likely recovering from the business depression,
in which case the detriment to his reliance interest would be far greater than the loss
to the landlord. In fact the general economic situation does seem to carry weight
with some courts who have recognized the defense as a method of extrication of
tenants from long term lease dilemmas during depression periods. Lindeke Land Co.
v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N. W. 650 (1934) ; Adams Recreation Palace Inc. v.
Griffith, 58 Ohio App. 216, 16 N. E. 2d 489 (1937). Contra: Levine v. Blumenthal,
117 N. J. L. 23, 186 Atl. 457 (1936).
32. Harby v. Henes, 45 Misc. 366, 90 N. Y. Supp. 461 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
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these contracts deal with real estate, strongly protected in many other ways
for historic reasons; and that it is in this area that the "deadbeat" debtor
most often appears. The character of the tenant and of the leasehold, be it
residence, office, factory, or farm, should exert some influence but such is
not articulated in the cases.
Certainly, the courts are not powerless to overcome Foakes v. Beer
where they are so inclined, as is evidenced by a sprinkling of cases. For
instance in Brackett Co. v. Lofgren,33 the opinion is expressed that Foakes
v. Beer is particularly unsatisfactory where a landlord admittedly yielded
a portion of the rent, receipted for a lesser amount for two years, and then
"after monthly rebates had grown to a staggering amount, sued to recover
in a lump sum the aggregate of the amounts voluntarily yielded." The rule
was avoided on the theory that as to an agreement which has been fully
34
executed on both sides, the question of consideration becomes immaterial.
5
Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co.3 uses a more conventional means of circumventing the rule. The theory here is that mere refusal of tenant to pay
rent "for any cause" creates a sufficient dispute to support the new contract
of accord as settlement.3" The executed contract idea becomes merely a
makeweight argument when in the last paragraph, the court recognized
that avoidance
of a doubtful suit is sufficient consideration for the land37
lord's assent.

These latter decisions in effect add up to a complete overthrow of
Foakes v. Beer, while giving lip service to it. From the standpoint of
counsel it would seem infinitely more desirable to have a clear understanding that each case would be decided on the basis of the bona fides of the
transaction than by circumvention of the rule by various legal rationales,
to each of which a different body of law is applicable.
INSURANCE CONTRACTS

Cases in this category show a greater awareness by the courts of the
existence of the overreaching debtor, perhaps because the relative inequality
of bargaining power is unmistakable. Even so, the insurance companies
have been moderately successful, often at the expense of a beneficiary with
powerful sympathetic appeal.3 8 But this may rest largely in the fact that
such defendants bend their efforts toward preventing the case from reaching the jury on any issue. Many companies manage to obtain a release of
33. 140 Minn. 52, 167 N. W. 274 (1918).

34. McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458 (1890) (Bases a similar
holding on points of executed agreement, gift, inefficacy of a receipt, and acquiescence);
cf. Hurlbut v. Butte-Kansas Co., 120 Kan. 205, 243 Pac. 324 (1926).

35. 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921).

36. It may be well to note here that this jurisdiction is one of those which really
decides most of these cases on their facts although plagued by the rule of Foakes v.
Beer. See also Eisenberg v. Battenfield Oil Co., 251 Mich. 654, 232 N. W. 386 (1930),
for a sensible decision.
37. Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Fellsway Motor Mart, 294 Mass. 306,
1 N. E. 2d 201 (1936), and Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N. W.
650 (1934), find consideration in implied agreement to remain in occupancy, a possibility evidently overlooked in Levine v. Blumenthal, 117 N. J. L. 23, 186 Atl. 457
(Sup. Ct. 1936). Some peculiar cases have come up in Wisconsin. In Ossowski v.
Wiesner, 101 Wis. 238, 77 N. W. 184 (1898), tenant succeeded in making a modification stick; apparently Foakes v. Beer was not even urged by counsel. Again in
Estate of Dohm, 188 Wis. 626, 206 N. W. 877 (1926), the rule was not mentioned in
the opinion which was based on the idea of acceptance being regarded as proof of a
gift. However in this case an administrator was contesting forgiveness of a debt of
a devoted nephew by the decedent uncle. The estoppel idea is articulated in Hidden
v. German Savings & Loan Society, 48 Wash. 384, 93 Pac. 668 (1908).
38. Lehaney v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 307 Mich. 125, 11 N. W. 2d 830 (1943).
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all claims from the plaintiff or a surrender of the policy. Faced with such
airtight evidence, the courts are often forced to decide that a valid accord
and satisfaction has taken place as a matter of law. In Woodbery v. New
York Life Ins. Co.3 9 the plaintiff accepted a payment equal to the amount
of premiums paid by decedent on a policy with double indemnity clause, in
full settlement, as further evidence of which she surrendered the policy.
This proved insurmountable, perhaps also because there was good reason
to suspect that the plaintiff's claim was not bona fide.40 However, given
some slight indication of lack of mutual assent, courts may be inclined
to
4
either rule out the company's defense or throw the issue to the jury. '
The rule of Foakes v. Beer has also been a handy tool in traversing the
defense, under the theory that payment of an admitted liability will not
discharge a greater disputed amount. Occasionally as in Harms v. Casualty Co.,4 2 a court will go so far as to outlaw the defense even in face of
a release and surrender of the policy.
An equitable approach would be to examine carefully the beneficiary's
assent to the conditions imposed on the check in the light of his available
alternatives, and the reasonableness of the amount tendered under the circumstances. The tools of release and surrender, and the fact that the beneficiary has a difficult case to prove once the defense is overcome, should
lessen the tendency for such an approach to discourage reasonable settlement.
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE CONTRACTS
In this field the courts have been more responsive to the economic disadvantage of the creditor and the comparatively slight reliance interest of
the obligor. The actual unfairness of regarding the employee's acceptance of
his salary check as his assent to the employer's version of settlement of a
salary dispute is dictated by the reality of the situation. 43 The two most
powerful forces tending to render such an assumption unrealistic are 1) the
employee's fear of losing his means of livelihood by too obstinate a protest,
and 2) his lack of reserve
funds which would enable him to refuse the
44
the check however small.
39. 223 App. Div. 272, 227 N. Y. Supp. 699 (1st Dept. 1928).
40. As exemplified by Lehaney v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra note 38, Michigan
seems to apply the doctrine very rigidly at times, perhaps as a result of the precedent
established by Tanner v. Merrill, 108 Mich. 58, 65 N. W. 664 (1895), where an employee in an impossible situation was forced to compromise by his employer and the
court went out of its way to avoid Foakes v. Beer to make the bargain stick.
41. As in Graham v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 612, 47 P. 2d 1029 (1935),
where beneficiary of life insurance policy with double indemnity clause cashed check
for face value of the policy but stipulated non-consent to waiver of double indemnity
claim on the receipt. See also Sexton v. Equitable Life Ins. Society of U. S., 223
App. Div. 738, 227 N. Y. Supp. 902 (2d Dept. 1927).
42. 172 Mo. App. 241, 157 S.W. 1046 (1913). See also Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Richter, 173 Okla. 489, 49 P. 2d 94 (1935) ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Lightsey, 49 F. 2d 586 (C. C. A. 4th 1931).
43. See Judge Frank's concurring opinion in Ricketts v. Penna. R. R., 153 F.
2d 757, 767 (C. C. A. 2d 1946), a case involving injured employee's release of employer of liability for one-tenth the actual damages sustained where he said that
employees are ". . . in many of their dealings with employers, necessitous persons,
under strong economic pressures, who, because of their helplessness, are to be protected from hard bargains . . ." Compare employee cases in collection 75 A. L. R.
905 (1931).
44. These basic elements are probably most obvious in cases involving releases
of employers from liability for injuries incurred by employees. E. g., Cleveland Ry.
v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, 86 N. E. 485 (1908) ; Forbs v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.,
107 Mo. App. 661, 82 S.W. 562 (1904) ; Note, 27 COL. L. REv. 430 (1927).
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Several cases bring out the first factor clearly. In Gibbons v. Brewster,45 the parties disagreed as to the method of computing bonus to plaintiff. Defendant paid plaintiff on basis of his own version, plaintiff protesting but cashing each check. At the trial defendant honestly testified that
plaintiff would have been fired, had he not accepted the change. Court
promptly ruled lack of consent on part of plaintiff; therefore no accord
and satisfaction. Exploitation of plaintiff's economic necessity was so
patent here that the doctrine of implied assent was directly repudiated. In
Hennessy v. St. Paul City Ry., 46 plaintiff's own testimony that fear of discharge prevented his objecting to employer's deduction from his wages the
value of property allegedly carelessly injured by plaintiff, accomplished
identical results. Yet in Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard,41 this factor
was clearly exposed when the company discharged him as a result of the
dispute, and yet the court upheld the defense of accord and satisfaction for
48
thd period during which the employee had accepted checks under protest.
The second factor needs no amplification and the two together are ample
to suggest a relaxation of the doctrinaire formalities in these cases.
In addition, the protest the employee feebly interposes falls on deaf
ears or is frequently parried by an assurance of adjustment as in Ferryboatinen's Union of California v. Northwestern Pacific R. R.49 where
employees cashed their checks relying on company's integrity in promising
adjustment of claims. As an example of measures a court can take, the
doctrine of Foakes v. Beer was employed, no meeting of the minds over
the alleged accord was found, and practically the most important, the custom of employees to cash such checks was discussed as rebutting implied
assent.50
That an employee, even after his discharge, frequently dare not institute suit for fear of killing his chances of reemployment when the labor
market again contracts is still another element.51 This may account in part
for the dearth of cases wherein an ordinary working man seeks his entitlement, in contrast to the multitude of cases involving relatively high-priced
employees, such as managers and agents whose resources permit some
defiance although the above factors apply to them in a lesser degree.5 2 The
workingman's general ignorance of the law may also be a vital reason for
45. 186 P. 2d 459 (Cal. App. 1947).
46. 65 Minn. 13, 67 N. W. 635 (1896).
47. 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
48. Another employee in the same situation must have misconstrued the decision
in this case since he brought suit several years later on almost identical facts except

that he had continued to accept all his checks under protest. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v.

Webb, 64 F. 2d 902 (C. C. A. 5th 1933). This time a federal court in effect overruled Dick v. Davis, 288 Fed. 445 (App. D. C. 1923), also on the same facts and
denied the employee any recovery. Note the more enlightened view of a somewhat
similar situation in Caivano v. Brill, 171 Misc. 298, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 495 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1939).
49. 84 F. 2d 773 (C. C. A. 9th 1930). See also' Brown v. Bendix Aviation Corp.,
76 N. Y. S. 2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
50. See Yardley v. Iowa Electric Co., 195 Iowa 380, 191 N. W. 791 (1923), for
an indication that any reassuring action on the part of the employer may suggest an
estoppel against him.
51. Causey v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 166 N. C. 5, 81 S.E. 917 (1914) ; Freeman
v. Morrow, 156 S.W. 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
52. E. g., Redmond v. Strange, 203 S.C. 35, 26 S.E. 2d 16 (1943) ; Barr v.
Clinton Bridge Works, 179 Ia. 702, 161 N. W. 695 (1917); Perryman v. Bear Mfg.
Co., 29 F. 2d 835 (C. C. A. 7th 1929) ; White v. Goodford Motor Co., 296 Ky. 508,
177 S.W. 2d 892 (1944); Alder v. Consumers Co., 152 F. 2d 696 (C. C. A. 7th
1945); Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. 150, 114 N. W. 733 (1908).
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paucity of such cases. Delayed by suspicion of lawyers, when he finally
inquires as to his rights, he is probably advised that he has precluded
himself from asserting his claim by his normal conduct in cashing the check
for what wages the employer is willing to pay.
Note also the frequency with which the fact that the plaintiff employee
failed to protest his wage check appears. 53 As a result the vast majority of
decisions denying employer's defense of accord and satisfaction are based
on Foakes v. Beer. Those decisions in which the defense of accord and
satisfaction is held valid, although no dispute ostensibly existed at the time
payment was made because the employee dared not protest, must proceed
on the presumption that an unliquidated sum supplies the necessary dispute
or more likely that failure of the employee to protest estops him from asserting a claim for additional wages. 54 Shade v. Sisson Mill & Lumber
Co.55 did not involve a check but articulated the estoppel theory. Knight
v. Missouri Pacific R. R. 5 ' was a particularly questionable case in which
an employee brought suit for recovery of monthly shortages in overtime.
Court noted that suit was begun almost two years after the last such shortage, and dismissed the claim on grounds that plaintiff's having cashed
checks for those months stating "For services rendered during month of
," constituted an accord and satisfaction. Understandably,
plaintiff had apparently delayed instituting suit until his discharge. Two
legal principles available for deciding otherwise were the fact that the
employer paid only the amount admittedly due, which, according to Foakes
v. Beer, would not be consideration for the alleged accord, and the notation
on the checks could certainly be construed as insufficient to convey the
debtor's intent that they were to be accepted in full settlement.
The cases of Glenz v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. 57 and Beerend v.
Benwood-Linze Co..5s illustrate a much more realistic approach. In the
former the court held that an illiterate employee could not be regarded as
assenting by his endorsement of his paychecks; while in the latter, plaintiff's
acceptance of semi-monthly salary checks containing an endorsement that
each was a settlement for the period covered did not constitute an accord
and satisfaction because they were for the amount stipulated in the employment contract and could not act as consideration for release of any disputed
claims.
A further aspect of this situation is that denial of the defense does no
more than permit plaintiff to proceed with the difficult burden of proving
his claim. Such are the obstacles that his recovery is not predictable. Moreover this type of defendant has only a pseudo reliance interest perhaps not
worthy of protection under doubtful circumstances.
53. In all these cases the doctrine of estoppel seems to be invoked to uphold the
employer's defense. Jennings v. Prudential Ins. Co., 18 Misc. 470, 42 N. Y. Supp. 50
(Sup. Ct. 1896) (Waiver by employee of employer's breach of contract in deducting
from each salary check the amount of arrearages in sub-agent's collections); Yanoscheck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 176 Wash. 137, 28 P. 2d 270 (1934) ; Guess v.
Montague, 140 F. 2d 500 (C. C. A. 4th 1943) (case arose under the minimum wage
law). But cf. Weinberg v. Belond, 81 Calif. App. 2d 201, 183 P. 2d 694 (1947).
54. Herman v. Golden Arrow Dairy, 191 Wash. 582, 71 P. 2d 581 (1937);
Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wash. 2d 449, 103 P. 2d 1095 (1940).
55. 115 Calif. 357, 47 Pac. 135 (1896).
56. 169 Ark. 397, 275 S. W. 704 (1925).
57. 125 Wash. 650, 216 Pac. 842 (1923); accord: Alder v. Consumer's Co., 152
F. 2d 696 (C. C. A. 7th 1945); cf. Lucacher v. Kerson, 355 Pa. 79, 48 A. 2d 857
(1946).
58. 192 S. W. 2d 660 (Mo. App. 1946); accord: Burns v. Northern Pacific Ry.,
134 F. 2d 766 (C. C. A. 8th 1943).
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Many of the cases in recent years involving workingmen's claims disclose the moral and financial backing of unions " whose support should
continue to increase litigation of this issue, provided the courts continue
their liberal interpretation of the rules, a trend seemingly well established
in this field.
While the rule of Foakes v. Beer has proven a protection for impotent
employees, a realistic solution would dispense with the drawing of arbitrary
distinctions between types of obligations, and enforce only those settlements
agreed upon without prejudice. The growing strength of labor unions
tends to increase the employee's bargaining power to make the latter
possible.
INJURED TORT CLAIMANTS

It is impossible to draw any generalization from this group as a whole
since the circumstances of the parties vary widely. There are indications
however that where the tortfeasor is economically powerful, the court will
carefully scrutinize his defense of accord and satisfaction interposed to the
suit of an individual of limited means. In Carlton v. Western and Atlantic
R. R.,0 the injured plaintiff was a former employee who accepted a check
and gave a receipt for the equivalent of month's wages already due him.
On the basis of Foakes v. Beer the court regarded the receipt as ineffective
to bar his suit. Comparatively few such cases exist because of the practice
of obtaining releases from such claimants. 61 In fact the cases concerning
these releases are the most persuasive exponents of the principle of duress
through economic pressure.
CONCLUSION

An encouraging scattering of decisions circumventing this defense by
various legal rationales indicates that the courts are moved by exploitation
of economic necessity at least in its most obvious instances. However, the
overreaching debtor is yet an all too uncomfortable reality. This would
seem properly remedied by a frank acknowledgment of the nullifying effect
of economic coercion, which would in turn supply impetus to the halting
recognition that disparity in knowledge, experience, economic and social
position result in excessively oppressive contracts. The difficulty lies in
so limiting the principle of economic duress as not to interfere unduly with
the idea that individuals should be left to fix the terms of their own contracts.
A discerning solution has been advanced in the proposed draft of the
Commercial Code, published April 15, 1948, by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the American Law Institute,
§ 902 (3) of which reads, "Where an instrument by its terms provides that
it is taken in full satisfaction of an obligation the payee by obtaining payment of the instrument or by negotiating it discharges the obligation unless
he establishes that unconscionable advantagehas been taken by the obligor."
By providing a practicable method for frustrating unscrupulous debtors, this rule would eliminate the unrealistic manipulation of Foakes v.
59. Shelley v. Portland Tug & Barge Co., 158 Ore. 377, 76 P. 2d 477 (1938) ;
Taylor v. Mathues, 112 Pa. Super. 169, 170 Atl. 309 (1934) ; Pederson v. Portland,
144 Ore. 437, 24 P. 2d 1031 (1933).
60. 81 Ga. 531, 7 S. E. 623 (1888). Contra: Texas & P. Ry. v. Poe, 131 Tex.
337, 115 S. W. 2d 591 (1938); cf. Westbrook v. Texas and P. Ry., 203 S. W. 2d
279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
61. And often the plight of the injured plaintiff is ignored. Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. Morgan, 210 S. W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
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Beer without lessening the usefulness of existing concepts, nor perceptibly
discouraging healthy private agreement. The choice of "unconscionable
advantage" rather than a phrase incorporating "duress" was fortunate in
that the latter has predefined judicial limitations which might deter its
extension to a novel situation. This new phraseology may even thwart
the wily debtor who obtains an unwitting discharge of his undisputed obligation. Certainly such a rule would loom insurmountable before an unscrupulous insurance company, employer or tortfeasor.
A reasonable interpretation of "unconscionable advantage" should involve consideration of all the elements in the transaction, comparing the
pressure applied with the standards generally prevailing in the community,
and taking into account the reasonableness of the compromise amount, the
time of payment, and the adequacy of the creditor's available legal remedy.
This would supply the necessary encouragement of adequate partial settlement where proverbial delays and uncertainties of legal procedure would
be disastrous for the distressed obligee, yet prevent outright exploitation of
his plight.
An equitable approach is, of course, always subject to the criticism of
uncertainty though it is more satisfactory than the use of fictions. Until
such time as sufficient decisions had pricked out the factual line beyond
which the wielding of economic advantage becomes "unconscionable", this
solution would probably increase litigation of the problem (though not to
any greater extent than corresponding application of legal rationales). At
the same time, past performance indicates that the facts of a particular case
would need considerable sympathetic appeal to lure the courts away from
their traditional faith in the legitimacy and advantageousness of private
settlement of controversy. Nevertheless, the realization that no forfeiture
is, in any event, imposed upon the debtor who has unjustifiably relied on
the integrity of his bargain may presage open acceptance of this principle
in the future.
W.A.B.

The State Public School Building Authority ActA Doubtful Solution For Pennsylvania Schools
Within recent years public and legislative attention has been increasingly directed to the financial plight of our public schools. During the
second session of the 80th Congress, an aid-to-education bill was passed by
the Senate which would have given public schools $300,000,000 a year in
federal appropriations. Yet this bill died in the House of Representatives
when the Education and Labor Committee failed to report on it prior to
adjournment. Even if this or a similar measure is subsequently enacted,
however, its passage will have relatively little effect on Pennsylvania since
educational grants by the federal government have consistently and correctly favored states, such as those in the South, where educational facilities
are at considerably lower levels.- In Pennsylvania the problem of financing education has been and will continue to be a matter for determination
1. "It is the purpose of the bill to provide through Federal funds assistance to
those school systems which, by virtue of inadequate State and local sources of revenue,
are in greatest need of such assistance. The allotments to States are variable, from
$5 per child in the ablest States, to $25 or more per child in poorer States." Report
of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Senate Bill No. 472. at 9.
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by the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, the school districts.2
The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of a recent Pennsylvania
enactment which was designed to promote the construction and operation
of educational facilities.3
During World War II, construction of Pennsylvania schools was, of
course, sharply curtailed. Post-war construction has not yet recovered
from shortages of labor and materials, and continues to suffer from rising
prices. 4 Great difficulties have been encountered in replacing school plants
that have been destroyed or seriously damaged by fire.5 Many of the
school buildings now being used are outmoded; and latest available statistics reveal that nearly one-half of Pennsylvania public schools are of the
one-classroom type.0 The need for funds cannot be denied, yet constitutional debt limitations impede the financing efforts of both the Commonwealth'7 and school districts.8 To circumvent these debt limitations, in
1947 the Pennsylvania Legislature created the State Public School Building Authority. Thereby it was intended that because an authority is not a
political subdivision and because the authority's bonds were to be paid
solely out of its own assets without pledging the credit of either state or
school district, no obligation which could be defined as debt within the constitutional sense would be created against either state or school district.
Such intention followed the general scheme of the authority method of financing; but it remains to be seen whether the Authority so created can
be reconciled with the Pennsylvania Constitution and case law.
THE PROBLEMS

Stated in its simplest terms, the State Public School Building Authority is merely an outgrowth of what has long been referred to in Pennsylvania as the Troy Plan. By means of the Troy Plan "a school district
that has borrowed up to the limit of its indebtedness (either the two or
seven percent), and still requires further finances for new buildings, obtains
2. "During the years 1941-1943, the Federal Government contributed about 5%
of total school expenditures in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth's General Fund contributed approximately 25%, and the balance of 70% was made available by local
school districts," The Distribution of State School Subsidies, Report I of the School

Commission to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 5 PA.
LEGIS. J. 4965, 4966 (1945).

3. STATE PUBLIC SCHOOL BUILDING AUTHORITY AT, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24,

§ 791.1 (Purdon Supp. 1947).
4.

BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION FOR THE

31, 1946, at 79: "The School plant which was available
after World War I at $6,000 to $7,500 per classroom has mounted to as high as
$20,000 per room."
5. Id. at 77.
6. STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION FOR THE
TWO-YEAR PERIOD ENDING MAY

SCHOOL YEAR ENDING JULY 1, 1945,
7. PA. CONSTIT. ART. IX, § 4:

submitted February 1947, at 66.

"No debt shall be created by or on behalf of the
State, except to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, repel invasion, suppress insur-

rection, defend the State in war, or to pay existing debt; and the debt created to
supply deficiencies in revenue shall never exceed, in the aggregate at any one time,
one million dollars . . ."
8. PA. CONSTiT. ART. IX, § 8: "The debt of any county, city, borough, township,
school district, or other municipality or incorporated district, except . . ., shall never
exceed seven (7) per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein,

. . . nor shall any such municipality or district incur any new debt, or increase its
indebtedness to an amount exceeding two (2) per centum upon such assessed valuation
of property, without the consent of the electors thereof at a public election in such manner as shall be provided by law." PA. CONSTIT. ART. IX, § 10: "Any county, township,
school district or other municipality incurring any indebtedness shall, at or before the
time of so doing, provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the
interest and also the principal thereof within thirty years."
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the organization of a non-profit corporation by the citizens of the district.
This corporation, by bond issue, raises the money required for the erection
of the buildings and leases this building to the school district for a term
of years. After the bond issue is paid by the non-profit corporation, the
practice has been for the corporation to transfer the school building and
land to the school district." 9 The Act merely substitutes an authority
for a private corporation and provides that the school district may lease
as lessee from the Authority for a term not exceeding 30 years.10 There
is no mention in the Act of future conveyance of the school building by the
Authority to the school district; and undoubtedly the annual rental payments by the particular school district to the Authority will be fixed at a
rate so that separate payments can be made out of current revenue derived
from the school district's taxable resources." The fundamental problem
is formulated as a question whether the annual rental payments are to
be regarded as separate transactions involving no increase in the school
district's indebtedness or whether the rentals which the school district
originally covenants to pay must be totalled and the leases held unconstitutional if the aggregate amount of rentals payable exceeds the constitutional
debt limit of the school district.
The corollary problem is focused more directly on the Authority and
less on the school district. Are the bonds of the Authority the debt of
the school district? If so, the circumvention of constitutional debt limitations would again be defeated; and therefore the Act has attempted expressly to negative this possibility. 2 Even admitting that the obligation on
the bonds has been sucessfully shifted, however, it still becomes necessary
to inquire into how the bonds are to be paid. The Authority's sole source
of revenue under the Act arises from the rental of school buildings. Pennsylvania courts, following other jurisdictions,' 3 have consistently supported
the validity of "self-liquidating" authorities; 14 but are rentals payable by a
political subdivision from its tax revenues sufficient to constitute a school
building as self-liquidating? The answer to this question, as well as the
answer to the more fundamental problem of whether a school district by
the payment of rentals is incurring indebtedness in the constitutional sense,
necessitate a scrutiny of cases and statutory changes which lead up to the
present enactment.
PRE-AUTHORITY

CASES

Almost seventy years ago the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began
to grapple with the meaning of debt under Article IX, Section 8 of the
9. See Opinion of Att'y Gen. on Lease of School Buildings, 39 D. & C. 643, 644
(1940).
10. PA. STAT. ANN., fit. 24, § 791.5 (Purdon Supp. 1947).

11. New tax powers were granted to school districts of second, third and fourth

classes in 1947, Act of June 25, 1947, Act No. 481, PA. STAT. ANN., fit. 53, H 2015.1-

2015.8 (Purdon Supp. 1947). See Evleth, A New Local Tax Policy in. Pennsylvania,
52 DIcKINsoN L. REV. 218 (1948) ; and for a general discussion of the effect of these
new powers see also Crawford, Where Your Money Goes, Phila. Inquirer, July 20,
1948, p. 17, cols. 7 & 8. In addition see 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 567 (1948).
12. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 791.4 (Purdon Supp. 1947) : "Purposes and General

Powers . . . Provided, however, that the Authority shall have no power, at any time
or in any manner, to pledge the credit or taxing power of the Commonwealth or any
of its school districts, nor shall any of its obligations or debts be deemed to be obligations of the Commonwealth or any of its school districts be liable for the payment of
principal or interest on such obligations; . . ."
13. E. g., California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal. 298, 298 Pac.
485 (1931).
14. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 At. 289 (1934).
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Constitution.15 In Appeal of the City of Erie 16 a taxpayer brought a bill
in equity to restrain city officials from paying over money in pursuance of
a contract for the erection of a market-house. Although it was admitted
that the city's debt was in excess of the 7% constitutional limit, a contract
had been made whereby private parties were to build a market-house and
lease it to the city for a 25-year term. In considering the question of
whether the contract set forth in the bill created a debt within the meaning
of the Constitution, and while affirming the decree granting an injunction,
the court found that: "Here is an agreement to pay, and that agreement to
pay must be provided for by a taxation over and above what is now necessary for the current expenses of the municipality. But this is just what the
constitution was intended to prevent; to prevent the citizen from being
overburdened with municipal taxation." 17 Yet the court emphasized that
if defendant had answered that its annual revenue was sufficient after interest payments on its indebtedness and ordinary expenses of city government,
to meet in one payment the total cost of the proposed rentals, an opposite
result would have been reached. Here the court simply followed the general rule laid down in other jurisdictions with regard to ordinary expenses.' 8
Pennsylvania courts continued to search for a yardstick to determine
what constituted an ordinary expense. Although Appeal of the City of
Erie 19 clearly held that rental of a market-house constituted indebtedness to
the amount of the aggregate installments, sixteen years later the same
court held that a borough's contract with a power company for electric
street lighting was not debt to the amount of the aggregate installments
but was an ordinary expense, payable each month from current revenue. 20
The distinction was not clearly drawn, 21 but began to crystallize when two
cases were decided in the following year. In the first,2 2 a contract for
repairing a portion of the city streets was held to be an ordinary expense
and not an incurring of indebtedness within the meaning of constitutional
limitations. In the second, 23 a municipality which had already reached
its constitutional debt limit contracted to purchase a waterworks by means
of twenty annual installments payable out of "current revenues and not
otherwise." Such contract was held to constitute the incurring of indebtedness in the aggregate amount of the twenty installments and was therefore
a violation of constitutional limitations. In a per curiam opinion the decree
of the lower court whereby purchase of the waterworks was held to be an
extraordinary expense was affirmed. Careful distinction was drawn between a contract for the supply of water and a contract for the means of
furnishing the supply, i. e., an installment purchase or indirect acquisition
15. Note 8 supra.
16. 91 Pa. 398 (1879).
17. Id. at 402.

18. Grant v. The City of Davenport, 36 Iowa 396 (1873) :"Where a contract made
by a municipal corporation pertains to its ordinary expenses, and is, together with

other like expenses, within the limit of its current revenues and such special taxes as
it may legally and in good faith intend to levy therefor, such contract does not constitute the 'incurring of indebtedness' within the meaning of the constitutional provision
limiting the power of municipal corporations to contract debts."
19. Note 16 supra.
20. Wade v. Oakmont Borough, 165 Pa. 479, 30 Atl. 959 (1895) ; accord, Scranton
Electric Co. v. Old Forge Borough, 309 Pa. 73, 163 Atl. 154 (1932).
21. The court said: "This was a current expense, the same as if it [the borough]
had rented a counsel chamber for a fixed term of years, at a monthly rental." Id. at
488. But the court failed to elaborate on the difference between a council chamber
and the market-house [extraordinary expense], the subject of litigation in Appeal of
the City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398 (1879).
22. Reuting v. Titusville, 175 Pa. 512, 34 Atl. 916 (1896).
23. Brown v. City of Corry, 175 Pa. 528, 34 Atl. 854 (1896).
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of a capital asset. "The one may pertain to an ordinary expense, and the
other, if it involves municipal purchase and ownership of the means of
furnishing the supply, can only pertain to an extraordinary expense." 24
On the other hand, no debt in the constitutional sense was created when
the same city purchased a sewer since the purchase price was immediately
payable by an appropriation of money, part of which was in a special
treasury 25
fund and the remainder of which was assessed on property
benefited.
In general, it may be concluded that during this "pre-authority" period
Pennsylvania adopted a strict construction of constitutional debt limitations. There was a particular awareness, derived from the lessons of the
Commonwealth's history, of the constitutional intention "to curb the extravagance of municipal expenditure on credit, to prevent municipalities
from loading the future with obligations to pay for things the present
desires but cannot justly afford, and in short to establish the principle that
beyond the defined limits they must pay as they go." 2 6 The so-called
Special Fund Doctrine, or Self-liquidating Doctrine, holding that obligations payable solely from a special fund derived from the revenues of the
enterprise for which such obligations are issued do not create a constitutional debt, was accepted by most jurisdictions apparently without reservation.27 Pennsylvania, however, proceeded more cautiously. Following
Brown v. Corry 28 and furnishing impetus to legislative action which
eventually resulted in the State Public School Building Authority, McKinnon v. Mert, 2 9 disapproved, at least, in part, the Special Fund Doctrine.
There, although by supplemental agreement to the contract the manner of
payment was limited to funds available from current revenues, it was held,
per curiam, that a school board could be enjoined from carrying out a contract with a private contractor for the erection of a school building when
the aggregate price would create an indebtedness exceeding the constitutional limit. The construction of this school building was labelled as an
extraordinary expense.30 Later, the reluctance of Pennsylvania courts to
accord blanket approval to the Special Fund Doctrine for the purpose of
evading constitutional debt limitation was further illustrated by their granting another injunction against the purchase of a waterworks. 3'
Political subdivisions in Pennsylvania, chafing under the strictures
of these precedents, attempted other ways of evading constitutional debt
limitations. The court struck down one such method when they ruled
that bonds issued by a bridge company in which a city owned all the stock
and had complete control were properly counted as a part of the city's
debt.32 Although recognizing that there was no direct liability for the debt
on the part of city, still the court refused to permit a corporate veil to cloak
24. Brown v. City of Corry, 175 Pa. 528, 532, 34 Atl. 854, 855 (1896).
25. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41, 48, 46 Atl. 1035,

1036 (1900).

26. Keller v. Scranton, 200 Pa. 130, 135, 49 Atl. 781, 782 (1901).
27. E. g., Shields v. City of Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913 (1923), construction of a lighting plant; City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839, 295 S. W.
1004 (1927), enlarging waterworks; Barbour v. State Board of Ed., 92 Mont. 321,
13 P. 2d 225 (1932); and McLain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1929),
construction of college dormitories.
28. Note 23 supra.
29. 225 Pa. 85, 73 Atl. 1011 (1909).
30. 225 Pa. 85, 88, 73 Atl. 1011, 1012 (1909).
31. Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912).
32. Schuldice v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28, 95 Atl. 938 (1915).
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the bridge company with what was termed "in effect the indebtedness of
the city." 33
With this conservative background and with the construction of a
school building already established as an extraordinary expense, 34 it was
therefore surprising that a lower court [Tioga County] subsequently approved a school building scheme which clearly seemed to violate the spirit,
if not the letter, of constitutional debt limitations.3 5 No mention was made
of how the private corporation, intended as lessor, was to raise $80,000,
estimated as the cost of construction; so the problem of maintaining the
separate entity concept in regard to obligations on a bond issue was necessarily not discussed. However, the court was called upon to face squarely
the question of whether the rental payments by the school district would
constitute a debt in their aggregate amount at the time the contract was
made. By deciding that the contract created no indebtedness in the constitutional sense since the annual rentals could be met from current rever.
nues, the court was in effect saying that rent for the use of a school building
was an ordinary expense; and that such rents were readily distinguishable
from progressive payments for the construction of a school building 36 or
an installment purchase of waterworks.3 7 This conclusion was grounded
heavily on the fact that there was no provision in the contract that the
school district would purchase the property from the corporation nor was
there any obligation on the corporation to sell to the school district. Such
dialectics may have produced a commendable result, but it is submitted
that there has been a patent disregard of reality. What will the corporation
do with the school building at the termination of the long-term lease?
Obviously, it will go to the school district for a nominal consideration, and
it is difficult to see why the mere exclusion of this provision from the terms
of the contract should work a revolutionary change in Pennsylvania law.
The situation became further complicated when such a plan was sunerimposed on authority financing.
AUTHORITY CASES
"The new 'authority' is a legalistic device to enable a community, in
debt up to its ears and unable to borrow in its own name, to get money
from Uncle Sam." 38 This statement is particularly true as applied to the
inception of intrastate authorities in Pennsylvania. Federal pump-priming
efforts in the early 1930's dictated the need for hybrid organizations, clothed
with some of the attributes of business corporations and some of the attributes of a municipal government, which could take advantage of proffered
33. Schuldice v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28, 32, 95 Atl. 938, 940 (1915).

34. Note 30 mtpra.
35. Mansfield Borough School District v. Mansfield High School Association,
9 D. & C. 113 (1926). Under this contract, similar to the Troy Plan (note 9 mrupra),
a private corporation was to construct the school and lease it to the school district for
a term of forty years at a rental for which the annual payments would not exceed
current revenues. The court denied the legality of the contract only because land
worth $1200 on which the building was to be constructed was to be conveyed by the
school district to the corporation for the nominal consideration of $1; and the court
ruled that conveyance at such a price was against public interest and an abuse of
discretionary power by the school board. Such reasoning at least seems consistent
with the fiction that this contemplated transaction was to be at arm's length. Accord
Opinion of Att'y Gen. on Lease of School Buildings, 39 D. & C. 643 (1940).
36. McKinnon v. Mertz, 225 Pa. 85, 73 Atl. 1011 (1909).
37. Brown v. City of Corry, 175 Pa. 528, 34 Atl. 854 (1896).
38. Davis, Borrowing Machines, 24 NAT. MuN. REV. 328 (1935).
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federal funds to facilitate public improvements, 9 secure a higher degree
of efficiency in administration which is available for a special project only
when it is placed in the hands of selected management, and at the same
time consolidate previously developed methods for evading constitutional
debt limitations. An authority has been generally defined as a special public
corporation whose obligations are payable solely from its revenues or property, or both, without recourse to taxes and special assessments. 40 Thus
the essence of an authority is that the undertaking for which it is formulated
be self-supporting. However, major difficulties arise when an attempt is
made to determine whether any single undertaking may be properly
categorized as self-supporting or self-liquidating.
In 1933 the Pennsylvania legislature paved the way for the Allegheny
County Authority 41 which was empowered to borrow from the U. S.
Government through the issue of bonds for the construction of highway
improvements. To avoid creating a debt of Allegheny County, the enabling
act had expressly denied the power to pledge the credit of the county and
notified bondholders that their security was restricted to a pledge of the
revenues from the proposed project.42 When the validity of the Authority
was litigated in the Tranter case, 43 the court supported defendant's contention that no county debt was created. Former decisions 44 were distinguished, on the basis that in them municipal property was itself liable to
execution on the bonds while here, in case of default, the bondholders were
limited to the appointment of a trustee to collect the income from the
property. In addition, once they decided there was no county debt, the
court apparently saw no need to enter into discussion as to whether or not
these projects constituted an ordinary expense even though defendants'
answer averred that after the debt was amortized by revenue receipts, the
improved property would revert without cost to Allegheny County. 45
Most important feature of the Tranter case from the standpoint of the
State Public School Building Authority was the nature of the contemplated
project. The construction of the highways, tunnels, and bridges in issue
was to be self-liquidating in the purest sense.46 There was no call upon the
public treasuries, no burden on the taxing power of the county, and revenue was to be derived solely from the tolls and charges which the Authority
was under a duty to provide.47 While it may be validly argued that even
these pure self-liquidators act as a drain on the municipality in that tolls are
39. The first great intrastate authority in Pennsylvania, the Allegheny County
Authority, received an allotment of $30,000,000 from PWA. See Tranter v. Allegheny

County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934).

40. Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and PracticalAspects, 47 YAis
L. J.14 (1937).
41. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 16, §§ 4160-1 (Purdon Supp. 1947).
42. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 16, §§ 4160-501 (Purdon Supp. 1947).
43. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934).
44. E. g., Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912) ; Schuldice
v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28, 95 Atl. 938 (1915). See notes 31 and 32 supra.
45. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 74, 173 At. 289, 293
(1934). Thus the court could not come to the unrealistic conclusion reached in the
Mansfield case that no property was to be acquired by the political subdivision
[". . . under the contract in this case, even after the termination of the period mentioned in the lease, the building would still belong to the corporation which constructed
it," Mansfield Borough School District v. Mansfield High School Association, 9 D. &
C. 113, 120 (1926).]
46. Apart from the cost of construction, however, it is notable that the contract
did obligate Allegheny County to pay maintenance costs; and this part of the agreement was sustained when such costs were shown to be well within the county's annual
current revenues.
47. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 85, 173 Atl. 289, 297
(1934).
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consuming latent taxable resources, 48 authorities of this type are by now
too firmly established to be subjected to other than academic discussion.
Moreover, the appearance in Pennsylvania of what may be termed an
adulterated self-liquidator, the General State Authority, 49 aroused considerably more controversy.
The General State Authority was far more comprehensive in its purposes and powers than is the State Public School Building Authority. The
former was created for the purpose of constructing and maintaining sewers,
state public buildings, a residence for the Governor, military installations,
airports, highway improvements, and many miscellaneous state institutions
in addition to public schools; -o while the latter is aimed solely at construction and maintenance of public school buildings. 51 The General State
Authority, after construction, was empowered to lease to the Commonwealth, or its political subdivisions, agencies, departments, public bodies, or
land grant colleges; 52 the leases of State Public Building Authority are
limited to school districts. 53 Except for the difference in scope and except
for variations in their membership, however, the two Authorities were almost identical. Both were given the same powers in regard to bond issues,
the same remedies were available to the bondholders of both, and neither
Authority was empowered to pledge the credit of the Commonwealth or
its political subdivisions. If the Kelley v. Earle cases, 54 which tested the
General State Authority, had been confined on their facts to contracts involving leases of schools to school districts they would now rule the determination of the validity of contracts under the present enactment; but these
cases can and should be distinguished.
The particular project in issue in both Kelley v. Earle cases concerned
construction of a waterworks for a state hospital by the Authority and subsequent lease from the Authority to the Commonwealth at an annual rental
which was calculated to pay the operating expenses of the Authority, interest on the bonds and to amortize the principal of the bonds. Under the
first Kelley v. Earle contract 5 5 title to the leased waterworks was to pass to
the Commonwealth at the end of the rental term. The majority of the court
held that such a provision created an agreement of sale, indebtedness to
the state in the aggregate amount of the rentals, and consequent invalidity
7
5
under Art. IX, sec. 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. " On reargument 5
when the provision for passing of title was excised from the contract, the
court looked no further than the lease and held that since annual rentals
could be satisfied from current revenue no debt in the constitutional sense
was created. The decision has been effectively criticized; 58 and a sub48. Davis, Borrowing Machines, 24 NAT. Mux. Rxv. 328, 332 (1935).
49. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1707-1 et seq. (Purdon 1942).
50. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1707-4 (Purdon 1942).
51. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 791.4 (Purdon Supp. 1947).
52. Note 49 supra.
53. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 791.5 (Purdon Supp. 1947).
54. Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 Atl. 501 (1936) ; Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa.
337, 190 Ati. 140 (1937).
55. 320 Pa. 449, 182 Atl. 501 (1936).
56. Note 8 supra.
57. 325 Pa. 337, 190 Atl. 140 (1937).
58. Note, 85 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 518 (1937). It is worth noting, however, that
the validity of at least one of the author's criticisms was destroyed by a subsequent
amendment to the General State Authority Act. At 520 of this article there is
comment to the effect that since the Authority was to have existence as a corporation
for only thirty-two years and since at the end of that time title would pass to the

Commonwealth by escheat, the court's finding of a true lease was additionally inconsistent with reality. In 1937 the Act was amended so that the Authority was to have
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sequent enactment confirmed what everybody knew when the Authority
was created, i.e. that title to the improvements would pass to the state when
the bonds were paid, 59 in spite of the court's many protests that the lease
had none of the attributes of a purchase. 60
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is to support the State Public
Building Authority on the reasoning of the Kelley v. Earle cases, they will
be faced with the problem of reconciling the distinction that can be drawn
between the contracting parties. In the Kelley v. Earle cases the proposed
lease ran from Authority to State, while under the present enactment the
leases will run only from Authority to school districts. At the time the
Kelley v. Earle situation developed, this distinction was unimportant; and
since the constitutional provision regarding indebtedness of the Commonwealth, Art. IX, sec. 4, was parallel in purpose to the provision limiting
indebtedness of municipalities, Art. IX, sec. 8, the two sections were construed together.6 ' In 1941, however, the Municipal Borrowing Law was
enacted.6 2 Although this law does not apply to the Commonwealth, school
districts fall directly within its provisions. The definition of debt therein
seems decisive in determining the validity of leases by the State Public
School Building Authority to school districts: "'Debt', all general obligations of the municipality in the present or future, except obligations payable
from current revenues, lease agreements not directly or indirectly involving
the acquisition of capital assets and contracts for service (italics supplied) ... ." 63 Despite the lack of any provision in the State Public Building Authority Act regarding disposition of school buildings when leases are
terminated but keeping in mind the disposition of property that was in fact
undertaken by the General State Authority, it is difficult to see how it may
be seriously contended that school districts are successfully evading such a
clear-cut prohibition.
A second distinction setting apart the Kelley v. Earle decisions from
contemplated leases under the State Public School Building Authority may
be drawn from the varying degrees to which the projects can be called selfliquidating. It has been said that in the reargument of Kelley v. Earle
"the court was ambiguous by failing to state in what respect the obligations
were self-liquidating ;" 64 but Mr. Chief Justice Kephart, speaking for the
court, announced: "A self-liquidating project may be defined as one wherein
the revenues received are sufficient to pay the bonded debt and interest
charges over a period of time. The source of the revenue is not important." 65 This would appear to be conclusive in favor of adapting the term
"self-liquidating" to school construction bonds amortized by annual rentals
which can be satisfied from a school district's current revenue; yet it is subperpetual existence as a corporation [PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1707-4a (Purdon
1942) ]; and the theory of perpetual existence has been followed in the State Public
School Building Authority Act [PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 791.4a (Purdon Supp.

1947)].
59. PA.

STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1707-1 note (Purdon Supp. 1947).
60. "We now have a very different situation [contrasted with the contemplated
purchase in the first Kelley v. Earle case] . . . no title under the leases or agreements passes to the Commonwealth; it remains with the Authority . . . if this were
an outright purchase of property to be paid for in the future it would undoubtedly be
within the constitutional objection, but it is not a purchase nor does it have the
attributes of a purchase," Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 348, 349, 351, 190 AtI. 140,
145, 146 (1937).
61. Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 457, 182 Atl. 501, 504 (1936).
62. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 2011.101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1947).
63. Id. at § 2011.102 (f).
64. Note, 85 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 518, at 521 (1937).
65. 325 Pa. 337, 345, 190 Atl. 140, 144 (1937).
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mitted that this definition was too broad. The source of the revenue does
seem important. If it stems solely from the taxing power of the school district, the added burden placed on taxpayers may have a chaotic effect on the
financial well-being of that district. If, on the other hand, revenue is
derived either wholly or in a major part from sources inherent in the project itself, the taxpayer will be spared and there is some economic justification for applying the term "self-liquidating." It must be remembered that
Kephart was discussing a waterworks for a state hospital, and he weakened
his own definition of a self-liquidating project when he admitted: "In very
many instances the State receives compensation on a per diem basis direct
from the patients or their relatives or the estates of both." 66 This statement injects an element not present in school building transactions since
the immediate users, the school children, pay no admission fees. Likewise,
rental of school buildings can thus be differentiated from rental of sewer
systems 67 and gas works.68 So in Kelley v. Earle Pennsylvania has approved an adulterated self-liquidator; but should this lead to approval of
projects which are liquidated solely by tax funds?
EVALUATION

Legislative vagaries have added more than a little to the confusion surrounding state authorities in Pennsylvania. The General State Authority
could have accomplished precisely what the State Public School Building
Authority intends to do; yet the former was repealed as of January, 1946 69
amid strong legislative debate, ° and the latter was created the following
year with at least a touch of political asperity. 71 Municipal authorities
have experienced fewer difficulties and have multiplied rapidly. By 1945
there were fifty municipal Authorities in operation in Pennsylvania, which
administered the following fifty-two projects: forty water systems, nine
sewer projects, a combined theater and municipal building, and a factory
building.72 In brief, the authority method of financing has heretofore been
restricted to undertakings which can be readily operated on a service charge
basis or to those undertakings which are self-liquidating in the sense that
at least a large percentage of the revenue is supplied by the immediate users.
At no time has the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania approved an authority
which simply entangles the taxpaying public in a new series of concealed
obligations as is contemplated under the State Public School Building
Authority.
66. Ibid.

67. Williams v. Samuel, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A. 2d 834 (1938); Gemmill v. Calder,
332 Pa. 281, 3 A. 2d 7 (1938) ; Hamilton's Appeal, 340 Pa. 17, 16 A. 2d 32 (1940).
68. Graham v. Philadelphia, 334 Pa. 513, 6 A. 2d 78 (1939).
69. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1707-1 note (Purdon Supp. 1947).
70. Sen. Ealy (speaking for repeal) : "It was this kind of financing, without any
kind of check on it, that destroyed the French during the French Revolution and
brought about the chaos and misery of that revolution and the orgy of it; it was this
kind of financing that destroyed the German Republic after the First World War . . ."
3 PA. LEGIS. J. 2724 (1945). Sen. Dent (speaking against repeal) : ". . . the only
reason I can see for the passage of this particular bill is to give satisfaction to some
people who believe in a certain philosophy of government . . . that there should be
no agency created by a government that does not reflect the debt of the government
itself." 3 PA. LEGIs. J.2723 (1945).
71. Rep. Andrews: "[This bill] is a move in the right direction, and if you had
not scrapped the authority that you did have . . . you would not have to crawl in
behind the authority method of financing by the back door. I am very pleased to see
that at least there has been a confession of error and that the House in part endorses
the authority principle of financing building operations in this Commonwealth." 30
PA. LEGIS. J. 4419 (1947).

72. Leedecker, Device for Operating Utilities, 34 NAT. MuN. Rv. 283 (1945).
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At common law Pennsylvania displayed a praiseworthy reluctance to
stretch constitutional debt limitations which were designed to limit those
civic projects which must be met by future taxation. In the rush for authority financing, there was some relaxation of this strict construction. Now,
however, contemplated rentals of buildings by school districts must be
examined in the light of "debt" as defined by the Municipal Borrowing
Law; and the pressing need for school buildings should not be permitted to
hide the fact that the new Authority cannot properly be termed "selfliquidating." It is not within the province of this note to suggest alternative
solutions for Pennsylvania school districts. Perhaps the revaluation of
property assessments now being undertaken by the State Tax Equalization
Board will indicate that many districts can complete their own buildings
and still remain within the 2% or 7% debt limitation; perhaps it is time
for a general revision of Pennsylvania debt limitations; or perhaps a specific
constitutional amendment should be provided to raise the ceiling on present
limitations for school districts. In any event, a solution more legally palatable than the State Public School Building Authority should be developed.
Speaking of such pseudo-self-supporting undertakings, one critic has
thoughtfully remarked: "While some practical justification for these arrangements may be found in existing unreasonable restrictions on borrowing, the principle is unsound, the effect is obscurity rather than clarity in
public fiscal operations, and this policy if extended and elaborated, will
result in a veritable maze of financial hocus-pocus." '3
C. W. B. T., Jr.
73. Bird, The Problem of Revenue Bonds, 27 NAT. MuN. REv. 304, 308 (1938).

